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Foreword
Ilkka Kiema’s doctoral dissertation focuses on two important areas: the role of
imperfect intellectual property in economic growth and commercial piracy of
proprietary products. Kiema’s first essay applies a macroeconomic perspective
whereas the second and third essays discuss piracy in a microeconomic setting.
The first essay studies intellectual property (IP) policy with imperfect intellectual
property rights in an endogenous growth model. Kiema applies a “pool of
knowledge”-approach and his model includes a hazard rate of imitation and a
patentability requirement. This model, like in many growth models, has the feature
with multiple equilibria. Within the growth-theoretic framework Kiema characterizes
growth-maximizing patents and the role of patentability requirement. In the second
essay Kiema studies intellectual property policy and commercial piracy within the
framework of a model where the higher risk of a punishment associated with a pirate
copy is analogous to an advertising cost, the value of which is chosen by government.
A major finding is that an increase in the price of the legal software increases the
price dispersion in the market for illegal products and decreases their minimum price.
In the third essay Kiema extends the second essay by including network externalities
to provide a characterization of the optimal pricing policy of the copyright owners in
the presence of commercial piracy. This essay provides a new perspective on the
debate of commercial piracy under network externalities by showing how the profit-
maximizing intellectual property protection strength increases with the quality of
pirate copies.
This study is part of the research agenda carried out by the Research Unit of
Economic  Structure  and  Growth  (RUESG).  The  aim  of  RUESG  is  to  conduct
theoretical and empirical research with respect to important issues in industrial
economics, real option theory, game theory, organization theory, theory of financial
systems as well as problems in labour markets, natural resources, taxation and time
series econometrics.
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RUESG was  established  at  the  beginning  of  1995 and  has  been  one  of  the  National
Centres of Excellence in research selected by the Academy of Finland. It has been
financed jointly by the Academy of Finland, the University of Helsinki, the Yrjö
Jahnsson Foundation, Bank of Finland and the Nokia Group. This support is
gratefully acknowledged.
Helsinki, September 26, 2008
Erkki Koskela                                                     Rune Stenbacka
Academy Professor                                            Professor of Economics
University of Helsinki                                        Hanken School of Economics
Director                                                              Co-Director
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1. SOME BACKGROUND
  According to a standard definition, an information good is a commodity whose
main market value is derived from the information it contains (cf. Shapiro – Varian,
1999,  p.  3).   As  the  emergence  of  information  technology  has  lowered  the  costs  of
storing and copying information, information goods have become infinitely
expansible, and for all practical purposes non-rival. Non-rival goods have
traditionally been called public goods in microeconomics, and according to
microeconomic theory non-excludable public goods are associated with market
failures, because they are subject to increasing returns and increasing returns imply
imperfect competition (Jones, 1998, pp. 73-79).
In other words, the production of the first copy of an information good constitutes a
large fixed cost, but after its emergence new copies can be produced at a small
marginal cost, implying that the number of the produced copies grows faster than
proportionally to the amount of resources which have to be put into producing them.
This further implies that in a situation of perfect competition, in which the price of the
information good is equal with the marginal costs of its production, the profits from
producing it would have to be negative, so that there would be no incentives for
producing it.
This familiar argument provides a justification for intellectual property rights which
grant the producers of information goods a temporary monopoly during which they
can obtain profit from their work. However, it is clear that intellectual property rights
involve a Nordhaus trade-off between two negative effects: on the one hand, a
weakening of intellectual property rights causes under-provision of information
goods, whereas a strengthening of intellectual property rights increases the welfare
loss which is caused by monopoly distortions (cf. Nordhaus, 1969, p. 76).
2The emergence of modern information technology has had a two-fold effect on the
Nordhaus trade-off. The increased possibilities of producing copies of information
goods illegally – like e.g. the possibility downloading music files or software from
peer-to-peer networks – has a direct negative effect on the revenue from selling them
and,  accordingly,  on  the  incentives  to  produce  them.  On  the  other  hand,  the
development of information technology has also led to the emergence of new business
models – like e.g. the Open Source Software (OSS) business model – which allow
firms to earn profits from freely distributable information goods.1 It has also been
argued that if an information good is subject to strong network externalities – like e.g.
many software products are – and if the pirate copies are used only by consumers with
a low valuation, piracy might be harmless or even useful for the copyright owner.2
  Many information goods (like e.g. music files, or files containing movies) are
valuable in a direct sense as consumption goods, whereas others have value because
of their use in production (cf. Quah, 2003, p. 295). The information goods which are
used in production can further be divided into two groups on the basis of the role that
they have in the production function of an economy. In growth accounting, the output
of an economy is modeled as being given by a function of labor, capital, and general
productivity, and a distinction can be drawn between the information goods such as
software, which appear as capital in this production function, and innovations. Also
innovations can be viewed as information goods as soon as they have been given a
linguistic expression which can be digitalized, and they show up in a production
function only indirectly, through the increase in factor productivity that they cause.
In  such  traditional  macroeconomic  models  as  the  Solow  model  the  time
development of factor productivity is exogenously given, but the more recently
developed endogenous growth models have explained the growth of factor
productivity as resulting from investments into research and development. Such
investments are assumed to be motivated by the monopoly rent that results from them.
However, in most endogenous growth models it is assumed that an inventor of a
product of a new kind or an improved design for an existing one receives a permanent
monopoly for producing it, ignoring the fact that such monopolies are can be lost
because of expiry of patents or imitation.
1 Cf. Lerner – Tirole (2002), pp. 223-227 and de Laat (2005), pp. 1522-1529, and Mustonen (2003).
2 See Conner – Rumelt (1991), King – Lampe (2003), Slive – Bernhardt (1998), and Takeyama (1994).
Cf. the discussion in Section 1.3. below.
3This dissertation discusses two aspects of the economics of information goods and
intellectual  property  rights.  In  each  case,  the  aim  will  be  to  model  the  fact  that
intellectual property rights are imperfect. Chapter 2 is concerned with the
macroeconomic problem of including imperfect intellectual property rights into an
endogenous growth model. Chapters 3 and 4 discuss piracy in a microeconomic
setting. Until now, most of the economic literature on piracy has been concerned with
end-user piracy, i.e. illegal reproduction and distribution of information goods for
free. In Chapter 3 I shall put forward a model of commercial (for-profit) piracy, which
I shall in Chapter 4 generalize to the situation in which the considered information
good is subject to network externalities.
The next two sections contains short a survey of endogenous growth theory and of
the economic literature on piracy, and the subsequent sections outline the contents of
the rest of the chapters of this book.
1.2. ENDOGENOUS GROWTH THEORY
By  definition,  an  endogenous  growth  model  tries  to  explain  the  emergence  of  the
production technology which is in use in an economy, whereas an exogenous growth
model takes the production technology as given, without explaining it. E.g., the
familiar Cass-Koopmans-Ramsey model is in this sense exogenous. In it a
homogenous final good is produced in accordance with the production function3
? ?,Y F K AL?
in which K is the amount of capital, L is the amount of labor, and the parameter A
characterizes the general productivity of the economy. In this model the parameter A
grows at an exogenously given, constant rate.
Historically, the first endogenous growth models postulated that the increase in the
efficiency of production is determined by the accumulation of capital.4 The obvious
interpretation  for  a  model  of  this  type  is  that  it  represents  a  process  of learning-by-
doing, during which firms learn to utilize capital more efficiently as its amount
increases. In more recent endogenous growth models the economy is divided into a
3 Ramsey (1928), Cass (1965) and Koopmans (1965). Cf. Romer (2001), pp. 47-60.
4 This is the case in e.g. the Frankel-Romer model, which was put forward in Frankel (1962) and
Romer (1986). Cf. Aghion – Howitt (1998), pp. 25-29.
4production sector and a research sector, and it is assumed that the improvements in
technology depend on the amount of resources that the research sector is given. These
normally include at least research labor, and sometimes also research capital. In a
model of this type,  the funding of the research sector is  motivated by the monopoly
rents from the new or improved products that the researchers invent.
It seems that the first model with these basic ideas was was put forward in Romer
(1990; cf. also Romer, 1987). In this model a single final output is produced from an
increasing variety of intermediate products in accordance with the production function
(Romer, 1990, p. S83)
? ? ? ?1
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where L is a fixed stock of labor, YH  is the human capital devoted to production, and
? ?x i  is the produced amount of the intermediate durable good i. Also the stock of
human capital H is fixed in this model, but it is divided between two uses, production
and research. Only the intermediate inputs i which for which i A?  are available at
each  moment  of  time,  and A grows because of the human capital AH  employed in
research. The employment in the research sector is funded by the monopoly rents
which result from a permanent monopoly to each invented product, and the growth of
their variety – i.e., the growth of A – makes the aggregate output Y of the economy
grow.
Romer’s model can be called a model of growth through specialization, since  in  it
growth is based on the invention of new kinds of products. However, in actual
economies growth is not based just on such specialization, but also on the
replacement of old-fashioned products by new and better ones. As Figure 1.1
illustrates, the endogenous growth models can, broadly speaking, be divided into the
models of growth through specialization and the Schumpeterian models of growth
through creative destruction,5 depending on whether they focus on the former or the
latter aspect of economic growth.
5 The models of this kind are called “Schumpeterian”, because Joseph A. Schumpeter is famous for
having claimed that “Creative Destruction”, during which old consumers’ goods, methods of
production, and other features of the economy get replaced by new ones, is “the essential fact about
capitalism” (Schumpeter, 1994, p. 83).
5Figure 1.1. Endogenous Growth Models with Perfect and Imperfect Intellectual
Property Rights.
A particularly simple Schumpeterian growth model is the one studied in Aghion –
Howitt (1998, pp. 53-64; cf. also Aghion – Howitt, 1992). In this model a single final
good is produced from an intermediate good in accordance with the production
function
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6where x is the amount of the intermediate good and A characterizes  the  level  of  the
available technology. There is a fixed stock of labor, which can be used in either
production  or  research.  The  workers  of  the  production  sector  are  involved  in
producing the intermediate good, whereas the workers of the research sector produce
innovations. The arrival of innovations is a Poisson process, whose arrival rate is
proportional to the size of the research labor force, and each innovation increases the
parameter A by a constant factor. Again, the income of the workers of the research
sector results from a monopoly rent to the innovations that they produce, and this
monopoly always lasts until the emergence of the next innovation.
  Unlike this simple model, the more realistic Schumpeterian growth models contain
many sectors, but in all of them, the results of research efforts consist in the
replacement of old-fashioned products or production technologies by new ones. The
multi-sector Schumpeterian growth models can be divided into two groups on the
basis  of  the  way  in  which  the  size  of  the  quality  improvement  that  an  innovation
yields is determined.
  Until now, the large majority of the Schumpeterian growth models have been quality
ladder models, in which each innovation corresponds to a quality improvement of a
fixed size to an earlier product of the same sector.  For example, in the quality ladder
model which was put forward in Grossman – Helpman (1991) there is a continuum
? ?0,1  of products, and the quality of a design of a product i is characterized by a
number which is of the form ? ? JJq i ??  for some J, where ?  is a constant.7 This
equation can be interpreted as meaning that the considered design corresponds to the
Jth step on the quality ladder. If in this model the highest-quality product in some
sector has i corresponds to the Kth step on the quality ladder, an innovation in that
sector will produce a design which corresponds to its (K+1)th step. In other words, the
quality value which corresponds to the best available design gets always multiplied by
the constant ?  because of the innovation.
  Since this assumption implies that the quality of a new design for a given product is
determined solely by the quality of its currently used design, it rules out all forms of
knowledge spill-over from the highly developed sectors of the economy to its less
developed sectors. The “pool of knowledge” or leapfrogging models are based on
another, equally extreme idealizing assumption. In these models the quality of a new
7 Grossman – Helpman (1991), p. 45. Observe the change in notation.
7design for a given product is determined by the total amount of available
technological knowledge, and it is independent of the quality of the previous product
of the same sector.
  Aghion and Howitt have put forward several models with this basis idea, but in each
of them there is a continuum ? ?0,1  of sectors, and the quality of the newest design for
a product in a sector i at time t is denoted by itA . In these models an innovation in a
sector i yield a design which has the quality max,tA , i.e. the quality which corresponds
to the highest value of itA  among all the sectors i of the economy. The value max,tA
increases at a pace which depends on the total amount of innovations in the economy.
These assumptions are motivated by the idea that the value max,tA  represents “the
research frontier”, or “pool of technological knowledge”, which all innovators utilize.8
However, all the endogenous growth models that were considered above are subject
to an obvious criticism: they have scale effects. I.e., in these models the growth rate
on  a  balanced  growth  path  is  an  increasing  function  of  the  size  of  the  economy.
Further, if a constant proportion of the population is involved in research in two
economies of a different size, according to these models the growth rates of the
economies should be proportional to their sizes, and if this proportion stays constant
in an economy in which the population grows exponentially, the growth rate of  the
economy should grow exponentially in time.
  However, these implausible conclusions are not backed up by evidence. The
number of the scientists and engineers who are involved in research and development
has grown dramatically in most Western countries during the last decades, but this has
not led to any comparable increase in the growth rates, which show no clear trend.9 It
also seems that the long run growth rates in developed Western countries are not
significantly different, unlike one would expect if they were determined by the factors
that appear in the endogenous growth models when they are applied to each country
separately (Evans, 1996).
8 Aghion – Howitt (1998), pp. 85-88. See also Aghion – Howitt (1996) and (1997).
9 This is dramatically illustrated by Jones (1995a), pp. 517-518, which contrasts the growth of the
number of scientists and engineers engaged in R&D in France, Germany, Japan, and U.S during the
period 1960-1988 with the aggregate total factor productivity growth in these countries during the same
period. In each case, the number of the scientists and engineers has more than doubled, whereas the
aggregate productivity growth shows no clear trend. Cf. also Jones (1995b).
8An obvious answer to the latter criticism is that the endogenous growth models
should be applied to the world as a whole, rather than to its individual countries (cf.
Jones, 1995a, p. 519). There are a variety of ways of answering former criticism and
explaining why the increase in research labor force does not show up in a
corresponding increase in the growth rate. These have been given a precise
formulation in the second-generation endogenous growth models.
  In some of these models, the number of the sectors of the economy is an increasing
function of the population, and it turns out that a large economy does not grow faster
than a small one because in the larger economy the research efforts have to be divided
between a larger number of sectors (Young, 1998). In the quality ladder model which
is due to Paul Segerström (1998) innovating becomes progressively more difficult in
each industry, so that on the average the amount of resources spent on each
innovation increase in the course of time.10
Below I shall not consider the problem of eliminating scale effects from endogenous
growth models. Rather, I shall address another obvious weakness of the models that
were described above: they assume that intellectual property rights are perfect. In each
of these models, it is assumed that an innovator receives a monopoly rent from the
invented good either permanently or at least until a better innovation emerges in the
same sector of the economy. However, actually the monopoly of an innovator is not
permanent because patents have a finite duration, and also because a monopoly may
be lost already before the expiry of the patent because of imitation. In addition, there
is empirical evidence which suggests that such appropriability mechanisms as secrecy,
lead time, and complementary sales and services would in most industries be more
important than patents.11 Clearly, innovations which are protected by secrecy or lead
time can be incorporated into the framework of endogenous growth theory just as well
10  Cf. Jones (1995a), pp. 519-521, and Jones (2005), pp. 1090-1095.
11  See Levin et al. (1987, p. 794), Mansfield (1986), and Cohen et al. (2000). Mansfield presents a
survey according to which in most industries, a large majority (more than 80%) of the commercially
introduced inventions would have been introduced even without the patent system. However, patents
were according to this survey nevertheless essentially more important within the pharmaceutical and
chemical industries (ibid., p. 175). Cohen et al. (2000) contains an analysis of a survey in which R&D
unit or lab managers were asked to evaluate the effectiveness of various appropriability mechanisms in
protecting the “firm’s competitive advantage” from both product and process innovations. The
considered mechanisms were secrecy, patents, lead time, complementary sales and services, and
complementary manufacturing. It turned out that, on the average, patents were the least central of these
mechanisms, whereas secrecy and lead time were the two most important ones (ibid., pp. 9-10; cf. also
Figures 1-4). Levin et al. (1987) discusses a survey which has led to similar findings (see, in particular,
ibid., pp. 793-798).
9as patented innovations, but only if it is postulated that the monopoly of each
innovator has a finite length.
  In addition to the temporal length of a patent, the policy instruments that are
considered in the literature on the economics of patents include the required inventive
step – i.e. the minimum improvement that an innovation must make to the existing
products if it counts as patentable – and the lagging and the leading breadth of  a
patent. With the lagging breadth, one means the minimum quality difference that the
patented product must have with a lower-quality product if the latter may be produced
without infringing on the patent. Similarly, the leading breadth of a patent is the
quality improvement which a superior product must at least have if it does not
infringe on the patent  (cf. O’Donoghue et. al., 1998, p. 3).
  None of these instruments of patent policy are explicitly considered in the early
endogenous growth models that were described above, but growth models have
subsequently been generalized by including them. Obviously, models of growth
through specialization are unsuited for an analysis of the growth effects of the
required inventive step of patents, since an innovation never replaces a lower-quality
product in them, but specialization models have been used for analyzing the effects
patent length in Chou – Shy (1991, 1993a) and Iwaisako – Futagami (2003), and of
imitation in Helpman (1993), Kwan – Lai (2003), and Furukawa (2007).12 In addition,
Iwaisako – Futagami (2003) analyzes also the effects of patent breadth with  a
specialization model by postulating that all innovators are subject to compulsory
licensing, and representing patent breadth with the royalty rate that such licensing
yields (ibid., p. 248).
  Unlike the models of growth through specialization, the Schumpeterian growth
models  could  be  used  for  analyzing  the  growth  effects  of  all  of  the  instruments  of
12  Each of these three papers is concerned with a model in which the strength of the intellectual
property rights is represented by the rate of imitation. Helpman (1993) discusses the strength of
intellectual property protection in the context of a model of trade between North and South, in which
new products are invented in the North and get imitated in the South. Furukawa (2007) considers a
model of growth through specialization in which the final sector productivity depends on past
experience in using intermediate goods, and in which imitation may be growth-promoting, if it
promotes the accumulation of experience. Kwan-Lai (2003) presents an account of the saddle paths of
a specialization model, with which one can analyze the tradeoff between the short-run negative effects
of an increase in IPR protection – i.e., that an increase in the rate of innovation causes a reduction in
the resources which remain available for consumption – and its long-run positive effects, which are
due to the increase in the variety of available goods in the future (p. 854). A specialization model of
growth leaves out the fact that patents for the existing products decrease the incentives to produce
improvements to them, and unsurprisingly, Kwan and Lai conclude that a strengthening of intellectual
property rights (in the form of a decreased rate of imitation) will increase both growth and welfare
when the model is calibrated by US data.
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patent policy that were mentioned above. A quality ladder model has  been  used  for
analyzing the growth effects of imitation in Segerström (2007) and Horii – Iwaisako
(2007), and O’Donoghue and Zweimüller (2004) use a quality ladder model for
discussing the optimization of the patentability requirement and the leading breadth
when these are allowed to differ. The growth effects of patent length have been
investigated in the context of a single-sector quality ladder model in  Horowitz – Lai
(1996). A pool of knowledge model will be generalized to a situation of imperfect
intellectual property rights in Chapter 2 of this book.
1.3. THE ECONOMICS OF PIRACY AND NETWORK EXTERNALITIES
  The effects of commercial piracy on welfare and the profits of the copyright owner
have been analyzed in an important, early paper Koboldt (1995), and in several
papers by Dyuti S. Banerjee (see Banerjee 2003, 2006a, and 2006b). Koboldt (1995)
discusses a model in which there are many information goods, and in which there is
free entry to the market for pirate copies. The price of pirate copies stays positive,
because their producers are faced with both costs of production and a danger of
punishment, which is viewed as analogous with an increment in the production costs
(ibid., pp. 136-137). In this setting the equilibrium price of pirate copies equals their
“long-run marginal costs” (ibid., p. 139), which include the costs of punishments.
Banerjee  (2003), (2006a), and (2006b) discuss a setup with a single copyright owner
and a single pirate, who is able to earn a positive profit for piracy.13
  However, most of the rest of the fairly extensive theoretical literature on piracy is
concerned  with  end-user  piracy,  rather  than  with  commercial  piracy.  One  strand  of
the literature studies the effects of piracy on the quality and the variety of  the
available information goods. E.g., Novos – Waldman (1984) show that piracy might
decrease the quality of the information goods that maximize the revenue of a
monopolist. This turns out to be the case in a model in which all consumers have the
same valuation for the considered information good, but differing copying costs.14
13 The basic features of Banerjee’s model are presented in Banerjee (2003). Banerjee (2006a)
generalizes the model to a situation in which the consumers and the software producers can affect
government decisions by lobbying, whereas Banerjee (2006b) considers a case in which the monitoring
costs are born by the copyright owner, rather than by the government.
14 See Proposition 2 in Novos – Waldman (1984), p. 242.
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Similarly, Johnson (1985) studies piracy in the context of a model of product
differentiation, and concludes that it may decrease the variety of the available
information goods in the long run.
  Another part  of the literature studies the effects of copyright protection on welfare
and on the revenue of the copyright owner. It is clear that piracy reduces revenue in a
model which contains no further elements besides the copyright owner who sells
legitimate copies and end users who choose between buying one of them and using a
pirate copy. However, the welfare effects of piracy turn out to be more complicated
even in this simple setting.
  The welfare effects of piracy have been analyzed in e.g. Yoon (2002) and Chen –
Png (2003). Yoon (2002) considers a situation in which the intellectual property
rights show up in a cost paid z by the consumers, i.e. in which copyright protection
lowers the value that a pirate copy has for the consumers by the amount z, but does
not cause extra costs for the copyright owner. In the context of this model it turns out
that,  also  when  the  effects  of  lowering  copyright  protection  on  the  incentives  to
produce new information goods are not taken into account, a decrease in copyright
protection might increase welfare (ibid., Figure 2 on p. 337). Intuitively, a reduction
in piracy has the effect of reducing the number of consumers who pay the extra cost z,
and an increase in copyright protection increases welfare when this positive effect
overrules the negative welfare effects of an increase in copyright protection.
  Chen – Png (2003) study the welfare effects of software piracy in a more general
setting, in which the policy instruments of the government include criminal sanctions
against  pirates,  taxation  of  copying  equipment  and  media,  and  a  subsidy  on  the
purchases of legitimate copies. They deduce the policy recommendations that a tax on
the copying medium is preferable to a fine on copying, that it is optimal to subsidize
the purchase of legitimate software, and also that when piracy occurs, it is welfare-
increasing and yet harmless for the publisher’s sales to reduce both the detection rate
and the price of legitimate copies (ibid., pp. 116-117).
  In  each  case,  it  turns  out  that  piracy  on  the  whole  reduces  the  revenue  of  the
copyright  owner.  However,  it  has  also  been  suggested  that  piracy  has  also  positive
effects which might compensate for this negative effect (Peitz – Waelbroeck, 2006a,
p. 450). Firstly, the demand for the complementary products (like e.g. concerts of an
artist) might be increased by piracy (Gayer and Shy, 2006). In addition, the copyright
owner can reduce the harmful of effects of piracy by bundling the information good
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with complementary products and services (like e.g. product support for a software
product) which are not available to the users of a pirate copy. Somewhat less
obviously, when the considered information goods are experience goods and the
consumers do not know in advance which products they prefer (e.g. to which
recordings they would enjoy listening), the possibility to sample pirate copies might
make them willing to pay more for their preferred product (Peitz – Waelbroeck,
2006b).
  Further, the copyright owner might be able to appropriate indirectly a part of the
revenue which is lost because of the pirates, and piracy might increase the value of
the product because of network externalities. In this section, I shall still consider the
last two of these possibilities in some more detail.
  Indirect  appropriability  is  possible  when  the  copyright  owner  is  able  to  charge  a
higher price for the shared copies of the information good. It was already pointed out
in Liebowitz (1985) that the journals which are available for photocopying in
libraries seem to be a case in point. When a publisher is able to charge a higher price
for a journal from libraries than from the individuals who subscribe the journal for
their private use, the publisher can appropriate indirectly a part of the value that the
photocopies have for their users (ibid., pp. 949-950).
  Indirect appropriation of this kind is possible when consumers are divided into
“clubs”,  the  same copy of  an  information  good is  used  by  all  the  members  of  each
“club”, and the “club members” share its costs. Situations of this kind have been
studied more systematically in e.g. Bakos et al. (1999) and in Varian (2000). Varian
considers a model in which the clubs are formed endogenously, i.e. in which potential
club members join the club only if the information goods that they obtain by joining
bring them a non-negative surplus. This  is  the  case  when,  for  example,  a  group  of
persons agrees to buy together a copy of a book and to share its costs equally.15 Bakos
et al. (1999) is concerned with a case in which club membership is determined
exogenously, i.e. on grounds which are unrelated to the considered information
goods, as it is the case when information goods are shared by a family or by a group
of friends (ibid., p. 121).
15 In  Varian  (2000),  the  clubs  are  endogenous  in  this  sense,  because  Varian  postulates  –  using  the
sharing of a book as an example – that the “willingness to pay for the book by all members of clubs
that  purchase  the  book exceeds  the  willingness  to  pay by members  of  clubs  that  do  not  purchase  the
book” (p. 475).
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  In Varian’s setting it turns out that both the copyright owner and the consumers
profit from sharing if the transaction costs of sharing are sufficiently low in
comparison with the costs of producing new originals (Varian, 2000, p. 476). In the
situation which is discussed in Bakos et al. (1999) there is a trade-off between an
aggregation effect (ibid., p. 124) and a team diversity effect (p. 126).  With the
aggregation effect, Bakos et al. mean that the differences in valuations of clubs are
smaller than the differences of the valuations of individuals, and that this reduction in
“buyer diversity” increases profits. The team diversity effect refers to the fact that the
differences in the sizes of the clubs tend to decrease the profits of the seller. Bakos et
al. (1999) conclude that if all the clubs are of the same size in a model with
exogenously formed clubs, sharing almost always increases profits of the seller (ibid.,
p.  127),  but when their  sizes differ,  the sign of the effect  that  club formation has on
profits depends on the relative magnitudes of the two effects.
  Another obvious example of a case in which the copyright owner appropriates
indirectly revenues from sharing is provided by the video rental stores and, more
generally, by the business models which are based on renting information goods.
Again, if the copyright owner can charge a higher price for the copies which are
available for rent rather than used by a single individual, she will be able to
appropriate a part of the extra value that sharing provides. In Varian’s analysis, the
possibility of sharing can even increase the profits of the copyright owner if each
consumer  either  wishes  to  use  the  information  good  just  for  once  (e.g.  to  watch  a
rentable movie just once) or if the consumers have heterogeneous tastes (Varian,
2000, 485-486).
  By definition, a product exhibits network effects if its value to each user depends on
the number of the other users that it has (Shapiro – Varian, 1999, p. 13). For example,
many software products are subject to network effects, because when a consumer
wishes to exchange files with other consumers, it is in her interest that the other
consumers are using identical or at least compatible software products. In addition,
the popularity of a software product improves the availability of complementary
goods and services, such as plug-ins, product support, and training seminars, and this
increases its value to its users in an indirect way (cf. Slive – Bernhardt, 1988, p. 888).
  Several authors have pointed out that piracy might increase the profit of the
copyright owner if the information good is subject to sufficiently strong network
externalities. Clearly, piracy decreases the revenue of the copyright owner when a
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consumer who would have bought a legitimate copy in the absence of piracy makes
use  of  a  pirate  copy  instead.  However,  when  the  consumers  who  would  not  have
bought the product in any case make use of pirate copies, piracy may also have a
positive effect on the revenue of the copyright owner, because in this case it increases
the size of the network of its users and the valuation that the paying consumers give to
it.
  Piracy can be in the interest of the copyright owner when the latter effect is stronger
than the former. Clearly, this cannot be the case if all consumers make use of pirate
copies instead of legitimately bought ones. Slive – Bernhardt (1998) have put forward
a model in which this does not happen because in it the consumers are divided into
business consumers and home consumers who  have  a  different  ability  to  pirate.
Takeyama (1994) considers a model in which the analogous result is valid because
pirate copies are of a lower quality than legitimate ones, and it can turn out that low-
valuation consumers make use of pirate copies while high-valuation consumers use
legitimate ones. The model which is developed in Chapters 3 and 4 below will in this
respect resemble the latter model, but its analysis turns out to be essentially more
complicated, since pirate copies have a positive price in it.
1.4. SUMMARY OF THE ESSAYS
1.4.1. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICY AND POOL OF KNOWLEDGE GROWTH MODELS
  Chapter 2 discusses a pool of knowledge model in which intellectual property rights
are imperfect. As it was explained above, a pool of knowledge model replaces an
idealized assumption of the quality-ladder models, i.e. that all innovations constitute a
quality improvement of the same size to the product on which they improve, with
another, equally idealized assumption: in them it is assumed that all innovations result
in a product with the topmost quality across all the sectors of the economy.
Accordingly, the considered model is by itself unlikely to yield interesting
quantitative predictions concerning the optimal IPR policy. However, the model may
nevertheless produce qualitative insights concerning IPR policy, and insights into the
prospects of developing more realistic models in the future.
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  The model differs from the earlier models of Aghion and Howitt in containing two
instruments of patent policy, the rate of imitation ? and the required inventive factor
SP? . It is easy to see that a pool of knowledge would not constitute an interesting
framework for discussing the distinction between required inventive factor of patents
and their breadth: if patents had in the model a leading breadth K which was larger
than the patentability requirement SP? ,  in  equilibrium this  would  have  precisely  the
same consequences as the assumption that SP K? ? . However, the model could easily
be generalized to include patents of a finite length. 16
  Aghion and Howitt assume in their pool of knowledge models that innovations are
uniformly distributed across all sectors of the economy, which has the consequence
that some innovations (i.e. the ones in the sectors in which the quality of the current
product is quite close to the research frontier) are quite small. Nevertheless, in these
models the innovator is always able to drive the previous incumbent out of the market
and choose monopoly pricing without being faced with price competition with her
(see e.g. Aghion and Howitt 1996, p. 16). However, it seems that it would be quite
difficult to give a detailed account of the economic mechanism which makes the old
products disappear in the context of these models.
  The current model improves on Aghion and Howitt’s pool of knowledge models in
having two interpretations. One may follow Aghion and Howitt in assuming that the
incumbent is always driven out of the market when a new innovation emerges, in
which case the minimum inventive factor ?  of the innovations that are actually made
is always identical with the required inventive factor SP? . However, it is also possible
to assume, more realistically, that each incumbent tries to compete with the entrant by
lowering the price of its old-fashioned product. In this case no firms will choose to try
to improve on products whose quality is too high, the inventive factor in the
innovations that are actually made has a minimum 0?  which is independent of SP? ,
and ? ?0max , SP? ? ?? .
  In the model each member of the labor force chooses whether to work in research or
in production, and in equilibrium the wage w from working in production is identical
with the wage Rw  from working in research. The latter is determined by the value of
16  This could be achieved by postulating that all products turn non-proprietary after the time T, or that
the rate at which they get imitated changes after time T. Cf. discussion in Section 2.8 below.
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patents, which depends both on the total amount of research in the future, and on the
way in which research efforts are divided between different sectors. Recently Cozzi et
al. (2007) have demonstrated that the decision to divide research efforts equally
between sectors can be motivated by the ambiguity aversion of the investors, and I
shall follow most of the previous endogenous growth literature in focusing on the
equilibria in which research labor is divided equally between the sectors in which
there is research. It will be seen below that after this restriction has been made, it
becomes possible to determine the balanced growth paths of the model because, by
definition, the size of the research sector stays constant on a balanced growth path.
However, it is not obvious which assumptions should be made concerning the amount
of research in the future when the system is not on a balanced growth path originally.
  Segerstrom (1998, pp. 1298-1301) demonstrates that in his quality ladder model
there is under reasonable restrictions to the parameter values a unique saddle path
which approaches the situation of balanced growth. It is natural to ask whether
Segerstrom’s argument can be applied to pool of knowledge models. This question
will be answered in Section 2.4. below: it turns out that this argument is applicable to
Aghion and Howitt’s earlier pool of knowledge models with perfect intellectual
property rights, and also to a model with a positive imitation rate, but not to a model
in which the required inventive factor is larger than 1.17
The balanced growth paths of the model can be characterized in a relatively simple
way in terms of a function ? ?, ,F g ? ?  called the research incentive function. This
function expresses the ratio Rw w  of the wage in the research sector and in
production for the constant growth rate g, imitation rate ? , and the required inventive
step ? , so that on a balanced growth path ? ?, , 1F g ? ? ? . The graph ? ?, ,F g ? ? ??
has a simple economic interpretation: each point on this graph represents a balanced
17  This is because it is essential for Segerstrom’s argument that the interest rate has an expression
which  does not explicitly contain ? ?v t , i.e. the value of an innovation. This turns out to be the case in
Segerström’s model, because  in it ? ? ? ?v t v t?  has an expression which does not explicitly depend on
? ?v t  or the interest rate (cf. Segerstrom, 1998, p. 1298 and p. 1300).  However, no analogous
expression exists in the currently considered model when 1? ? .
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growth path of a more general model in which the workers may have a preference for
science or for production, shown in a wage differential between the two sectors.18
  It also turns out that the model leads to simple definition of a growth trap which is
due to slow growth in the past. Intuitively, this is a situation in which the equilibrium
value of the growth rate g is zero if the state of the economy corresponds to very slow
constant growth in the past, although a balanced growth path with a positive growth
rate exists for the same parameter values. It turns out that growth traps which are due
to slow growth in the past are possible when the imitation rate is small but positive.
  As it seems plausible, the growth maximizing value of the imitation rate is zero, and
this is also the welfare maximizing value of the imitation rate if the knowledge
increase parameter ? , which characterizes the contribution that each innovation
makes to the shared pool of knowledge, is sufficiently large. The growth-maximizing
value of the required inventive step ?  is  always  positive,  but  it  is  small  in  slowly
growing economies. It also turns out that if the profitability of research is sufficiently
large, the problem of choosing the growth-maximizing value of ?  might fail to have
an economically meaningful solution.
1.4.2. COMMERCIAL PIRACY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICY
   Chapter 3 presents a model of commercial piracy, which is utilized also in Chapter
4  in a modified form. The model aims at explaining a puzzling feature of the market
for pirate copies: the pirate copies which are sold rather than distributed for free are
homogenous goods with several manufacturers and – when they are distributed on the
Internet – with almost zero reproduction costs, but they nevertheless often have a
positive price.19
18  In other words, the situation in which ? ?, ,F g ? ? ??  where 1? ?  represents an equilibrium of a
model in which the preference for science or for production shows itself in the fact that the wages in
the two sectors satisfy the condition Rw w ?? . Such a more general model can be motivated by the
fact that persons with a scientific education often seem to have a preference for research, which is
shown in accepting employment in research also when it has a lower salary than employment of other
kinds (cf. Stern, 2004).
19    This is made apparent by e.g. the U.S. Department of Justice reports on court cases against large-
scale commercial software pirates. See e.g.
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/vae/Pressreleases/12-DecemberPDFArchive/05/20051213petersonnr.pdf ,
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/vae/Pressreleases/08-AugustPDFArchive/06/20060825ferrernr.pdf, and
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/vae/Pressreleases/04-AprilPDFArchive/07/20070420knott.pdf
(accessed on October 9, 2008).
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  As it was mentioned above, the question what stops the price of pirate copies from
sinking to zero because of a Bertrand competition between their manufacturers is not
addressed by Banerjee’s models of commercial piracy (Banerjee 2003, 2006a,
2006b), which contain only a single commercial pirate, whereas the model of Koboldt
(1995) treats copyright protection as analogous with an increment in production costs.
A model with the latter basic idea leads to the predictions that all pirate copies should
have the same price and that they should be available to all the potential customers of
commercial pirates. However, casual empiricism suggests that there is price
dispersion in the market for pirate copies, and also that pirate copies are not available
to all the consumers who would be willing to buy them (as one can easily verify by
e.g. trying to find functioning, illegitimate copies of recently introduced software
products on the Internet). However, both of these observations can be explained if the
danger of getting caught and receiving a punishment with which the commercial
pirates are faced is not modelled as a cost of production, but as an advertising cost.
This is the approach which will be followed in Chapters 3 and 4 below.
The model which is developed in Chapter 3 postulates that commercial pirates – to
whom I shall in what follows refer as bootleggers – have two kinds of costs. It will be
assumed that the informing of consumers increases the risk of getting caught and,
accordingly, the expectation value of the cost of a punishment, and that this increase
functions analogously with an advertising cost. Secondly, the bootleggers may also
have fixed costs either because a part of the risk of punishment may be independent
of whether the bootleggers inform their potential customers, or because of digital
rights management (DRM) systems.
The agents of the considered model are the copyright owner, K potential
bootleggers, and a continuum of consumers whose valuations for a legitimate copy of
the product are uniformly distributed in ? ?0,1 , and whose valuations for a pirate copy
are smaller by a factor q. These agents participate in a leader-follower game in which
the copyright owner first sets the price Mp  of a legitimate copy of the considered
information good. In a next step, each potential bootlegger decides whether to enter
the market and to pay a fixed cost F. Then the bootleggers who have entered (if any)
choose the number of their advertisements and their price distribution, and send them
to randomly chosen consumers, after which the consumers make their buying
decisions.
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Each advertisement causes the advertising cost b. The bootleggers are not
constrained to specifying the same price in different advertisements and by
assumption, they cannot keep track of the consumers to whom they have already sent
an advertisement, so that the same bootlegger might send several advertisements to
the same consumer. This implies that the form of advertising which is considered in
the current model resembles the description of advertising in Butters’s classical
model of advertising (Butters, 1977), in which advertisers send advertisements of a
homogenous product to randomly chosen consumers, and the sending of an
advertisement causes a cost b.
  It is easy to see that when only one bootlegger enters the market, in equilibrium she
will specify the same price maxp  in all her advertisements. However, when more than
one bootleggers enter, there will be price dispersion: in this case the largest price in
the advertisements will still have the value maxp , but the prices in the advertisements
are now distributed between minp  and maxp , where minp  is a decreasing function of
the number of the active bootleggers.
 In the model the parameters b and F are viewed as policy variables which are
affected by the government and by DRM systems. In Chapter 3 I analyze the effects
of these variables on the markets for pirated and legitimate copies of information
goods, and in particular, on the revenue of the copyright owner, both when the price
of legitimate copies Mp  is exogenously given and when the copyright owner has
chosen it optimally.
  It turns out that when both Mp  and the number of the bootleggers k on the market
are  fixed,  the  demand  of  the  copyright  owner  is  an  increasing  function  of  the
advertising cost b and a decreasing function of the quality q of the pirate copies.
Further, the demand is a decreasing function of the number of bootleggers if Mp  is
not so large that all consumers prefer pirate copies to legitimate copies. Otherwise,
the demand is independent of the number of the bootleggers.
These results make it natural to ask how the number k of the bootleggers who pay
the fixed cost and enter the market depends on the policy variables F and b. It is easy
to see that for each fixed value of Mp  an increase in F has always a non-positive
effect on k, but an increase in b may also increase k. Intuitively, this is because the
advertising cost may function as a collusive device in the sense that some consumers
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can buy a pirate copy from a single bootlegger only because of it and accordingly, the
advertising cost allows the competing bootleggers to charge a price which is higher
than their marginal costs.20 This positive effect might be larger than the direct
negative effect that an increase in the advertising costs causes.
  The discussion of the optimization problem of the copyright owner, i.e. the problem
of choosing Mp  so that the revenue of the copyright owner is maximized in
equilibrium, shows that the optimal value of Mp  is never such that some pirate copies
would be so cheap that all consumers would prefer buying one of them to buying a
legitimate copy. Although the expression of the revenue of the copyright owner is, in
general, complicated, it turns out that for each fixed number of the bootleggers k the
revenue-maximizing price Mp  is characterized by a surprisingly simple condition.
This condition is
min,
1
2M k
q
p p
?? ?
where min,kp  is  the  minimum  price  of  pirate  copies  when  there  are k active
bootleggers, and q represents the quality of the pirate copies. When k is not fixed, but
determined by the cost F of entering the pirate copy market, the revenue-maximizing
price Mp  is always either the price which is determined by the above condition for
some k, or the largest price which suffices to block the entry of one more bootlegger.
  In general, the revenue of the copyright owner is a non-decreasing function of the
fixed cost F and a decreasing function of q. Hence, in the absence of network effects
it is always in the interest of the copyright owner that the fixed costs of commercial
pirates (caused by e.g. DRM systems) are increased. However, in equilibrium the
revenue of the copyright owner is sometimes increased and sometimes decreased by
an increase in the “advertising cost” b. This is because an increase in b might increase
the profits of the bootleggers and the incentives to enter the pirate copy market.
  The other testable predictions of the model include that an increase in the price of
legitimate copies increases price dispersion in the market for pirate copies. Since low-
price pirate copies can be viewed as a counterpart of non-commercial forms of piracy,
a possible interpretation of this result is that high prices of legitimate copies
20 This can be contrasted with the models of actual collusions, in which prices are kept above the
marginal costs by the fact that selling the considered good at a price which is below the price set by the
competitors would break the collusion in subsequent periods, and reduce future profits. See e.g.
Stenbacka (1990).
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correspond to the coexistence of commercial and non-commercial forms of piracy.
Similarly, high-quality pirate copies can be expected to be subject to more price
dispersion than low-quality pirate  copies.
  In  what  follows  I  shall  not  present  a welfare analysis of this model or the closely
related model of Chapter 4, which will be considered in the next subsection. This is,
perhaps, in need of a separate justification. A welfare analysis would address the
question how the choice of the policy variables F and b affects the value of a welfare
function. However, it is questionable whether one should include the welfare which is
obtained by illegal means (like the profits from selling pirate copies, or the utility
from using them) in the welfare function of a social planner.21  In addition, since the
current model is concerned with an information good which already exists, rather than
with the incentives for creating new information goods, a more general model would
be needed for a discussion of the other side of the Nordhaus tradeoff, i.e., of the fact
that a decrease in the revenue of the copyright owner decreases the incentives for
creating new information goods.
1.4.3. COMMERCIAL PIRACY, NETWORK EXTERNALITIES, AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY POLICY
Chapter 4 will be concerned with the extension of the above model to network
industries. This extension is motivated by the fact that, although it has been proved in
the earlier literature that piracy might in a variety settings increase the revenue of a
copyright owner in the presence of sufficiently strong network externalities, until now
this has been proved only in the context of models of non-commercial (end-user)
piracy.22 It is not prima facie obvious  to  which  extent  such  results  generalize  to
commercial piracy, since end-user piracy and commercial piracy have different
effects on the profit of the copyright owner. The decrease of profit which is due to a
loss of market share is smaller in the case of commercial piracy, because pirate copies
21 Cf. Sandmo (1981), in which the analogous question is considered in the context of tax evasion. It is
problematic whether a welfare function of a model of tax evasion should include the utility of tax-
evaders since one might argue that the Pareto principle should not be extended to cases in which the
utility of an individual is increased by illegal means (ibid., p. 275).
22  See, however, Banerjee (2003), pp. 113-116. Banerjee presents an analysis of the effects of network
externalities on the competition between a monopolist (i.e. the copyright owner) and a single
commercial pirate. In the context of this model, it turns out that the pirate diminishes the profit of the
copyright owner even in the presence of network externalities.
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with a positive price are less attractive to consumers, but for the very same reason
also the positive effect which is caused by network externalities is smaller.
  The considered model differs from the one of Chapter 3 in so far that in it the
bootleggers have no fixed costs and that their number is infinite, and also in so far
that the valuations of the consumers are fixed only after the copyright owner has set
the price Mp  of legitimate copies. When Mp  has been chosen, the consumers and the
bootleggers form the expectation that the total market penetration of the product will
have some value en . This determines the quantity ? , which is called the valuation
parameter, in accordance with eA Bn? ? ? (where A, B are non-negative constants),
and the valuation parameter determines the valuations of the individual consumers.
  Just like before, the consumers form a continuum ? ?0,1 , but this time the consumer
?  gives the valuation ??  to a legitimate copy and the valuation q??  to a pirate copy
of the product. A Nash equilibrium of the model is a situation in which the actual
market penetration n of the product turns out to be en  after the bootleggers have sent
their advertisements and the consumers have made their buying choices, given these
valuations.
  It turns out that once Mp  has been fixed, the values of ?  for which the bootleggers
enter the market and send advertisements form a closed interval ? ?,L H? ? . The values
of ?  can be divided into intervals also on the basis of the pricing that the bootleggers
choose in equilibrium if they enter the market for the given ? . The function ? ?2 Mp?
will be defined in such a way that if ? ?2 Mp? ?? , in equilibrium all the consumers
who can buy a pirate copy will prefer it to a legitimate copy, but when ? ?2 Mp? ??
the highest-valuation consumers prefer a legitimate copy to some (at least the highest-
price) pirate copies. The function ? ?3 Mp?  characterizes another borderline: when
? ? ? ?3 2M Mp p? ? ?? ? , the highest-valuation consumers prefer legitimate copies to all
(even the cheapest) pirate copies, but when ? ? ? ?2 3M Mp p? ? ?? ? , all consumers
prefer the cheapest pirate copies to legitimate copies.
  Analogously with the results of the previous chapter, it turns out that it is never
optimal for the copyright owner that ? ?2 Mp? ?? .  This  result  is  quite  intuitive:  the
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reason why piracy has in the earlier literature sometimes turned out to be profit-
increasing for the copyright owner is that it acts as a surrogate for price
discrimination. In the current model this would mean that low-valuation consumers
make use of pirate copies while high-valuation consumers buy legitimate ones, but
when ? ?2 Mp? ?? , all consumers find pirate copies preferable.
  Just like in the simpler models of non-commercial piracy, it turns out that for some
parameter specifications the revenue-maximizing price Mp  is  sufficiently  low  to
block the bootleggers from the market, whereas for others the optimal Mp  is such that
the bootleggers enter but ? ?3 Mp? ?? . It also turns out that the third alternative,
which is not present in the models of non-commercial piracy – i.e., the case in which
? ? ? ?2 3M Mp p? ? ?? ? , and in which expensive pirate copies cause market
segmentation but cheaper ones do not – is never revenue-maximizing for the
copyright owner.
  Since in this model the bootleggers have no fixed costs, the strength of intellectual
property rights is represented in it solely by the “advertising cost” b. The current
model approaches a model of non-commercial piracy in the limit in which 0b ? ,
whereas large values of b lead to a situation of no piracy. Accordingly, the problem of
choosing the value of b so that the revenue of the copyright owner is maximized can
be viewed a generalization of the question whether non-commercial piracy is
beneficial to the copyright owner in the presence of network externalities. It turns out
that when the pirate copies are of a sufficiently low quality, the solution of the
problem of choosing the revenue-maximizing b approaches the situation of non-
commercial  piracy  (i.e.  the  free  availability  of  pirate  copies  to  all  consumers),  and
that when they are of a sufficiently high quality, a state of no piracy is revenue-
maximizing. The revenue-maximizing value of b can  also  differ  from both  of  these
corner solutions, although this seems to be the case only when the effect of piracy on
the revenue of the copyright owner is rather small.
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CHAPTER II
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICY AND
POOL OF KNOWLEDGE GROWTH MODELS
ABSTRACT.1
I consider an endogenous “pool of knowledge” model of growth through creative
destruction with imperfect intellectual property rights. The parameters of the model
include the hazard rate of imitation and a patentability requirement. The model leads
to a natural definition of growth traps which are due to slow growth in the past, and
which are equilibria of the model when the rate of imitation is small but positive. The
growth-maximizing value of the imitation rate is zero, but the growth-maximizing
value of the patentability requirement can have any positive value below a theoretical
maximum. A low patentability requirement is growth-maximizing in slowly growing
economies.
2.1. INTRODUCTION
    The policy instruments that are regularly considered in the literature on the
economics of patents include the required inventive step and the duration of a patent,
and its lagging breadth and leading breadth.2 Until recently, economists have
considered the problem of the optimal choice of these instruments mostly within a
partial equilibrium framework.  On the other hand, endogenous growth theory studies
the incentives to conduct research and development within a general equilibrium
framework. This makes it possible not just to explicitly discuss the effects of
intellectual property rights on growth rate,  but also to consider some aspects of IPR
protection that do not have any obvious representation in a partial equilibrium model.
1 An earlier version of this paper has been published as Kiema, I., 2007, “Intellectual Property
Protection Strength in a ‘Pool of Knowledge’ Endogenous Growth Model”, HECER Discussion Paper
No 184 (http://ethesis.helsinki.fi/julkaisut/eri/hecer/disc/184).
2 Here lagging breadth refers to the minimum quality difference that the patented product must have
with a lower-quality product if the latter may be produced without infringing on the patent, and
similarly, leading breadth is the quality improvement which a superior product must at least have if it
does not infringe on the patent (Cf. O’Donoghue et. al., 1998, p. 3).
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However, in a large majority of the endogenous growth models that have been put
forward until now intellectual property rights have been perfect in the sense that a
research firm which makes an innovation always gets a permanent monopoly for
producing the product which corresponds to it.
  While surveying the earlier literature on endogenous growth theory in Section 1.2
above, I divided the endogenous growth  models into the models of growth through
specialization, in which each newly invented design of a product increases the number
of the different products on the market, and Schumpeterian models of growth through
creative destruction in which each newly invented design of a product replaces an
existing design. As Figure 1.1 of Chapter 1 illustrates, the Schumpeterian models can
further be divided into the the single-sector and multi-sector models  on  the  basis  of
the number of the different designs that the products on the market have at each
moment of time.
  Until now, most of the multi-sector Schumpeterian models have been quality ladder
models, in which each innovation causes a quality improvement of the same size to an
earlier product.  However, Philippe Aghion and Peter Howitt have put forward several
versions  of  a  “pool  of  knowledge”  or  leapfrogging  model,  in  which  the  quality  of  a
new design for a given product is determined by the total amount of available
technological knowledge in the whole economy (Aghion and Howitt, 1996, 1997, and
1998, pp. 85-121),
  At  the  end  of  Section  1.2.  I  also  shortly  surveyed  the  earlier  literature  in  which
restricted intellectual property rights have been incorporated into the framework of
endogenous growth theory. As it was seen above, the Schumpeterian growth models
have been used for analyzing the growth effects of illegal imitation and of the
required inventive step, the leading breadth, and the length of patents. However, until
now such analyses have been conducted only in the context of quality ladder models,
rather than “pool of knowledge” models.
   In a Schumpeterian growth model the innovators are motivated by the profit that
results from a monopoly for producing a product with an improved design. In actual
economies the improvements in the designs of goods do not just make consumption
shift within each sector of the economy from old-fashioned products to new ones.
Rather, they shift consumption also across industries. In other words, when there are
dramatic innovations within some industries (like computer or communications
industry) but not in others, the share of the innovative sectors within the economy
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grows larger.3 This seemingly trivial observation is somewhat problematic from the
perspective of a Schumpeterian quality-ladder model, since it suggests that R&D
investment into improving low-quality products would yield a smaller return than the
attempts to improve on high-quality products, and if this were the case, in equilibrium
the low-quality products would permanently retain their low quality.
  In most quality-ladder models this difficulty is overcome either by choosing the
relevant utility function or production function in such a way that the demand for the
products of a given sector is independent of their quality,4 or by postulating that the
difficulty of producing an innovation is proportional to the profit that it yields, so that
the expected returns from R&D turns out to be identical in all sectors.5 A more natural
explanation for the fact that R&D is no concentrated to improving on the highest-
quality products is that the knowledge needed for improving on one product is useful
also for improving on other products, so that improving on a low-quality product
becomes easier when the products of other sectors reach higher quality. This idea has
been implemented into the “pool of knowledge” models, since in them the innovators
make use of a shared pool of technological knowledge, which is represented by the
quality of the newest products on the market.
  Clearly, it is natural to ask whether pool of knowledge models could form the basis
of an interesting approach to intellectual property policy. In what follows I shall
develop and evaluate such an approach. For the sake of simplicity, I shall follow
Aghion and Howitt in making the extreme assumption that each improved product
receives the quality which corresponds to the current leading-edge technology (see
Aghion and Howitt, 1996; 1997; 1998, pp. 85-121). However, I will not assume that
an innovation would always yield a permanent monopoly to producing the invented
product.  Rather,  intellectual  property  rights  are  restricted  by  two  parameters,  the
required inventive step and the imitation rate.
3 For a summary of the relevant macroeconomic data concerning U.S., see Jorgensen (2005). The rapid
growth of output share of the computer and the software industries in the U.S. gross domestic product
is dramatically illustrated by e.g. Figure 4 in ibid., p. 753.
4 See e.g. Segerholm (1998), O’Donoghue and Zweimüller (2004) and Horii and Iwaisako (2007). Each
of these papers is concerned with a model which resembles the classical model of Grossman and
Helpman (1991) in so far that the demand for the goods of a sector is independent of its current quality.
However, the two latter papers incorporate imperfect intellectual property rights: O’Donoghue and
Zweimüller (2004) consider the optimization of the patentability requirement and the leading breadth
when these are allowed to differ, and in the model of Horii and Iwaisako (2007) the holder of a patent
loses its monopoly with an exogenously given probability in each period.
5 For a simple implementation of this idea, see Aghion – Howitt (2005), p. 71-75. Cf. also Segerstrom
(2007).
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  The required inventive step can be given two interpretations. In Aghion and Howitt’s
earlier pool of knowledge models the producer of the lower-quality product always
exits the market when a higher-quality good emerges, even if the quality improvement
is very small, and if one accepts this postulate, the required inventive step can be
viewed simply as a patentability requirement imposed by the government. However,
as it will be explained in more detail below, if each incumbent tries to compete with
the entrant by lowering prices, it turns out that research is concentrated in the sectors
in which research yields a quality improvement whose size suffices to make this
infeasible. Accordingly, the required inventive step can also be viewed as representing
the minimum quality improvement for which the inventor is not threatened by
competition with the producer of the lower-quality product. Hence, even without
considerations  of  restricted  IPRs,  the  current  model  improves  on  the  earlier  pool  of
knowledge models by giving economic reasons for the assumption that lower-quality
products disappear from the market.
  Some of the issues that growth theory should address is, obviously, the fact that the
current fast economic growth did not begin earlier than during the European industrial
revolution of the 18th century, although other civilizations had reached a comparable
technological level earlier,6 and the closely related question under which
circumstances a state of slow growth is self-sustaining in the sense that slow growth
in  the  past  is  the  cause  of  slow  growth  in  the  future.  It  turns  out  that  a  pool  of
knowledge model with imitation leads to a rigorous and elegant definition of a growth
trap which is due to slow growth in the past. Below I shall analyze the conditions
under which such growth traps emerge in the current model.
  To keep this chapter at a manageable length, the breadth and the duration of patents
have not been included among the parameters of the model. I shall nevertheless make
below some comments on the results that their inclusion would yield. It will be seen
below that a pool of knowledge model does not provide an interesting framework for
analyzing patent breadth, and also that patents of a finite length could be incorporated
to the current framework with relatively small modifications. I also do not consider
the problem of removing scale effects from  the  model.  It  seems  that  in  the  current
6  An often quoted example is formed by China during the Yuan dynasty. Cf. Quah (2001), pp. 79-82.
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model the most natural way to address the problem of scale effects would be to
postulate that the number of sectors of the economy increases with population. 7
  I shall present the main features of the model in Section 2.2 below. Section 2.3
analyzes the properties of the momentary equilibria of the production sector of the
model, and Section 2.4 shortly discusses its dynamics. Sections 2.5 and 2.6 are
concerned with its balanced growth paths and the circumstances under which growth
traps and multiple equilibria are possible. Section 2.7 discusses the optimization of the
policy variables, the imitation rate and the patentability requirement, and Section 2.8
concludes.
2.2. THE FRAMEWORK
  The earlier pool of knowledge growth models by Philippe Aghion and Peter Howitt
which were mentioned above are models in which a single final good is produced
from a continuum ? ?0,1  of intermediate goods. In these models technological progress
consists in the discovery of new, improved designs for the intermediate goods. In
what follows, Aghion and Howitt’s framework will be reinterpreted as describing a
continuum ? ?0,1  of final goods which  are  used  by  consumers  with  a utility function
which has a similar form with the production function of Aghion and Howitt’s model.
  In the current model the government has two policy instruments with which it can
affect the long-run growth rate, the rate of imitation and the required inventive step,
and it is easy to see that in the limit in which there is no imitation and no required
inventive step, the mathematical structure of the current model becomes identical with
the  structure  of  one  of  the  earlier  models  by  Aghion  and  Howitt,  despite  of  its
different economic interpretation.8 The structure of the current model has been
depicted in Figure 2.1 (Cf. Figure 3.1 in Aghion and Howitt, 1998, p. 86).
7  Cf. Jones (2005), pp. 1093-1095.
8 More specifically, the multisector “pool of knowledge” growth models that Aghion Howitt have put
forward in Aghion and Howitt (1996), Aghion and Howitt (1997), and Aghion and Howitt (1998, pp.
85-121), can all be viewed as variants of a basic form of their model, which they present in ibid., pp.
86-91. It is easy to verify that if one assumes that there is no imitation, all the results in Section 2.3
except for the analysis between the competition of an entrant and an incumbent are valid also in this
model, when the final goods are viewed as intermediate goods and the utility function (3) is interpreted
as a production function of a single, homogenous final good, for which the consumers’ utility function
is given by (4), except for conventional definition (17), which fixed the unit of wealth. Hence, the
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Figure 2.1. A multi-sector Schumpeterian growth model without capital.
In the current model there is a continuum of agents whose measure has been
normalized to one and who can work either in production or in research. Time is
continuous, and the amount of labor working in production is denoted by L. The size
of the whole labor force has been normalized to 1 so that a labor force of size 1 L?
remains available for research. There is a continuum ? ?0,1  of final goods which the
agents consume.  Each final good i is produced using labor only in such a way that
(1) i iy l?
  The instantaneous utility function of the agents is
(2) ? ? 1
0 it it
u t A y di?? ?
current model becomes essentially identical with one of Aghion and Howitt’s models, when one puts
0? ?  (i.e. there is no imitation)  and 1? ?  (i.e. there is no required inventive step).
Knowledge
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where itA  is the quality parameter which characterizes the level of technology in
sector i at time t and ity  the consumed amount of the good i at time t. Here 0 1?? ? ,
so  that  the  utility  function  of  the  final  good  is  concave.  It  will  be  assumed  that  the
consumption of two different variants of the good of the same sector brings no extra
utility. (I.e., if the consumer consumed the amounts iy?  and iy??   of two products of
the same sector i with  the  respective  quality  parameters iA?  and iA?? , by assumption
this makes only the contribution ? ?max ,i i i iA y A y? ?? ? ?? ??  to the integral in (2), so that
consuming different products of the same sector is pointless). The total utility of each
agent is given by the utility function
(3) ? ?
0
tU e u t dt?
? ?? ?
where the rate of time preference 0? ?  is an exogenously given constant.
The firms of the research sector produce sector-specific innovations. An innovation
in a sector ? ?0,1i?  is a new design for the good of sector i whose quality parameter
iA  equals the current maximum value max,tA  of quality parameters, which represents
the current stock of knowledge, or a “technology frontier”. This assumption
distinguishes pool of knowledge growth models from the quality ladder models, and it
is motivated by the idea of a technology spillover from the other, more advanced
sectors.
  When an innovation happens in a given sector ? ?0,1i? , the product which
corresponds to the innovation becomes temporarily proprietary. This means that its
inventor receives a temporary monopoly for producing it. This monopoly can end in
one  of  two  ways:  either  another  innovation  is  made  in  the  same  sector,  or  the
considered product turns into a nonproprietary product, which is produced under
perfect competition. The latter event is governed by a Poisson process with the hazard
rate ? .
  In an actual economy a proprietary good which is produced by a monopolist can
become a non-proprietary good, which is produced by several competing firms, in
many ways. Most obviously, when the monopoly is based on a patent, this will
happen if  a competing firm brings an essentially identical  product to the market, and
the government fails to prosecute it for its violation of intellectual property rights. In
what follows, I shall assume that the monopolies of innovators are based on patents,
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but if one applied the current model also to the innovations which have not been
patented, and which are protected only by e.g. a trade secret,9 the parameter ?  could
be  thought  of  as  a  measure  of  danger  that  the  trade  secret  leaks  out.  Intuitively,  the
parameter ?  is in each case a representation of the strength of intellectual property
rights and other ways of protecting innovations, and its value can be affected by the
government.
  Innovations have also a required inventive factor SP?  (where ‘SP’ refers to the social
planner). The parameter SP?  specifies  the  minimum  that  the  ratio  of  the  quality
parameter values before and after the innovation must at least have if the innovation is
patentable. In other words, since the quality parameter receives by assumption the
value max,tA  after the innovation, an innovation in a sector i may be patented if and
only if
(4) max,t SP
it
A
A
??
  The flow of innovations in a sector i is governed by a Poisson process which has at
time t the arrival rate
(5) it itd? ??
where itd  is the amount of research labor in sector i at time t and the constant ?  is the
efficiency parameter,  which  represents  the  efficiency  of  the  research  sector  in
producing new innovations. It is also assumed that the Poisson processes that
correspond to the innovations of the different researchers and the ones which turn
proprietary innovations into nonproprietary ones are all independent of each other.
  Finally, the innovations also increase the pool of knowledge which they utilize. The
size of this pool of knowledge is represented by the “technology frontier”, i.e. the
maximum value max,tA  of the quality parameter, and the time development of max,tA  is
determined by the equation
(6) ? ?max, max, 1 lnt tA A L? ?? ??
9  A generalized interpretation of the current model in which the monopolies of inventors are not
always based on patents can be motivated by the empirical evidence which suggests that such
appropriability mechanisms as secrecy, lead time, and complementary sales and services would  in
most industries be more important than patents. See Levin et al. (1987, p. 794), Mansfield (1986), and
Cohen et al. (2000).
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Here 1 L?  is the size of the labor force in the research sector, so that ? ?1 L? ?  is the
rate at which innovations emerge in the economy as a whole, and the constant ln?
expresses the efficiency of the innovations in improving the level of technology.10
2.3. THE PRODUCTION SECTOR
  In this section I shall deduce the properties of the momentary equilibrium of the
production sector, taking the available labor force L and the quality parameters of
both proprietary and non-proprietary goods as given. It will turn out to be convenient
to specify the quality parameters in terms of the quantity
(7)
max
i
i
A
a
A
?
which will below be called the relative quality of the sector i. Each non-proprietary
product i is produced under perfect condition, so that its price Np  equals its
production costs. Given the production function (1), these are equal with the current
wage w, so that
(8) Np w?
  The proprietary products are produced by a monopolist, i.e. the firm which has
invented them. Since the number of the consumers has been normalized to 1, the
consumption ? ?iy t  of the good i by  the  representative  consumer  expresses  also  the
demand of the good i. This easily implies that when the monopolist does not have to
compete with the producers of lower-quality products, the profit of the monopolist is
maximized when it chooses the price
(9) Pr Np w p? ?? ?
   Together with the utility function (2) and the available work force L, the prices (8)
and (9) and the labor market clearing condition determine the produced amount of
each good. The labor market clearing condition can be formulated as
(10) ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?1 1
0 0Pr Pr N N
h a y a da h a y a da L? ?? ?
10 My motive for denoting this constant by ln?  is to keep my notation similar with the one used in
Aghion – Howitt (1998; see p. 88).
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where Prh  and Nh  are the density functions that the relative quality parameter a has
among the proprietary and the nonproprietary products, and ? ?Pry a  and ? ?Ny a
denote the produced amounts of a proprietary and a non-proprietary good with
relative quality parameter a.
  The  utility  function  (2)  is  such  that  in  equilibrium the  ratio  between the  consumed
amounts of any two goods i and j must be identical for all consumers, and hence, it
must also equal the ratio of the produced amounts of the two goods i and j. More
specifically, (2), (8), and (9) imply that
 (11)
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
? ? ? ? ? ?
1 1 1 1
1 1
1
1
N Pr
Pr Pr
y a y a
y a y a
? ?
?
? ? ? ?
?
? ??
?
???
  Now one can conclude from (10) and (11) that
(12) ? ? ? ?1 11Pr
Pr N
L
y ?? ? ?
?
? ? ?
where the aggregators Pr?  and N?  are given by
(13)
? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?
1 1 1
0
1 1 1
0
Pr Pr
N N
h a a da
h a a da
?
?
?
?
?? ??
?
?? ??
?
?
  Clearly, (11) and (12) suffice to determine the produced amounts of both proprietary
and non-proprietary goods. The profit of the monopolist of a sector with the relative
quality parameter value a is now seen to be
(14) ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ?
1 1
1 1
1
Pr Pr
Pr N
L
a y a p w a w?
?
??
? ?
?
? ?
? ?? ? ?? ? ?
? ?? ?? ? ?? ?? ?
  In what follows C will denote the total amount of wealth that is consumed at a time t.
Since the size of population has been normalized to 1, C is numerically identical with
the wealth consumed by each single agent at a moment of time t. Given the prices (8)
and (9), and the optimal distribution of consumption between the different products
which is given by (11), the budget constraint of a consumer whose consumption is C
can be put into the form
(15)
? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ?? ?
? ?? ? ? ?
1 1
0 0
1   1
Pr Pr N N
Pr N Pr
w
C h a y a da w h a y a da
w
y? ?
?
?
?
? ?
? ?
? ? ? ?
? ?
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On the other hand, since in equilibrium each consumer distributes her consumption
between the different goods in accordance with (11), one can conclude from (2), (11),
and (12) that the instantaneous utility of the represtntative consumer equals
? ?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ?
? ?? ? ? ?? ?
1
0
1 11 1 1 1 1
max, max, Pr Pr0 0
1
max, Pr Pr
1
1
it it
t N t
t N
u t A y di
aA h a a da aA h a a da y
A y
?
? ?? ? ? ?
?? ?
?
?
? ? ? ?
? ?
?
? ??? ?? ?
? ? ? ?
?
? ?
When this result is combined with (15), it is seen that the consumption level C
provides the utility
(16) ? ?? ?11 1max0t i i Pr N
C
u A y di A
w
?
?? ?? ?? ?
?? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ??
  In a growth model with capital, the choice of the units of wealth at one instant of
time would suffice to determine the units at all other moments of time, but since the
current model does not contain capital, and since also the stock of the other goods
varies in it constantly, in it the units of wealth must be chosen for each moment of
time separately by convention, and also the interest rate is defined only relative to
such a conventional choice. A customary choice would be to normalize the wage level
to 1, but in what follows, I shall fix the units by choosing the wage level to be
(17) ? ?? ?? ?11Pr Nw ? ?? ?? ? ?? ?? ? ? ?
Under this normalization of w, the utility of the representative consumer becomes
simply
(18) max,t tu A C
??
2.4. THE DYNAMICS OF THE MODEL
   When ,i NEWV  denotes the value of a patent to a new innovation in the sector i, the
condition which characterizes the equilibrium of the research sector can be written as
(19) ,i NEWw V??
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Since the arrival of innovations is a Poisson process, this immediately implies that if
,i NEWV  had a different value in different sectors i, there would be research only in the
sectors in which ,i NEWV  is largest.
    In general, ,i NEWV  depends on not just the total amount of research in the future, but
also on the way in which research efforts are divided between the different sectors of
the economy. Given that the expected profit from a proprietary innovation is identical
in all the sectors in which there is research, it will be assumed below that there is the
same amount of research labor in all the sectors in which there is research.11 This
implies  that  innovations  emerge  at  the  same rate  in  all  the  sectors  in  which  there  is
research.
  In what follows ?  will denote the minimum value of the quality improvement
max iA A   in the innovations which are actually made. If one follows Aghion and
Howitt  in  assuming  that  the  incumbent  is  always  pushed  out  of  the  market  when  a
product with a better quality emerges (even if the quality improvement should be very
small), the above assumptions imply that there will be the same amount of research in
all the sectors i in which the quality improvement max iA A  in the invented product
exceeds the patentability requirement SP? . In this case ?  and SP?  are always identical.
  However, as it was explained in Section 1, we wish to consider also an alternative
interpretation for the model. Under this interpretation, the incumbent will attempt to
stay on the market and sell its lower-quality product at a lower price OLDp . It is easy
to see that when the consumers maximize the utility function (2), they will prefer
buying a new product with the quality parameter maxA  for the price NEWp to buying an
old product with relative quality iA  for the price OLDp  only if
max
i OLD
NEW
A p
A p
?
? ?
? ? ?
? ?
Hence,  the  monopolist  will  be  able  to  charge  the  optimal  price NEWp w ??  even if
the incumbent sinks it price to the level of the production costs OLDp w?  if the
relative quality of the old product satisfies the condition max 0iA A ?? , where
11 This assumption seems to be shared by all the Schumpeterian growth models which have been put
forward in the earlier literature, and it seems very difficult to produce  sensible estimates for the market
value of patents without it. Cozzi et al. (2007) present an argument which motivates this assumption in
the context of the model in Segerstrom (1998).
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(20) 0
?? ? ??
  Under the latter interpretation of the model, ?  will be given by ? ?0max , SP? ? ?? ,
since if in this case the social planner should choose a patentability requirement
0SP? ?? , ,i NEWV  will be maximal only in the sectors i in which the quality
improvement exceeds 0? , and the firms will act just like the patentability requirement
was 0? .
    It will shortly be seen that on a balanced growth path C is a constant, so that the
result (18) makes it natural to define the growth rate of the economy as
(21) max maxg A A? ?
The  main  aim  of  this  paper  is  to  provide  an  analysis  of  the  effect  of  the  policy
variables ?  and ?  on the balanced growth paths and growth traps of the current
model and, in particular, their effects on g.  Nevertheless,  we shall  also have a quick
look at the out-of-equilibrium dynamics of the model.
  In the discussion of its dynamics, the variable C can be viewed as a control variable,
whereas the aggregators Pr?  and N?  are predetermined variables. It is easy to see
that these variables suffice to determine the growth rate of the economy, since (12),
(15), and (17) imply that
(22)
? ?
? ?? ?
1 1
11
Pr N
Pr N
L C
?
?? ?
?
?
? ?
? ?
? ? ??
? ? ?
and according to (6) and (21) the growth rate is given by
(23) ? ?1 lng L? ?? ?
  A familiar argument shows that when the utility function U is given by (3) and (18),
in equilibrium
(24)
1
C g r
C
?
?
? ??
?
?
where r is the interest rate. Obviously, this result determines the time development of
C for any given values of the predetermined variables and consumption at time 0t ? ,
if the interest rate r can be expressed as a function of the current consumption and the
predetermined variables. It turns out that r has such an expression when 1? ? , but not
necessarily otherwise.
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  To see why this is  the case,  assume that 1? ? . Now patents become worthless for
their owner because of the emergence of better innovations at rate ? ?lng ?  and
because of imitation at rate ? , so that the change in the value iV  of an innovation with
relative quality a in a sector i satisfies the condition
? ? ? ?? ?lni i i iV a V g V rV? ? ?? ? ? ? ??
When one puts 1a ? , and applies the equilibrium condition ,i NEWw V?? ,  (14),  and
(22), it turns out that when a new innovation has just emerged in sector i so that the
value iV  of the current innovation in sector i equals ,i NEWV
(25)
? ?? ?
? ?11
1
lni
i
Pr N
V C
r g
V ?? ?
?? ? ?
? ?? ?
? ?
? ? ?? ? ? ?? ?? ?? ? ?? ?
?
Here the derivative iV?  should be interpreted as the change in the value of a patent for
some fixed, given new innovation.  It  should  be  observed  that  when  the  value  of  a
patent with the relative quality a is denoted by ? ?V a , iV?  is different from ? ?1dV dt
(i.e. the change in the value of an innovation with relative quality 1a ? ),  since  the
relative quality of each innovation changes as a function of time.
  Consider now two innovations which have at time t the relative qualities 1a ?  and 1.
Trivially, the ratio of their relative qualities remains 1a a?  as long as they are on the
market, so that according to (14) the ratio of the profits that they yield remains ? ?1 1a ?? .
On the other hand, when there is no patentability requirement, each innovation which
is on the market at some time t has at that time the same probability of being on the
market at any given time t?  in the future. Putting these results together, it follows that
(26) ? ? ? ? ? ?1 1 1V a a V???
and together with the equilibrium condition ? ?1w V??  and (17) this implies that
(27) ? ?? ? ? ? ? ?? ?
? ?
? ?
1
1 1
1
1 1
1 1
Pr N
Pr N
d dt VV d g
a
V dt V
? ?
?
? ?
??
? ??
? ?
?
? ?
? ? ??? ? ? ?
?? ? ?
? ??
  The derivatives Pr?? and N??  which appear in (27) have simple expressions when
1? ? . Clerarly, the aggregators Pr?  and N?  can be expressed in the form
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(28)
? ? ? ? ? ?
? ? ? ? ? ?
max
max
1 1
max0
1 1
max0
A
Pr Pr
A
N N
A A H A dA
A A H A dA
?
?
?
?
?? ??
?
?? ??
?
?
where PrH  and NH  are the density functions of the parameter A among the
proprietary and the non-proprietary products, respectively. Once more utilizing the
fact that the rate at which old products get replaced by new ones is lng ?  for all
values of a when 1? ? , it is now seen that
? ? ? ?
lnPr Pr
g
H A H A?
?
? ?? ? ?? ?
? ?
?  and ? ? ? ? ? ?
lnN Pr N
g
H A H A H A?
?
? ?? .
When these results are inserted into (28), a straightforward calculation shows that
 (29)
ln 1 lnPr Pr
g g g ?
? ? ?
? ?? ? ? ? ? ?? ??? ?
?
and
(30)
1 lnN Pr N
g g?
? ?
? ?? ? ? ? ? ?? ??? ?
?
Together (27), (28), and (29) imply that
 (31)
? ?? ?
? ?
1
1
ln 11 2
1 ln
Pr
Pr N
gV g g
V
? ?
? ?
? ? ??
? ? ??
? ?
? ?
? ? ??? ? ?
?? ? ?
?
  Obviously, when the initial values of the predetermined variables Pr?  and N?  and
the control variable C have been given, the results (24), (25), (26), (29), (30), and (31)
suffice to determine the development of the system in the future.
  This above analysis constitutes the pool of knowledge analogy of the way in which
the dynamics of a quality ladder model has earlier been discussed in Segerstrom
(1998, pp. 1298-1302), and Segerstrom (2007). In each case, it is essential for the
argument that i iV V? , i.e. the rate at which the value of an innovation changes, has an
expression which does not explicitly contain r or iV .  It  is  also  easy  to  see  that  this
construction does not generalize to the case in which 1? ? , since (26) has no analogy
in this case. Rather, it is now observed that unlike in e.g. the Segerstrom model, in this
case i iV V?  can only be evaluated after making some restrictive assumptions
concerning the amount of research in the future.
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2.5. THE BALANCED GROWTH PATHS
    We now turn to the discussion of the balanced growth paths of the considered
model, and for this reason we consider first in general its steady states, i.e. situations
in which the growth rate max maxg A A? ?  is a constant. When 0g ? , the quality
parameter of an innovation whose age is t is in this case gta e?? , and the innovations
for which 1gta e ??? ?  cannot be replaced by a better innovation. The maximum age
0t  for which this condition is valid is
(32) ? ? ? ? ? ?? ?0 ln ln 1 lnt g L? ? ? ?? ? ?
If new innovations emerge at the constant rate ? ?1 L? ? , the number of the
innovations which are younger than this age is ? ? ? ?ln ln? ? .  However, this cannot be
the case if ? ? ? ?ln ln 1? ? ? , i.e. if ? ?? , since the measure of the sectors of the
economy has been normalized to 1. The interpretation of this result is that the current
model has no balanced growth paths with a positive growth rate when ? ??  since in
this case the products of all sectors would end up being so close to the research
frontier that improvements to them would not exceed the required inventive factor. In
what follows, I shall assume that
(33) ? ??
  When (33) is valid and the growth rate has the constant value g, within a finite time
the number of the sectors in which there is research will obtain the constant value
? ? ? ?1 ln ln? ?? , so that the rate at which innovations happen in each of these sectors
is
? ?
? ? ? ?
1
1 ln ln ln ln
L g?
? ? ? ?
?
?
? ?
The  other  sectors  are  protected  from  innovation,  but  in  both  kinds  of  sectors,  a
monopolist might loose the monopoly because her product might become non-
proprietary through imitation.
  In what follows, ? ?Pr g?  and ? ?N g?  shall denote the values of Pr?  and N?  in a
steady state with growth rate g. These can be determined by calculating as the limits
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that Pr?  and N?  approach when g stays constant.
 12 It  is  easy  to  see  that  if  the
growth rate has a constant value 0g ? , the functions Prh  and Nh  approach the limits
(34) ? ? ? ?? ? ? ?
? ?
? ?? ?
1 ln1
1
1 ln ,  1
lim
1 ln ,                  1
g
t Pr g
a a a
h a
a a
? ??
?
? ? ?
? ?
?
?? ?
? ??? ?
???
and
(35) ? ? ? ? ? ?lim 1gt N Prh a a h a???? ? ?
When (34) is inserted into the definition of Pr? , it turns out that
(36)
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ?
? ?
? ?? ?
? ? ? ? ? ?
? ?? ? ? ? ? ?
1 11 ln1 1 1 1 1 1
0 1
1 1
1 1
ln ln
1 ln 1 ln1
   1
1 1 1 1 1 ln
g g
Pr
g
g a a da a da
g g
? ? ?? ? ? ?
?
? ?
?
? ?
? ? ? ? ?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
? ? ? ? ? ?
? ?
? ? ?
? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ? ? ?? ?? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ?
? ?
  The results (34) and (35) also imply that
? ? ? ? ? ?? ?? ?
? ?
? ?
1 ln ln
1 ln ,  1
1 ln ,                       1
Pr N
a a a
h a h a
a a
? ?? ? ?
? ?
?? ??? ? ?
???
  Hence, the sum ? ? ? ?Pr Nh a h a? , i.e. the total number of  product with a given relative
quality a, is independent of ?  as it,  of course,  should be the case.  This allows us to
conclude that also the sum ? ? ? ?Pr Ng g? ? ? ??  is independent of ? . When 0? ? ,
there are no non-proprietary goods so that in this case ? ? 0N g? ?  and ? ?Pr g? ? ? .
Inserting the value 0? ?  into (36), it now follows that
(37)
? ?
? ? ? ?
1 1
1 1 1
1
ln ln 1
?? ?
? ? ? ? ?
?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ? ?? ?? ?? ? ? ?? ?? ?? ? ? ?? ?
The value of N?  is now determined by the results (36) and (37) and the fact that
(38) ? ? ? ?N Prg g? ? ? ??
  In general, a steady state is a balanced growth path if it satisfies the equilibrium
condition ? ?1w V?? , i.e. if the wage from working in production is identical with the
12  Obviously, in the special case in which 1? ?  the steady state values of Pr?  and N?  could also
be determined by inserting the values 0Pr N? ? ? ?? ?  into (29) and (30) and solving for Pr?  and
N? .  It is easy to verify that the values which are obtained in this manner are identical with (36) and
(38) when 1? ? .
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expected profit per worker from research. Here the profit flow is given by (14), and
the wage is fixed by the convention (17), so that the wage is a constant on a balanced
growth path. Since also the labor force involved in production must be a constant if g
is constant, (14) implies that on a balanced growth path 0C ?? , and one can conclude
from (24) that
(39) r g?? ?
  As we saw above, the hazard rate with which a product is replaced by a better one is
0 as long as its age is smaller than the value 0t  defined by (32), and ? ?lng ? ?  after
that. Given that the relative quality of a product which is invented at t will be ? ?g t ta ?? ?
at a subsequent point of time t? , in a steady state
? ?? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ?
? ?? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ?
0
0
0
ln
1
t t r t t g t t
tt t
r t t g t t t g t t
tt t
V e e dt
e e dt
?
? ? ?
?
?
? ? ?? ? ? ? ?
?
? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ?
??
??
??
?
?
Since the labor force L, the wage w, and the aggregators Pr?  and N?  all stay
constant in a steady state, (14) implies that
? ?? ? ? ?? ?? ? ? ?1 1g t tg t tt te e ?? ??? ? ??? ?? ?
and remembering that r g?? ?  it is seen that
(40) ? ?? ? ? ?? ?
1
1 t
t
V
r g
?
?
?
where
(41) ? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ?? ?? ?0 0
0
1
1 1 ln
0
t g t g t g P t t
t
r g e dt e dt? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
??? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ?? ??
  Clearly, the quantity r?  is time independent, and if it were the case that 0g ?? ?  i.e.
if there was no growth and no imitation, ? ?r g?   would be simply r? ? . Accordingly,
a natural way to think of ? ?r g?  is to view it as a generalized discount factor for future
profits,  which  takes  into  account  not  just  the  interest  rate,  but  also  the  other  effects
which lower the expected value of the future profits from a patent.
  When (40), (14) and the fact that ? ?1 lnL g ? ?? ?   are inserted into the equilibrium
condition ? ?? ?1w V?? , it receives the form
(E1) ? ?, , 1F g ? ? ?
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where F is given by
(42) ? ? ? ?? ?
? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ?1 1
1 ln1
, ,
Pr N
g
F g
g g r g?
? ??? ? ?
? ? ? ?
???
? ? ? ?
In this definition it is explicitly mentioned that F depends also on the parameters ?
and ? , which describe the strength of IPR protection and which implicitly affect
? ?r g? , Pr? , and N? , since below we shall investigate the growth effects of the
choice of ?  and ? .
  In what follows I shall refer to F as the research incentive function. This is because
of a simple economic interpretation that one can give to the steady states in which the
growth rate is positive but ? ?, , 1F g ? ? ? . The equilibrium condition ? ?1w V??  is an
expression of the idea that the wage is identical in production and in the research
sector.  However,  there  is  empirical  evidence  which  suggests  that  persons  with  a
scientific education have a preference for research which is shown in accepting
employment  in  research  even  when  it  has  a  lower  salary  than  employment  of  other
kinds.13 Within growth theory, this phenomenon could be modeled by postulating a
wage difference between the research sector and production.14
  In the current framework, this could be achieved by postulating that the utility of an
individual depends on the sector that she works in (because of e.g. a social status
associated with science) in such a way that in equilibrium the quantity
? ?? ?1V w? ??  is not 1. The preference for science could be modeled by giving ?  a
value  which  is  smaller  than  1  and  similarly,  a  preference  for  employment  in
production can be modeled by setting 1? ? . Under this interpretation of the model,
each value ?  of the function ? ?, ,F g? ? ??  can  be  viewed  as  the  strength  of
preference which would make g the growth rate on a balanced growth path, when the
intellectual property policy is represented by ?  and ? .
13  Cf. Stern (2004).
14  A growth model with this feature has been put forward in e.g. Fershtman et al. (1996; cf. p. 114).
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2.6. THE GROWTH TRAPS
  With a growth trap I shall in what follows mean an equilibrium in which the growth
rate is zero, although also a balanced growth path with a positive growth rate would
be possible for the same parameter values. There is a fairly trivial sense in which the
current model has growth traps. In a pool of knowledge model researchers cannot
freely choose the size of the quality improvement that their research yields in a given
product.  Rather,  its  size  is  determined  by  the  closeness  of  its  current  design  to  the
“research frontier” and given the idealizing assumption that the shift of the “research
frontier” that each single innovation causes is infinitesimal, this implies if all products
are sufficiently close to the research frontier, there are no incentives for improving on
any of them.15
  However, the growth traps of this kind can be viewed as an artifact of the modeling
technique  that  we  have  chosen,  i.e.  of  the  fact  that  in  the  model  it  is  impossible  to
make large improvements to the highest-quality products. As it was pointed out in the
introduction, it is more interesting to ask whether a state of no growth could be caused
by slow growth in the past. We are now in the position to pose this question in a
precise manner.
  A situation of very slow growth in the past can be represented by postulating that the
values of the aggregators Pr?  and N?  are the limits of their steady-state values
? ?Pr g?  and ? ?N g?  when 0g ? , i.e. that they have the values
(43) ? ? ? ?0
,    0
0 lim
0,     0Pr g Pr
g
?
??
? ??
? ? ? ? ? ??
 and
(44) ? ? ? ?0
0,    0
0 lim
,     0N g N
g
?
??
??
? ? ? ? ?? ??
  Now a growth trap which is due to slow growth in the past can be defined to be a
situation in which 0g ? , ? ?0Pr Pr? ? ? , and ? ?0N N? ? ?  is  an  equilibrium,
although there is a balanced growth path with a positive growth rate for identical
values of all the parameters of the model (i.e. for identical ? , ? , ? , ? , ? , and ? ).
15 More specifically, when the patentability requirement SP?  is larger than 1, there are no incentives
for improving on proprietary products whose relative quality parameter a is larger than 1 SP? . Hence,
if 1 SPa ??  for all products, there are no incentives to improve on any of them, so that g will remain
permanently zero.
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  Geometrically, a situation in which 0g ?  and the aggregators Pr?  and N?  have
their low-growth values ? ?0Pr Pr? ? ?  and ? ?0N N? ? ?  is an equilibrium if the
research incentive function satisfies the condition ? ?0, , 1F ? ? ? ,  so  that  the  kind  of
growth traps that we are considering do not exist when F is a decreasing function of g.
However, it is easy to see that F is not in all cases decreasing in g.
  More specifically, definition (42) shows that a change in the steady-state growth rate
g has three kinds of effects on the research incentive function. Firstly, larger values of
g correspond to smaller values of multiplier ? ?? ?1 lng ? ?? .  Intuitively, this means
that the supply of productive labor is smaller when the growth rate is larger, because a
larger part of the population works in the research sector, and this diminishes the
profits from new products. Secondly, (41) easily implies that
? ?
0
r g
g
?
?
?
?
i.e. that an increase of g increases the effective discount factor of future profits.
Intuitively,  this  means  that  when  the  growth  rate  is  higher,  the  expected  profits  are
lower because the danger of loosing the monopoly for a product is larger, and because
the quality of the products of the other sectors increases faster.
  Finally, (36), (37), and (38) imply that
? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ? ? ?1 1 1 1 1 0PrPr N gg gg g
? ?? ?? ? ? ?
??? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
? ?
so that an increase of g decreases the denominator in (42). Intuitively, this means that
a higher growth rate has also a positive effect for a monopolist, because when growth
is faster, a larger part of the products of competitors are proprietary, and have higher
prices.
  Figure 2.2 depicts a situation in which the last, positive effect is for small values of g
larger than the two negative effects, causing the model to have multiple equilibria.
Given that the main aim of this paper is to evaluate the changes of an approach based
on “pool of knowledge” models in general terms, and to deduce qualitative results
concerning the growth effects of intellectual property rights protection from them, in
this and the subsequent figures the parameter values have not been calibrated to any
particular economy. Rather, they have been chosen to illustrate the different
possibilities that the current model allows for.
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  In Figure 2.2 there are two positive values g, 1g g?  and 2g g? , which satisfy (E1)
and which accordingly correspond to balanced growth paths of the model. In addition,
since ? ?0, , 1F ? ? ? , also the situation in which 0g ?  and the aggregators Pr?  and
N?  have their low-growth values is an equilibrium of the model, so that it constitutes
a growth trap which is due to slow growth in the past.
Figure 2.2. The research incentive function ? ?, ,F g? ? ??  when 1.5? ? ,
0.5? ? , 0.005? ? , 0.95? ? , 0.1? ?  and 0 1.0499
?? ? ? ?? ? ? .
  Obviously, the positive effect of growth on the research incentive function does not
exist if there is no imitation (because in this case all products are proprietary,
independently of the growth rate), and it can be expected to be small also when the
imitation rate is too high (because in this case most products will be non-proprietary
even for high values of the growth rate). The following proposition confirms this
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intuition by showing that multiple equilibria exist when ?  is small but positive, but
not necessarily otherwise.
PROPOSITION 1. (a) If 0? ? , the research incentive function is decreasing in g, so that
there cannot be multiple equlibria with 0g ? , or growth traps due to slow growth in
the past.
(b) For all values 0? ? which are sufficiently close to 0 (a sufficient condition being
? ?? ?1? ?? ? ? ?? ?? ? ), the model has for some values of the efficiency parameter ?
multiple equilibria, one of which is a growth trap caused by slow growth in the past.
Figure 2.3. The research incentive function ? ?, ,F g? ? ??  when 1.5? ? ,
5? ? , 0.5? ? , 0.95? ? , 0.1? ? , and 0 1.0499
?? ? ? ?? ? ? .
  Proposition 1 is illustrated with Figure 2.3, in which both the imitation rate ?  and
the efficiency parameter ?  are larger than in Figure 2.2, but which corresponds to the
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same parameter values otherwise. A larger imitation rate decreases the incentives for
research, implying that a larger value of ?  is needed for obtaining a positive growth
rate.  It  also  decreases  the  positive  effect  of  growth  on  research  incentives  via  the
larger market share of proprietary products, and this is shown in the fact that now F is
everywhere decreasing, and multiple equilibria are impossible.
2.7. THE GROWTH AND WELFARE EFFECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
POLICY
  In the current model intellectual property policy affects growth and welfare via the
required inventive factor ?  and the imitation rate ? . Given that the model allows for
multiple equilibria, the function ? ?,g ? ?  is now defined to be the largest value of g
which for the given ?  and ?  satisfies (E1) if such values exist, and 0 otherwise. In
this section I study the growth-maximizing and welfare-maximizing choice of ?  and
? , assuming that ? ?,g g ? ?? .
  The practice of restricting attention to the equilibrium with the largest growth rate
can be motivated by observing that in e.g. Figure 2.2 the balanced growth path which
corresponds to the smaller of the two possible positive long-run growth rates – i.e. the
one for which 1g g?  – has some quite implausible features. In this equilibrium an
arbitrarily small increase in the amount of research and the corresponding increase in
g would cause a situation in which the profits of research firms per worker would be
larger than the wage in production so that the firms would have an incentive to
increase their research efforts even more. The situation in which 1g g?  is nevertheless
an equilibrium, because just like in most other endogenous growth models, in the
current model the contribution of each firm to the growth rate of the economy is
infinitesimal. In all actual economies the decisions of each firm have an effect on the
growth rate of the economy (however small this effect might be), and this suggests
making the following restriction on the considered equilibrium value of the growth
rate g:
(E2) ? ?, , 0F g P g?? ? ?
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  Excluding the implausible case in which ? ?, ,F g P g?? ?  is  precisely  0  when
? ?, , 1F g P? ? , it is clear that the largest of the equilibrium values, ? ?,g g P?? , will
always satisfy the additional condition (E2). Accordingly, for the rest of this section I
shall assume that (E1) and (E2) are both valid for the considered balanced growth
paths.
  Since  (3)  and  (18)  imply  that  the  utility  of  each  agent  is  infinite  and  a  reasonable
welfare analysis is impossible when g ?? , I shall also assume that
(45) g ??
In the current model there is no disutility of labor and the agents have identical
income, and it is natural to define the welfare function to be given simply by the
utility (3) of the agents. Restricting attention to balanced growth paths, I shall below
consider the normalized utility function
(46) max,0U U A??
The definition (3) and the results (18), (22), and (38) easily imply that this is given by
(47) ? ?Pr
C L
U G
g g
? ?
? ?
? ? ?
? ?
?
where
(48) ? ?
? ?? ?? ?
? ?? ?
1
1 1
1
1
Pr
Pr
Pr
G
? ?
?
?
?
?
?
?
? ? ? ?
? ?
? ?? ? ? ?? ?
  In  what  follows,  I  shall  take U?  to be the welfare function that the social planner
wishes to maximize. The formula (48) shows that if the social planner adjusts ?  and
?  in such a way that the growth rate on the balanced growth path is increased, this
has three kinds of effects on the function U? . The increased growth increases welfare
in the future, which is shown by the increase of the term ? ?1 g? ? , but it demands a
larger work force in research, so that the term ? ?? ?1 lnL g ?? ? ?? ?  is decreased in
(47). Thirdly, a larger growth rate corresponds to different quality parameter
distributions ? ?Pr g?  and ? ?N g? , which is shown in the change in ? ?PrG ? . This
effect is characterized by the following lemma.
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LEMMA 1. The function ? ?PrG ?  receives its minimum for some value Pr?  which
belongs to the interval ? ?0,? . The function ? ?PrG ?  receives its largest value in this
interval both when 0Pr? ?  (i.e. when all products are non-proprietary) and when
Pr? ? ?   (i.e. when all products are proprietary).
  In other words, the resources for producing the different products are allocated most
efficiently when the products are either all proprietary or all non-proprietary, This
result  should  be  contrasted  with  the  familiar  results  concerning  the  deadweight  loss
that microeconomic analyses of a monopoly yield. As Lemma 1 shows, in the current
model there is nothing that would correspond to the deadweight loss when all the
goods in the economy are produced by monopolists. In order to understand intuitively
why this is the case, it should be observed that when the labor force L is fixed, the
consumed amount of each good is the same when all the products are proprietary and
when they are all  non-proprietary,  although the prices of the goods differ in the two
cases. The two cases are otherwise different only in so far that when the goods are
proprietary, the owners of the firms receive a part of the wealth that is spent on buying
the goods, whereas when they are non-proprietary, all the wealth that is spent on the
goods is given to their producers.
  However, as we are not considering the welfare effects of the distribution of wealth
between  labor  and  the  owners  of  firms,  but  implicitly  assume  that  each  consumer
owns an equal share of the firms,16 this  difference  does  not  show  up  in  a  welfare
calculation. Rather, the only way in which the monopolies affect welfare is that, when
monopolies cause price differences, the consumers fail to distribute their wealth
between the products in an optimal fashion. (E.g., if there are two goods with the
same  quality,  it  would  be  socially  optimal  to  consume  the  same  amount  of  each  of
them, but this will not happen if one of them is competitively priced and the other one
has a monopoly price.)
  The  growth  and  welfare  effects  of  the  rate  of  imitation ?  are characterized by the
following  proposition.  In  the  current  model  the  effects  of  imitation  on  the  research
incentive function are purely negative, since larger values of ?  correspond to a larger
16 This assumption is made implicitly when it is assumed that welfare can be evaluated by considering a
single representative consumer, whose consumption is equal with the average consumption of all
consumers.
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danger of the loss of monopoly, and also to lower prices of competing products, and
accordingly, the growth maximizing value of ?  is 0.
PROPOSITION 2. Keeping the other parameters fixed, the growth rate ? ?,g ? ?  is  a
decreasing function of the rate of imitation ?  whenever ? ?,g ? ?  is positive, so that the
growth maximizing value of the rate of imitation is 0? ? . If the knowledge increase
parameter ?  is sufficiently large (if ln? ? ?? )  this is also the welfare maximizing
value of ? .
  The assumption which appears in this proposition – i.e., ln? ? ??  – means,
intuitively, that the negative welfare effect of growth which is due to the decrease of
the labor in production is smaller than the positive effect which is due to increased
future welfare.
  There is no similar general and simple answer to the question which value of the
required inventive factor ?  is growth-maximizing. The following proposition
characterizes the optimal value of ?  in general terms.
PROPOSITION 3. Assume that the imitation rate ?  and the other parameters of the
model except for the required inventive factor ?  are fixed.
(a) If ? ?,g ? ?  is positive when 1? ? , the value ? ?,g ? ?  will be increased by a
sufficiently small increase of ? .
(b) If ? ?? , the model does not have balanced growth paths. If balanced growth
paths with a positive growth rate exist for some value of ? , the value of ?  which
maximizes the growth rate is smaller than ? ?2 1e ?? .
  Part (a) of this proposition shows that the growth-maximizing choice of ?  is  never
1, and part (b) shows that the optimal patentability requirement is small when the
profitability (which is measured by 1 ? ) is low.  Clearly, Proposition 3 is compatible
with both a situation in which the growth-maximizing value of ?  is smaller than ? ,
and with a situation in which growth is an increasing function of ?  in the whole
interval ? ?1,? . Figure 2.4 illustrates the former possibility.
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Figure 2.4. The growth rate as a function of the required inventive factor,
when 1.5? ? , 0.05? ? , 1? ? , 0.85? ? , and 0.1? ? .
  In this case ? ?2 1e ? ?? ? , and one can conclude from Proposition 3(b) that the problem
choosing ?  so that growth is maximized must have a well-defined solution. When
this is the case, (38) and Lemma 2 imply that the welfare-maximizing value of ?  will
be  larger  or  smaller  than  the  growth-maximizing ? ,  depending  on  the  sign  of
? ?PrG ?  which represents the welfare effects of the price distribution of the products.
In the situation of Figure 2.4 the growth-maximizing choice of ?  is smaller than 0? ,
and as it was explained in Section 4, 0?  is the minimum inventive step for which
makes  it  unprofitable  for  the  incumbent  to  sell  its  product  at  a  lower  price  after  the
new product has been invented. Hence, Figure 2.4 can be interpreted as meaning that
the growth-maximizing policy would be to protect the holder of the newest patent not
just from imitation but also from competition with inferior products.
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  Figure 2.5 represents a case in which ? ?2 1e ? ?? ? . In this case Proposition 3 does not
imply  that  there  was  a  growth-maximizing  value  of ? .  No  such  value  exists  in  the
situation of Figure 2.5, since in it growth is increased by an increase in ?  in  the
whole interval ? ?1,? , but the model fails to have an equilibrium if ? ?? .
Figure 2.5. The growth rate as a function of the required inventive factor,
when 1.2? ? , 0.05? ? , 3? ? , 0.85? ? , and 0.1? ? .
  Intuitively, an increase of ?  has a positive effect on the research incentive function
because it increases future profits by lengthening the time during which the
innovation is protected from being replaced by a superior product, and a negative
effect because it increases the average current quality of the products of competitors,
by shifting research efforts to the worst products on the market. Since the former
effect  is  small  in  an  economy  with  few  innovations,  it  is  to  be  expected  that  small
values of ?  would be optimal in an economy with a small growth rate.
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  I shall conclude this section with a proposition which shows that this is, indeed, the
case. The proposition is concerned with the effects of the lowering of the efficiency
parameter ? . A decrease in ?  shifts the research incentive function F downwards
and decreases ? ?,g ? ? , and as Figures 2.2 and 2.3 illustrate, such a shift will make
? ?,g ? ?  decrease to zero continuously when F is decreasing in g (as in Figure 2.3) but
not necessarily otherwise (e.g. not in the situation of Figure 2.2). We wish to consider
the limit in which the growth rate is small but positive, and for this reason the
following proposition contains the restrictive assumption that F is decreasing in g.
PROPOSITION 4. Assume that the imitation rate ?  is fixed and suppose F is a
decreasing function of the growth rate g. Define 0?  by
? ?? ?? ?0 inf , 0 for someg ? ?? ? ? ? ????? ?  (i.e., let 0?  be the threshold value of the
efficiency parameter ?  below which the growth rate will be zero, independently of
how the social planner chooses the inventive factor ? ). Now the growth-maximizing
value of the required inventive factor ?  approaches 1 when 0? ?? ? . If the welfare
maximizing value of ?  corresponds to a positive growth rate when 0? ?? ? , also
this value approaches 1 when 0? ?? ? .
2.8. CONCLUDING REMARKS
  Above I have studied the generalization of a pool of knowledge growth model to a
situation of imperfect intellectual property rights. In the model the very idealized
assumptions  of  the  quality  ladder  models  –  i.e.  that  all  innovations  are  of  the  same
size – has been replaced with an equally idealized assumption – i.e., that the available
pool of knowledge is equally useful for developing all products – and, as it stands, the
model is unlikely to produce interesting quantitative predictions concerning e.g. the
optimal required inventive step or the extent to which R&D should be subsidized or
taxed. Nevertheless, the above analysis has produced both several interesting
qualitative results and insights into the prospects of developing more realistic pool of
knowledge models in the future.
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  While considering the dynamics of the model, I presented the pool of knowledge
version of a standard analysis of dynamics of a quality ladder model when it is not
initially on its balanced growth path. It turned out that when there is no required
inventive step, this analysis has an analogy for arbitrarily values of the imitation rate,
but  not  otherwise.  In  the  presence  of  a  patentability  requirement  the  analysis  of  the
dynamics of the model is essentially more difficult, and it seems to be possible only
after introducing restrictive assumptions concerning the amount of R&D in the future.
  It was seen that the model provides conceptual tools for understanding growth traps,
and it led to a simple definition of a growth trap which is caused by slow growth in
the  past.  It  turned  out  such  growth  traps  are  possible  when  the  rate  of  imitation  is
small but positive. It also turned out that on a balanced growth path growth is always
increased by a decrease of imitation, so that the growth-maximizing imitation rate is
zero.
  However, these results were deduced assuming that the efficiency with which the
available pool of knowledge can be used for making new innovations is independent
of  whether  the  products  are  proprietary.  It  should  be  observed  that  in  an  actual
economy the “proprietary” products are often not protected by patents but by e.g.
trade secrets, and in this case it might be easier to utilize the current pool of
knowledge when there are more non-proprietary products on the market. It is clear
that the growth-maximizing imitation rate might be positive in a generalized model in
which this effect is taken into account.
  The analysis of comparative statics revealed that the growth-maximizing value of the
required inventive step is always positive.  The model led to the plausible prediction
that the growth-maximizing required inventive step is small in a slowly-growing
economy, and when the profit margins of the monopolists are small. It was also seen
that for large values of profitability the problem of choosing the growth-maximizing
required inventive step might fail to have an economically meaningful solution in a
pool of knowledge growth model.
  These results can be compared with the results of such microeconomic analyses of
the required inventive step as e.g. O’Donoghue (1998), Hunt (2004), and Denicolò –
Zanchettin (2002). O’Donoghue (1998) and Hunt (2004) conclude from their models
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that the growth-maximizing required inventive step is positive,17 but in the context of
the model of Denicolò – Zanchettin (2002) it turns out that a positive novelty
requirement is not needed in the optimal patent policy, if the leading breadth is chosen
optimally.18
  There are several ways in which one might wish to generalize the current model. To
make the model more realistic, one might replace the assumption of a single pool of
knowledge with the idea that the products are distributed into “bundles” which utilize
separate but interconnected pools of knowledge. A less dramatic and easier
modification would be to include the instruments of patent policy which were not
considered above. As it was pointed out in the introduction, patent literature
distinguishes between patent length, the patentability requirement, and the lagging
and the leading breadth of a patent. As a natural next step, one might wish to
generalize  the  current  framework  in  such  a  way  that  it  allowed  for  a  discussion  of
patent breadth and patent length.
  However,  it  seems  that  a  pool  of  knowledge  growth  model  does  not  allow  for  an
interesting discussion of the distinction between the leading breadth of a patent and
the patentability requirement. If one assumed that patents have a leading breadth K
which is larger than the patentability requirement ? , this would in the current model
have precisely the same consequences as the assumption that the patentability
requirement was K: since in the model all new products are of the quality which
17 O'Donoghue, T. (1998) analyzes the effects of a patentability requirement on research spending and
on welfare in a model in which the firms choose their level of R&D spending, and also the size of the
innovations that they are targeting (ibid,. p. 659). Proposition 1 in ibid., p. 667, shows that when there
is no required inventive step and patents have no leading breadth,the amount of investment in research
may be smaller than the socially optimal investment. O'Donoghue also concludes that a positive
patentability requirement may increase R&D spending and welfare (Propositions 2 and 3 in ibid., pp.
669-670), and also that patentability requirement can have a  positive effect on R&D spending even
when patents have a leading breadth (ibid., p. 673).
    The main difference between the models of O’Donoghue et al (1998) and Hunt (2004) is that
whereas in the former model each firm chooses a targeted innovation size, in the latter paper each firm
chooses only a R&D intensity, and both the size of the resulting innovation and its time of arrival are
random phenomena (Hunt, 2004, p. 403). In Hunt’s model, the leading breadth and patentability
requirement are identical (ibid., p. 404). It turns out that also in the context of this model the growth-
maximizing patentability standard is positive (Proposition 4 in p. 413). One of the interesting points
that Hunt (2004) makes is that the optimal patentability standard depends on the rate of innovation in
the industry, so that the optimal patentability requirement is different in different industries (ibid., p.
414).
18 See Proposition 1 on p. 812 in Denicolò – Zanchettin (2002). This paper analyzes a simple two-
period model of sequential innovation. In this model the innovation of the second period builds upon
the innovation of the first period, and the first innovation may be protected by both a patentability
requirement and leading breadth.
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corresponds to the research frontier, there would in both cases be research in only
those sectors whose distance from the research frontier was larger than K.
  On the other hand, it would be fairly easy to include patents of a finite duration into
the current framework, since in it the size of an innovation exceeds the patentability
requirement ?  if and only if it replaces a product whose age is larger than a constant
0t . Hence, many features of the current model would remain unchanged if one
replaced the patentability requirement ?  with a minimum age 0t  which a product
must exceed before it can be replaced by a new one. However, in a model with this
interpretation one should either assume that all products become non-proprietary
when they reach the age 0t , or that the rate of imitation gets higher when the products
reach the age 0t , since imitating becomes legal at that time, and these changes would
affect the results of the above analysis.
APPENDIX. PROOFS OF THE PROPOSITIONS IN CHAPTER 2.
PROOF  OF PROPOSITION 1. The definition (41) easily implies that ? ? 0r g g? ? ?? .
Further, when 0? ? , ? ?Pr g? ? ? , which is according to (37) independent of g.
Plugging these results into (42), it turns out that when 0? ? ,
? ?
? ?1 1 1
0
ln
r gF
F g g r g g? ?
?? ?? ? ?
? ? ?
?
?
This proves the validity of (a).
  Turning to (b), assume now that 0? ? . First, it is observed that if it for some value
of ?  it is the case that ? ?0, , 1F ? ? ?  and ? ?? ?
0
, , 0
g
F g g? ?
?
? ? ? , then the model
must have an equilibrium for some positive value 2g  of g, since
? ? ? ?lnlim , , 0g F g P? ? ?? ? ? .  Since ? ?, ,F g ? ?  is a decreasing function of ? , it follows
that when ?  is given a slightly smaller value, there will still be a positive value
2g g?  which corresponds to an equilibrium, but ? ?, , 1F g ? ? ?  so that 0g ?  is  a
growth trap due to slow growth in the past.
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  Accordingly, we now consider the condition which must be valid if ?  can be chosen
so that ? ?0, , 1F ? ? ?  and ? ?? ?
0
, , 0
g
F g g? ?
?
? ? ? .Clearly, (41), (42), (43), and (44)
easily imply that the former of these conditions is equivalent with.
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  Define now the function I by
(A2) ? ? ? ? ? ?
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Clearly, when one puts ? ?ln lnR g ? ?? ?  and ? ?0 lnt g?? , it turns out that
? ?? ? ? ?1 0ln , ,g I Q R t?? ? , ? ?? ? ? ?2 0ln , ,Pr g I Q R t?? ? , and ? ? ? ?3 01 , ,r g I Q R t?? ,
where ? ?1 1Q g ?? ? , ? ?2 1Q g? ?? ? ? , and ? ? ? ?3 1Q g? ? ? ?? ? ? ? .
  Plugging these expressions into (42), and remembering that N Pr? ? ? ??  where
?  is independent of g, it now follows that
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When 0g ? , the computation of the value of ? ?0, ,I Q R t g? ?  is complicated by the
fact that,  both when 2Q Q?  and when 3Q Q?
? ? ? ?00 0 1,    1lim lim 0,    1
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so that is necessary to consider the cases in which 1? ?  and 1? ?  separately. A
tedious but straightforward calculation shows that
 (A4)
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Now (A3) and (A4) imply that
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where
(A6)
? ?
? ?
1 1 ln ,   1
1 ,     1
? ? ? ?
?
? ? ?
? ? ???? ?
? ??
As explained above, we wish to find out under which circumstances the derivative
(A5) is positive when ? ?0, , 1F P? ? ,  i.e.  when (A1)  is  valid.  When ?  is chosen so
that it satisfies (A1), the expression (A5) will be positive if and only if
(A7)
? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?
? ?
? ?
1 1 11 1
0
ln ln
? ? ?? ? ? ?
? ? ? ? ? ? ?
? ?? ? ? ?? ? ?
? ?
Considering separately the case in which 1? ?  and the case in which 1? ? , it easily
follows from (A6) and (37) that in both cases 1 ln? ?? ? . This implies that  (A7) is
valid whenever
? ? ? ? ? ?1 1 11 1 1
0
? ? ?? ? ?
? ? ? ? ?
? ?? ? ?? ? ?
? ?
This is equivalent with ? ?? ?1? ?? ? ? ?? ?? ? , and it can be concluded that in this case
the model has an equilibrium which is a growth trap due to slow growth in the past, as
it is stated in part (b) of this proposition. ?
PROOF  OF LEMMA 1. The definition (48) implies that
(A8) ? ?
? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ?? ?
? ?? ?? ?
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1
1 1
1 1 1 1
1
Pr
Pr
Pr
G
? ? ? ? ? ?
?
?
? ? ? ? ? ?
?
? ? ? ? ?
?
?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
? ? ?
? ? ? ?
This further implies that there is just one value Pr?  of Pr?  for which ? ? 0PrG? ? ? ,
and that G is a decreasing function when Pr Pr? ? ?  and an increasing function when
Pr Pr? ? ? , so that the value ? ?PrG ?  is the minimum of G. The definition (48) also
implies that ? ? ? ?0G G? ? ,  so  that  it  must  be  the  case  that 0 Pr Pr? ? ? ? , and the
value ? ? ? ?0G G? ?  is the maximum of G within the interval 00, ??? ??? ? .?
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2. The definitions (36) and (41) immediately imply that
0Pr ??? ? ? and that ? ? 0r g ?? ? ?? , but according to (38) ?  is  independent of ? .
Hence, one can conclude from (42) that
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(A9)
? ?
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By definition, for any given values of ?  and P the value ? ?,g P?  satisfies the
condition ? ?? ?, , , 1F g P P? ? ?  so that
? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?
Fdg
d F g
?
?
? ?
? ?
? ?
<0
since we are assuming (E2). Hence, the growth maximizing value of the imitation rate
is 0? ? .
    Turning to the claim concerning welfare, it is observed that
? ?? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ?
? ?? ? ? ?1 2
1 ln 1 1 ln 1
1 ln
g gd L d
dg g dg g g g
?
?
?
? ? ? ? ? ??
? ? ? ? ?
?
? ?? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ?? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ? ? ?
Since we are assuming the validity of (45), i.e. that g ?? , and that ln? ? ?? , this
implies that
? ?? ?
? ?? ? ? ?1 2
1 1 ln
0
1 ln
d L
dg g g g
?
?
? ? ?
? ? ? ??
?? ?
? ?? ?? ? ?? ?
.
This implies that the term ? ?L g? ? ?  receives its maximal value when 0? ? , since
the growth rate is  largest  in this case.  On the other hand, Lemma 1 states that  when
0? ? , also the function ? ?PrG ?  receives its maximal value 1 ??? , which is
independent of g.   Putting  these  results  together,  it  follows  from the  definition  (47)
that the choice of ?  which maximizes the welfare function U?  is 0? ? . ?
 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3. Let the function I be still given by (A2),  define 1Q , 2Q ,
3Q , R, and 0t  just  like  in  the  proof  of  Proposition  1,  so  that
? ?? ? ? ?1 0ln , ,g I Q R t?? ? , ? ?? ? ? ?2 0ln , ,Pr g I Q R t?? ? , and ? ? ? ?3 01 , ,r g I Q R t?? .
Now (42) implies that
 (A10)
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Since each of the values 1Q Q? , 2Q Q? , and 3Q Q?  is independent of ?  it easily
follows from (A2) the definitions ? ?? ?lnR g ? ??  and ? ?0 lnt g??  that, for each of
these values of Q,
(A11)
? ?
? ?
0
0
2
, , QtI Q t RQe
g Q R
?
? ?
??
?
? ?
Together with (A2), this implies that
(A12)
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We now put ? ?0, ,i iI I Q R t?  and
(A13)
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? ?0
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, ,
i
i
i
I Q R t
J
I Q R t ?
?
?
?
when 1,2,3.i ?  Using these notations, (A10) receives the form
(A14)
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  In order to prove (a), assume that 1? ? . In this case lnR g ??  and 0 0t ? , so that
? ?ln
i
i
i
Q
J
Q g? ?
?
?
Since ? ? ? ?1 21 1g Q Q g? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? , it now follows that 1 2J J? , and one can
conclude from (A14) that
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? ? ? ?? ?
? ?? ?
1 1
1 1 2 2
3 3 11 1
1 2
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J I J IF g
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F g I I
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Further, since ? ? ? ? ? ?1 31 1g Q g g Q? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? , it must also be the case
that 1 3J J? , so that it can further be concluded that
? ?
? ?, ,1
0
, ,
F g
F g
? ?
? ? ?
?
?
?
Hence, also ? ?, ,F g ? ? ?? ?   is positive, and since we are assuming that (E2) is valid,
0
dg F
d F g
?
?
? ?? ? ?
? ?
This completes the proof of (a).
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  Turning to part (b) of this proposition, it was demonstrated in Section 5 above that
? ??  whenever the model has balanced growth paths. Turning to the other claim
which was made in part (b), assume that ? ?2 1e ? ?? ? . It can be concluded from (A12)
that
(A15)
? ?
? ?
? ? ? ?
? ?? ?
0
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Hence, this derivative is negative whenever
(A16) 02 Q t?
Since ? ?0 lnt g??  and ? ?1 1Q g ?? ? , the condition ? ?2 1e ? ?? ?   implies that  (A16)
is valid for all 1Q Q? . Hence, (A15) implies that
? ?
? ?0
0
, ,1
, ,
I Q R t
I Q R t ?
?
?
is a decreasing function of Q when 1Q Q? , and hence, 1 2J J?  and 1 3J J? . Together
with (A14), these results imply that
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Together with (E2), this implies that
0
dg F
d F g
?
?
? ?? ? ?
? ?
This completes the proof of (b). ?
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4. Assume that 1? ? . The definition (41) implies that
? ?0r ? ?? ?? . When this result, (43), and (44) are inserted into (42), it follows that
(A17) ? ?
? ?
? ? ? ?
? ?
1
1
,         0
0, ,
1
,       0
F ? ?
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? ? ?
? ?
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However, it easily follows from (37) that 0??? ? ? , and one can conclude that
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(A18)
? ?0, ,
0
F ? ?
?
?
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?
Hence, since F is by assumption a continuous and decreasing function of g,
? ?? ?? ?
? ?? ?
? ?? ?
0 inf , 0 for some
inf 0, , 1 for some , when
inf 0, ,1 1, when
g
F
F
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Obviously, since F is continuous in ? , ? ?? ?
0
0, ,1 1F
? ?
?
?
? . Let 1? ? ?  be arbitrary.
Now it must be the case for all values 0? ?? ?  which are sufficiently close to 0? , for
all ? ? ?? and for all growth rates g that
? ?? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ?
0
, , 0, , 0, ,1 1F g F F
? ? ? ? ? ?
? ? ? ? ?
? ?? ? ?
?? ? ?
In other words, when ??  is sufficiently close to 0?  there will be no growth if ? ? ?? ,
so that the growth-maximizing value of ?  must in this case be smaller than ? ? . Since
1? ? ?  was arbitrary, it follows that the growth-maximizing value of ? approaches 1
when 0? ?? ? . Similarly, also the welfare-maximizing value of ?  must approach 1
if it is a value for which the growth rate is positive. ?
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CHAPTER III
COMMERCIAL PIRACY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICY
ABSTRACT1
I discuss the competition between a copyright owner and several commercial pirates
who sell copies of the same information good to consumers. I view the increased risk
of a punishment that offering a pirate copy to a consumer causes as an advertising
cost, whose value is chosen by the government. The structure of the market for pirate
copies is affected also by fixed costs which are caused by punishments or DRM
systems. I present a systematic analysis of the effects of these policy variables and the
quality of pirate copies on the market for the considered information good.
3.1. INTRODUCTION
  The distribution of illegal pirate copies of information goods might have a variety of
motives. Such copies are distributed on the one hand by the members of peer-to-peer
networks, who deliver digital goods on the Internet without monetary compensation
and who are motivated by e.g. a feeling of identification with the other network
members, and on the other hand by commercial pirates who are, more conventionally
from the perspective of the economist, motivated by the revenue that results from
their activities. Somewhat less obviously, the consumers of an information good
might also form clubs each of which buys a single copy of the information good,
produces further copies of it, and distributes one of them to all club members.2
 Given that both commercial and non-commercial forms of piracy are illegal, there is
no obvious way of estimating the extent to which pirate copies of information copies
1 An  essentially  identical  version  of  this  paper  has  earlier  been  published  as  Kiema,  I.,  2008,
“Commercial piracy and intellectual property policy”, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
68, 304-318.
2   For  the  producer  of  the  first  copy  of  the  information  good,  this  practice  resembles  a  situation  in
which the club members buy a single copy of an information good and use it  successively. The latter
practice is legal when the considered product is e.g. a book, a journal, or a video tape, and in both
cases, the producer of the first copy might be able to appropriate indirectly a part of the value that the
good has for its consumers. Cf. Varian (2000).
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get  sold  rather  than  distributed  for  free,  or  the  effects  of  commercial  piracy  on  the
profits of copyright owners. Nevertheless, e.g. the International federation of the
Phonographic Industry (IFPI) has estimated that approximately 37% of all the [music]
CDs that were purchased in 2005 globally were pirate copies.3 However, in the case
of the software industry it is more difficult to find estimates of the prevalence of
commercial piracy.
  The Business Software Alliance (BSA) publishes yearly a piracy study which
contains estimates for the piracy rate (i.e. the ratio of the number of pirated software
units  to  the  total  number  of  installed  software  units)  for  different  countries  of  the
world, and also for different regions of the world as a whole. For example, according
to the BSA the worldwide piracy rate was 35% in 2005.4  However, such estimates do
not make a distinction between commercial and non-commercial forms of piracy.5
Nevertheless, e.g. the other surveys of the BSA suggest that both the commercial and
non-commercial forms of software piracy are of a considerable economic
significance.6
 There is a relatively large economic literature on end-user copying.7 Dyuti S.
Banerjee has  recently  put  forward  several  closely  related  models  of  the  competition
between a monopolist (i.e., the copyright owner) and a single commercial pirate in
(Banerjee, 2003, 2006a, 2006b), but it nevertheless seems that until now economists
3  International federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI), The Recording Industry 2006 Piracy
report, p. 4, available at http://www.ifpi.org/site-content/library/piracy-report2006.pdf, accessed on
October 29, 2006.
4 Third Annual BSA and IDC Global Software Piracy Study,
http://www.bsa.org/globalstudy/upload/2005%20Piracy%20Study%20-%20Official%20Version.pdf,
accessed on April 13, 2007, p. 13.
5  This is because the estimates of the BSA have been calculated from an estimate of the total number
of installed software units, which is based on the number of the sold hardware units and surveys
concerning their average software load, and an estimate of the number of the sold software units, which
is based on information concerning the market revenues of software vendors and software pricing. Cf.
ibid., p. 14.
6  In  one  of  such  surveys,  the  BSA  has  investigated  the  attitudes  of  the  online  consumers  from  six
different countries towards spam, i.e. commercial emails that they have received without requesting or
signing up for them (BSA, Consumer Attitudes Toward Spam in Six Countries, 2004, available at
http://www.bsa.org/usa/events/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&pageid=20654,
accessed on April 13, 2007). In each country, more than 80% of the respondents stated that they had
received spam which was concerned with computer software (ibid., p. 6), and 27% reported that, in the
product category “computer software”, they had “purchased an item or taken advantage of an offer”
which  was  suggested  to  them  in  spam  (ibid.,  p.  12).  Only  31%  of  the  respondents  stated  that  they
agreed with the statement that they would “never buy commercial software using this method because
it is most likely unlicensed and illegal” (ibid., p. 16).
7   For a survey, see Peitz and Waelbroeck (2006a).
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have given much less attention to commercial piracy than to end-user copying.8
Below I shall put forward a model of the competition between the copyright owner
and several commercial pirates, to whom I shall refer as bootleggers.
  The  production  costs  of  pirate  copies  are  low,  and  in  the  case  of  the  pirate  copies
which are distributed in an electric form via the Internet they are almost zero.
Accordingly, if intellectual property rights are not enforced, the prices of pirate copies
can be expected to fall to zero via Bertrand competition. However, when bootleggers
are in danger of being punished for their activities, it may be costly for them to inform
potential consumers of their products, since this may increase the risk of getting
caught and receiving a punishment. For example, if an illegally operating Internet site
which offers pirate copies of software products for sale informs its potential
customers by sending e-mail messages to randomly chosen addresses, the risk of a
punishment is increased by each message. In this case the expected cost from a
punishment is analogous with an advertising cost, which explains the positive price of
pirated information goods.
  Information goods can be protected not only by copyright and other intellectual
property rights but also by digital rights management (DRM) systems. Digital rights
management tools can, broadly speaking, be divided into cryptography (i.e.  the
distribution of information goods in an enciphered format) and watermarking (i.e.
embedding information into a digital product in such a way that each copy of the good
becomes different).9 Watermarks can be used for tracking down the person who has
originally bought the legitimate copy of an information good from which the pirate
copies on the market have been produced, which makes it easier penalize commercial
pirates.10 Clearly, a cryptographic device causes a fixed cost for a commercial pirate,
but the costs of watermarking can be either fixed or variable: if a bootlegger removes
the  watermark,  its  removal  causes  a  fixed  cost,  but  if  she  sells  watermarked
information goods, the risk caused by the watermark increases with the number of the
copies that she sells.
8   See, however, Yao (2005), which discusses counterfeiting on a more general level, without
restricting attention to counterfeited information goods.
9  For a survey, see Eskicioglu and Delp (2001).
10  Since a large-scale commercial pirate can be expected to be able to break down a cryptographic
system, watermarking seems to be the more relevant DRM tool in the context of large-scale
commercial piracy (cf. ibid., pp. 683-684). See also Park and Scotchmer (2005), contains an analysis of
DRM  and  of  the  different  effects  of  the  use  of shared and independent DRM systems on end-user
piracy.
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  Below I shall analyze the effects of DRM systems and the policy instruments of the
government on the profits of the bootleggers and the copyright owner. In the model
the “advertising costs” which are caused by an increased risk of legal sanctions keep
the price of pirate copies positive also when there are several bootleggers on the
market. Accordingly, the model differs from previous work in the same field in so far
that it provides tools for analyzing also the market structure of the market for pirate
copies and its effects on the market for legitimate copies.11
3.2. THE MAIN FEATURES OF THE MODEL
  The agents of the model that is considered below are 1) a copyright owner who sells
copies of an information product legally, 2) K potential bootleggers who wish to sell
illegitimate pirate copies of the same good, and 3) a unit mass of consumers, which is
indexed by ? ?0,1? ? . The bootleggers can inform the consumers of the availability of
their products by sending them advertisements at random. As a paradigmatic example
of a situation of this type, one might think of an illegally operating Internet site which
sends advertisements of pirated software products to randomly chosen e-mail
addresses. The sending of an advertisement is associated with a cost b which should
be interpreted as the increase in expected cost of punishment that sending a single
advertisement causes.
  More precisely, I shall assume that sending an advertisement causes an increase ?
in the risk of getting caught, that the bootlegger receives a punishment G if  she gets
caught, and that the bootleggers are risk neutral. In this case the “advertising cost” b
is given by12
(1) b G??
Any combination of ? and G which corresponds to the same value of b has the same
effects on the markets for both legitimate and pirate copies, and accordingly I shall
11   Cf. (Banerjee, 2003, 2006a, 2006b), which discuss several closely related models of the competition
between the copyright owner and a single pirate. In these models the pirate copies are of a lower
quality than legitimately bought copies, and this stops the price of the good from sinking to zero
through Bertrand competition. However, in these models the number of the pirates is by assumption 1,
and they do not address the question why the price of the pirate copies does not sink to zero through a
Bertrand competition between the pirates (rather than between them and the copyright owner).
12  For a discussion of the econometric problem of actually constructing an index which measures the
strength of legal software protection in a given country, see Andrés (2006, pp. 34-37).
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below analyze the effects of the choice of b (rather  than  of ? and G) for these
markets.13
  I shall assume that the bootleggers cannot keep track of the consumers to whom they
have already sent an advertisement. Rather, each of the bootleggers sends each of the
advertisements  with  the  same  probability  to  each  consumer.14 This  implies  that  a
bootlegger might send to the same consumer several advertisements in which the
product is offered for sale at different prices. This assumption is particularly plausible
in the context of trade on the Internet, since the potential customers of bootleggers
might have several e-mail addresses. In addition, if the consumers are divided into
groups whose members inform each other of the advertisements that they have
received, a single advertisement might reach individuals with different e-mail
addresses, and in this case a bootlegger cannot eliminate the possibility that the same
group of consumers receives many advertisements from her. In this case one should
interpret b as the average cost of reaching a single consumer with a single
advertisement.
  This implies that the description of the competition between the bootleggers
resembles the classical model of advertising by Gerard R. Butters which was put
forward in Butters (1977),15 and similarly with Butters’s model, in the current model
there will be price dispersion in the market for the advertised product.16 Clearly, this
result is quite plausible in the context of the illegal business model of the bootlegger:
since the bootleggers do not necessarily know the prices set by their competitors or
the demand that they face, they have an incentive for finding out the optimal price
13    It  is  easy  to  see  that  the  problem  of  choosing ? and G so  that  the  monitoring  costs  of  the
government are minimized, given the constraint (1), does not have a well-defined solution: if an
increase in monitoring causes costs for the monitoring authorities, but an increase in punishments (like
fines) does not, any increase of G and decrease in ?  which keeps (1) valid seems always beneficial
from the perspective of the government. Hence, it seems that a meaningful discussion of the optimal
choice of ?  and G would require a more general model.
14    In  a  more  general  model  could  be  assumed  that  the  bootleggers  would  be  able  to  target  their
advertisements at the consumers who are likely to buy a pirate copy. This would change the demand
function (8), but it  is easy to see that the analysis of the market for pirate copies for a fixed value of
Mp – i.e. the results which are summarized in Proposition 1 below – would still remain valid.
However, the analysis of the optimization problem of the copyright owner would become essentially
more complicated.
15  See also Tirole (1988, pp. 290-294). The current model and Butters’s model of advertising can both
be contrasted with Varian´s model of sales (Varian, 1980), in which the potential customers are divided
into informed and uninformed consumers, and the informed consumers know the prices chosen by all
the sellers, whereas the uninformed consumers know only the price set by the seller from whom they
make their purchase.
16  More precisely, there is price dispersion whenever there are more than one active bootleggers on the
market. See Proposition 1 below.
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level experimentally, by specifying different prices in different advertisements.
Further, when peer-to-peer networks are viewed as a limiting case of commercial
piracy,  also  the  fact  that  identical  information  goods  are  sold  by  pirates  and
distributed for free on peer-to-peer networks is seen to exemplify price dispersion in
the market for pirate copies.
  However, the current model differs from Butters’s model in several essential
respects. In the currently considered model there is an oligopoly in the market for
pirate copies,17 and since the “advertising costs” have been meant to represent the
expected costs from a punishment for copyright violation, it will be for simplicity
assumed that the copyright owner may advertise for free, and that all consumers have
the option of buying the product from her. In addition, since I wish to model a
situation in which only a part of the consumers prefers buying a pirate copy to buying
a  legitimate  copy,  unlike  Butters  I  shall  assume  that  the  reservation  prices  of  the
consumers differ.
  I shall assume that reservation price of the consumer ?  (where 0 1?? ? )  for  a
legitimate copy of the good is ?  and that for a pirate copy her reservation price is q? ,
where ? ?0,1q?  is a constant.18 In Banerjee (2003), from which I have borrowed this
notation, it was assumed that q corresponds to the probability with which a pirate
copy is operational.19 However, here the parameter q has been meant to represent not
only the fact that a pirated product might be technically of a worse quality than a legal
one or not operational at all, but also features like that the consumers might prefer
legally bought copies also for ethical reasons, because there might be legal sanctions
against using (and not just against selling) pirate copies, or because buying a pirate
copy requires giving credit card information to criminals.
  Different values of q seem plausible in the different applications of the model. One
might expect that e.g. music files downloaded from a peer-to-peer network are
17  Butters (1977) is for the most part concerned with a model with a large number of sellers with no
market power. See, however, Appendix A (ibid., pp. 483- 488) for a short discussion of an oligopoly of
N sellers.
18  Clearly, one could also assume that consumers differ also with respect to q and not just with respect
to ? . E.g. one could follow Chen and Png (2003, p. 110) by assuming that some consumers reject
pirate copies on ethical grounds while others do not. The remarks made in footnote 14 above apply also
to models of this type: our discussion of the market for pirate copies for each fixed value of Mp  can be
generalized in an obvious way to such models, but choosing the optimal Mp  would be essentially
more complicated in their context.
19  Banerjee (2003, p. 100).
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experienced by their users to be of an almost identical quality with legally bought
ones, and in this case it seems plausible to assume that 1q ? . However, the other
considerations besides the technical quality seem more relevant in the case of e.g.
illegally bought software products, and this motivates the assumption that they
correspond to essentially lower values of q. Finally, if one applied the current model
to pirate copies of other branded articles instead of information goods, they could be
associated with even lower values of q.
  In the model a copyright owner and K potential bootleggers play the following four-
stage leader-follower game.20
1) The copyright owner sets the price Mp  of legitimate copies.
2) Each  potential  bootlegger  decides  whether  to  enter  the  market  and  to  pay  a
fixed cost F.
3)   The bootleggers (if any) who have entered decide the number of the
advertisements that they send and send them to randomly chosen consumers.
The bootleggers are not constrained to offering the product at the same price in
different advertisements.
4) The  consumers  choose  whether  to  buy  the  product.  If  a  consumer ?  has not
received any advertisements, she will buy the product from the copyright
owner if 0Mp? ? ? , and she will buy nothing otherwise. If a consumer ?  has
received at least one advertisement, and if the lowest price suggested in the
advertisements that she has received is p,  she  will  buy  the  product  from  the
copyright owner if ? ?max 0,Mp q p? ?? ? ? .  If  this  is  not  the  case,  she  will
buy the product from a bootlegger at price p if 0q p? ? ? . If neither of these
conditions is valid, she will not buy anything. If the consumer buys the
product from a bootlegger at price p and if there are several bootleggers who
have offered the product at price p to  her,  she  will  choose  one  of  them  at
random.
  In this game the aim of the copyright owner is to maximize her profit, which is
simply equal to her revenue
20  Cf. ibid., which contains a discussion of both a leader-follower game and a Bertrand game in the
context of a model with a single pirate.
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(2) ? ? ? ?M M M M MR p p D p?
where ? ?M MD p  is the demand function of the copyright owner,  and each bootlegger
? ?1, 2,...,i k?  aims at maximizing the profit i i iP R bA? ? , where iR  is the revenue of
the ith bootlegger and iA  is the number of the advertisements that she sends.
Obviously, in equilibrium the number of the bootleggers who actually enter the
market will be
(3) ? ? ? ?max when the number of the bootleggers isM i ik p k R bA F k? ?? ? ?
  Part 4) of the definition of the considered game implies that if the cheapest price at
which a consumer ?  can buy the considered good from a bootlegger is p, she will buy
it from the copyright owner if and only if
(4)
1
Mp p
q
? ??
?
 and Mp? ?
and from the bootlegger if and only if
(5)
1
Mp p
q
? ??
?
 and q p? ?
Clearly, (4) implies that there are consumers who are willing to buy the product from
a bootlegger for the price p only if ? ? ? ?1Mp p q p q? ? ? .  This  condition,  which
must be valid for all advertisements in equilibrium, is equivalent with
(6) Mqp p?
   If the condition (6) is valid for the cheapest price p which is suggested in the
advertisements that the consumer ?  has received, then it will be the case that:
  If p q? ? , the consumer does not buy anything.
(7)  If ? ? ? ?1Mp q p p q?? ? ? ? , the consumer buys a pirate copy for price p.
  If ? ? ? ?1Mp p q? ? ? ? , the consumer buys a legitimate copy.
  I shall denote the demand function of the pirate copies by ? ?x p .  More precisely,  I
shall let ? ?x p  denote the proportion of the consumers who would buy a pirate copy at
the price p if p was the cheapest price which is suggested to them in the
advertisements that they have received.  Clearly, (7) implies that
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(8) ? ? ? ?? ?
? ?
? ? ? ?
,                      1,    1
,   1 1 ,   1
MA M
B M M M
q p q p q px p p q p
x p
x p p q p qp p q q p q p
? ? ? ??? ? ??? ?? ?? ?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ?? ? ? ?
Here the case in which ? ? ? ?Ax p x p?  corresponds to the situation in which there are
no  consumers  who would  buy  a  legitimate  copy if  they  are  offered  a  pirate  copy at
price p. In Section 4 below it will be seen that in equilibrium the choice of Mp  by the
copyright  owner  and  the  choices  of  the  values  of p by the bootleggers will be such
that ? ? ? ?Bx p x p?  for all the advertisements that the bootleggers send.
  In the next section I deduce the equilibrium distribution of the prices of pirate copies
for a given value of Mp  and a corresponding number of bootleggers ? ?Mk k p? . This
will  be  utilized  in  the  subsequent  discussion  of  the  optimization  problem  of  the
copyright owner who chooses Mp .  However, as it was explained in the introduction,
reliable estimates of the size of the market for pirate copies and of the risk of getting
caught which the bootleggers face are not available, and accordingly it is also
interesting to study the situation in which Mp  is exogenously given. This situation can
be thought of as a model of a case in which the copyright owner has no information
concerning the bootleggers, or bases her decisions on incorrect estimates of the
parameters that characterize the market for pirate copies.
3.3. THE MARKET FOR PIRATE COPIES
  Below I shall assume that there are k bootleggers, labeled 1,..., k , who have entered
the market. Analogously with notation used in Butters (1977),21 I define ? ?iA p  to be
the measure of the advertisements sent by bootlegger i at a price smaller than or equal
with p, ? ?ia p  to be the derivative of ? ?iA p  whenever it exists, and A to be the total
number of the advertisements.
  As it was explained in Section 2 above, I assume that the bootleggers cannot keep
track of the consumers to whom they have already sent an advertisement – which is
quite plausible in the context of trade on the Internet, since most potential consumers
have several e-mail addresses – and that a bootlegger might send several
21  Cf. Butters (1977, p. 469).
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advertisements to the same consumer. If there are N consumers to whom the
bootleggers send altogether M advertisements at random, the probability with which a
consumer does not receive any advertisements is
1 1
1 1
M N
N N
?
? ?? ? ? ?? ? ?? ?? ? ? ?? ?? ? ? ?? ?
where M N? ?  is  the  number  of  the  advertisements  per  consumer.  Clearly,  in  the
limit in which the number of the consumers approaches infinity this becomes
1
lim 1
N
N eN
?
??
??
? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?
In the currently considered case, the mass of the consumers has been normalized to
one, and the measure of the advertisements which contains a price not larger than p is
denoted by ? ?
1
k
i
i
A p
?
? . Hence, the probability with which a consumer receives at least
one of these advertisements is
? ?
1
1 exp
k
i
i
A p
?
? ?? ?? ?? ?
?
  It is easy to see that if 1k ? , i.e. if there is just one active bootlegger on the market,
she cannot have an incentive to specify different prices in different advertisements. If
the single bootlegger sends A advertisements which all contain the price p, her profit
will be
(9) ? ? ? ?? ?1 1 AkP px p e bA?? ? ? ?
Hence, in this case it is optimal for the bootlegger to advertise at the price p which
maximizes ? ?px p .  For reasons which will  become soon obvious,  I  shall  denote this
price by maxp , and I shall put
(10) ? ?max max maxr p x p?
Further, one can also conclude from (9) that when 1k ? , the optimal number of the
advertisements is
(11) ? ?? ? ? ?max max maxln lnA p x p b r b? ?
  However, it is clear that when there are more than one active bootleggers on the
market, there must be price dispersion in the market for pirate copies: if two
bootleggers specified the same price in all their advertisements, each of them could
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increase her profits by making a sufficiently small reduction in the price.22 By  the
same argument,  it  can be seen that there cannot be any set  of advertisements with a
positive measure which would all contain the same price, when there are at least two
bootleggers. It is also clear that it can never be optimal for a bootlegger to specify a
price which is larger than maxp ,  i.e.  the  price  which  is  optimal  in  the  absence  of
competition. Hence, when 2k ? , the prices specified by the bootleggers correspond
to a continuous distribution function ? ?iA p , so that the revenue of each bootlegger is
(12) ? ? ? ? ? ?max
min 1
exp
kp
i j ip
i
R px p A p a p dp
?
? ?? ?? ?? ?
??
for some minp . The problem of maximizing this quantity can be solved by the standard
tools of the analysis of variations, and its solution is given by the following
proposition.
PROPOSITION 1.  Suppose that the price of legitimate copies is Mp , that there are k
active bootleggers on the market, and that their strategies for a symmetric Nash
equilibrium relative to Mp . The largest price suggested in the advertisements has the
value maxp p?  for which ? ?px p  is maximal, and the smallest price minp  suggested in
them is determined by the condition
(13) 1 1 1min max
k kr b r??
where ? ?min min minr p x p?  and ? ?max max maxr p x p? . When 2k ? ,  the  number  of  the
advertisements with a price not larger than ? ?min max,p p p?  sent by a bootlegger i is
given by
(14) ? ? ? ?? ?
? ?
min min min
1 1
ln ln
1 1i
px p px p
A p
k p x p k r
? ?
? ?
  Proposition 1 implies that when 2k ?  the  total  number  of  advertisements  sent  by
each bootlegger is given by
22  As  it  was  explained  in  Section  2,  the  conclusion  that  the  prices  of  pirate  copies  vary  is  quite
plausible: since the bootleggers operate on an illegal market concerning which it is difficult to find
detailed information, they can be expected to try to receive such information by specifying different
prices in different advertisements.
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(15)
? ?
? ?
1
max max
max
min
1 1 1
ln ln ln
1 1
k k
i
r r
A r b
k r k b k
?? ?? ? ? ?? ? ?? ?? ? ? ?? ?? ? ? ?? ? ? ?
A comparison of this result with (11) shows that the total number of the
advertisements that the bootleggers send is independent of their number k. However,
according to Proposition 1 an increase in k shifts their price distribution downwards.
The condition (13) which determines the value of smallest price minp  which occurs in
the advertisements can be made more intuitive by observing that (12) and (14)
together imply that the revenue of each bootlegger is
(16)
? ? ? ? ? ?
? ?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
max
min
max max
min min
1
1 1
min
min min min
exp
 1i i
kp
i j ip
i
k
p p A pi i A
p p
R px p A p a p dp
dA p dA pr
r dp r e dp r e
px p dp dp
?
?
? ?
? ?? ?? ?
? ?
? ?
? ? ? ?? ?? ?? ?
??
? ?
This result states that the revenue of each bootlegger is identical with the revenue that
she would receive if she was the only bootlegger in the market and she specified the
price minp  in all her advertisements. As k increases, the increased competition in the
market for pirate copies in shown in the fact that, in accordance with (13), this price
sinks from the price which would be optimal in the absence of the other bootleggers,
maxp , towards the cost of sending a single advertisement, b.
  Combining (13), (15), and (16), the revenue of the bootlegger can be also written
(17) ? ?
1
min min min min
max
1 i
k
A
i
b
R r e r r r b
r
? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ?? ?
? ?
so that profit of each bootlegger is seen to be given by
(18) minmin lni i i
r
P R bA r b b
b
? ? ? ? ?
  These results have been proved without assuming that the “demand function” ? ?x p
for pirate copies – i.e., the probability with a consumer buys a pirate copy if the
lowest price suggested to her is p –  is  of  the  particular  form  (8).  However,  a  more
detailed analysis of the comparative statics of the market for pirate copies will depend
on the form of ? ?x p .
  The optimal price of a pirate copy in the absence of other bootleggers, maxp , can be
deduced from (8) by elementary means. Clearly, some of the consumers who receive
an advertisement with price p will prefer a legitimate copy to a pirate copy if
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1Mp q p? ? ?  and ? ? ? ?Bx p x p? , but there will no such consumers when
1Mp q p? ? ?  and ? ? ? ?Ax p x p? .  It  is  also  clear  that ? ?Apx p  obtains its largest
value when 2Ap p q? ? , and that ? ?Bpx p  obtain  its  largest  value  when
2B Mp p qp? ? . Since A Bp p? , it is possible to distinguish between three cases: if
1A B Mp p p q? ? ? ? , the optimal price is Bp , if 1M A Bp q p p? ? ? ? , the optimal
price is Ap , and if 1A M Bp p q p? ? ? ? ,  and  the  optimal  price  must  be  the  corner
solution 1Mp p q? ? ? .  Solving for Mp , these results receive the form
(19)
? ? ? ? ? ?? ?
? ? ? ?? ?max
2,     2 1 2
1,   2 1 2 1 2
2,          1 2
M M
M M
M
qp p q q
p p q q q p q
q p q
? ? ? ?
??? ? ? ? ? ? ? ??
? ? ???
Hence,
(20) ? ?
? ?? ? ? ? ? ?? ?
? ? ? ? ? ?? ?max
2 1 ,     2 1 2
1 ,   2 1 2 1 2
1 2,              1 2
M M
M M
M
p q p q q
x p p q q q p q
p q
? ? ? ? ?
??? ? ? ? ? ? ??
? ? ???
  Now it can be concluded from (15) that the total number of the advertisements is
(21)
? ?? ? ? ? ? ?? ?
? ?? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ?
? ?? ?
2ln 4 1 ,                     2 1 2
ln 1 1 ,   2 1 2 1 2
ln 4 ,                                     1 2
M M
M M M
M
qp b q p q q
A p q p qb q q p q
q b p q
? ? ?? ? ? ?? ??? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ?
?
? ???
  The following proposition, which follows easily from these results together with
Proposition 1, summarizes the comparative statics of the market for pirate copies for a
fixed value of Mp  and a fixed number of active bootleggers k. The additional
assumption min1Mp q p? ? ?  which  is  made  in  this  proposition  means  that  some
consumers prefer buying a legitimate copy to buying a pirate copy at minp , i.e. the
cheapest price that pirate copies have on the market. In the next section it will be seen
that this additional assumption is always valid when Mp  is chosen optimally.
PROPOSITION 2. Suppose that there are k active bootleggers, that their strategies form
a Nash equilibrium relative to the price of legitimate copies Mp , and that
min1Mp q p? ? ? .
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(a) An increase in the price Mp  of legitimate copies increases the revenue of each
bootlegger, the number of the advertisements, and the largest price maxp that pirate
copies have on the market. If 2k ? , an increase in Mp decreases the smallest price
minp of pirate copies on the market.
(b) An increase in the number of the bootleggers k does not affect the total number of
the advertisements or the largest price of pirate copies maxp , but it decreases minp , the
revenue of each single bootlegger, and their total revenue.
(c) An increase of the advertising cost b does not affect maxp ,  but  it  decreases  the
number of the advertisements and when 2k ? , it shifts minp  upwards. In this case the
profit iP  of each bootlegger receives its maximum value for a single value Eb  of b
within the interval ? ?max0,b r? . The profit iP  is an increasing function of b when
Eb b?  and a decreasing function of b when Eb b? , and
max0
lim lim 0b i b r iP P? ?? ? .
(d) An increase in the quality parameter q increases the maximum price maxp  of pirate
copies, the number of the advertisements, and the profits of the bootleggers. The
effect of an increase of q on minp  can be either positive or negative,  but it  is  always
the case that min 1 2p q? ? ? .
  The  intuitive  explanation  of  the  last  of  these  results  is  that  an  improvement  in  the
quality of pirate copies on the one hand allows the bootleggers to charge higher
prices, but on the other hand it also intensifies competition by increasing the number
of advertisements, and this tends to lower the prices of pirate copies. This leads to the
prediction that when the pirates have a considerable risk of receiving a punishment, an
improvement in the quality of pirate copies can be expected to increase their price
dispersion. The fact that min 0Mp p? ? ?  when 2k ?  has a similar intuitive
interpretation.
  Part (c) of this result, which is illustrated by Figure 1 below, is concerned with the
question how the profits of each bootlegger depend on the parameter b. This question
is important for obvious reasons: when the number of the bootleggers on the market
depends  on  their  profits  in  accordance  with  (3),  it  is  in  the  interest  of  the  copyright
owner that their  profits  are low.  Part  (c) of this result  implies that  when 2k ? , the
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profits earned by the bootleggers are for sufficiently low values b increased by an
increase of b, which might increase the incentives to enter the market for pirate
copies. I formulate this observation as a separate corollary.
COROLLARY 1.
(a) For each fixed value of Mp  an increase in F has always a non-positive effect on
the number of the bootleggers.
(b) For each fixed value of Mp  an increase in b has sometimes a positive and
sometimes a negative effect on the number of the bootleggers.
Figure 1. The profit iP  of each bootlegger as a function of the “advertising cost” b
for some values of k when 1 3Mp ?  and 2 3q ? .
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3.4. THE MARKET FOR LEGITIMATE COPIES
   In the current model the profit of the copyright owner is equal with her revenue
? ? ? ?M M M M MR p p D p? . The characterization of the demand ? ?M MD p  of  the
copyright owner is easy when ? ? ? ?? ?2 1 2Mp q q? ? ? . In this case maxp  is according
to (19) such that none of the consumers who have the option of buying a pirate copy
will choose a legitimate copy, and the demand of the copyright owner is simply
(22) ? ? ? ?1AM M MD p e p?? ?
Here the total number of the advertisements A is given by (21), so that
(23) ? ?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ?
? ?? ?
1 ,    2 1 2 1 2
4 1 ,       1 2
M M M
M M
M M M
qbp p q q q p q
R p
bp p q p q
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ??? ?
? ? ???
  It is now immediately observed that when ? ?M MR p  is  given  by  either  of  these
formulas, the copyright owner can increase her profits by lowering Mp , so that these
choices of Mp  cannot be optimal for her.
  It is essentially more complicated to calculate ? ?M MD p  in the more interesting case
in which ? ? ? ?? ?2 1 2Mp q q? ? ? . Clearly, in this case the consumers ?  for  whom
? ? ? ?max 1M Mp p p q?? ? ? ?  will buy a legitimate copy if and only if they do not
receive any advertisements. The demand from such consumers is
(24) ? ? 1max 2
1
kAM
L M M
M
p p b
D p p e
q p
?? ??? ? ?? ??? ?
On the other hand, a consumer would buy a legitimate copy even if she could buy a
pirate copy for minp  if ? ? ? ?min 1Mp p q? ? ? ? . Putting
(25) ? ?min minmax , 1Mp p p q? ? ? ?
the demand from such consumers (if any) is seen to be
(26) ? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ?min minmax 0,1 1 1 1H M M MD p p p q p p q?? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
Finally, the consumers ?  for whom ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?max min1 1M Mp p q p p q?? ? ? ? ? ?  will
buy a legitimate copy if they do not receive an advertisement which contains a price
which is lower than ? ?1Mp p q ?? ? ? . The demand from such consumers is
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(27) ? ? ? ?? ?
? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?min 1
max
1 1
1
M M
M
p p q kA p q
Med M p p q
D p e d? ?
?? ? ? ? ?
? ?
? ?
Here  the  indexes  ‘L’,  ‘Med’,  and  ‘H’  refer  to  low,  medium,  and  high  valuation,
respectively. The total demand of the copyright owner is the sum of the three demand
components, i.e.
(28) ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?M M H M Med M L MD p D p D p D p? ? ?
  Unfortunately, it seems that one cannot express the value of the integral which
occurs in (27) in terms of elementary functions. The results in the rest of this section
are based on a change of variables in this integral. If one puts
(29) ? ?? ? ? ?1M Mz p q qp?? ? ?
the demand component ? ?Med MD p  is seen to equal
(30) ? ? ? ?
? ?
1
min
1 2
1
M
M
kA qp zM
Med M p qp
qp
D p e dz
q
?
?
?
? ?
  Using (8), (13), and (14) , the integrated function can be expressed in the form
(31)
? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?? ?
? ?
? ?
? ? ? ?? ? ? ?
? ?
1
1
min min
21 1 12
1 1 1
4 1
M
k k
kA qp z
M M
k k k
MM
p x p
e
qp zx qp z
b q q
f z
qpqp z z
?
?
? ?
? ?
? ? ?? ?? ?
? ?? ?
?
where
(32) ? ?
? ? ? ?? ? ? ?11 14 1 k kk
b
f z
z z
??
?
?
Putting these results together, the demand of the copyright owner can now be
expressed in the form
(33) ? ? ? ?
min
1 2
min2 1 1
1M
M
M M p qp
M M
b p p
D p f z dz
p p q?
?? ??? ? ? ?? ??? ??
  These results make it easy to analyze the comparative statics of the profit of the
copyright owner relative to the variables b, q, and k when  the  price  set  by  the
copyright owner is fixed.
PROPOSITION 3. Assume that the price Mp  of legitimate copies is fixed, that there are k
active bootleggers, and that their strategies form a symmetric Nash equilibrium
relative to Mp .
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(a) The demand ? ?M MD p  of copyright owner is a decreasing function of the quality
parameter q.
(b) When ? ? ? ?? ?2 1 2Mp q q? ? ? , the demand ? ?M MD p  is independent of the
market structure in the market for pirate copies, but when ? ? ? ?? ?2 1 2Mp q q? ? ? ,
? ?M MD p  is a decreasing function of k.
(c) An increase in the fixed cost F has a non-negative effect on ? ?M MD p . An increase
in the advertising cost b increases ? ?M MD p  if  it  does  not  affect  the  number  of  the
bootleggers. If this is not the case, an increase in b can also decrease ? ?M MD p .
  According to part (c) of this proposition, an increase in the punishments for piracy
can decrease the profits of the copyright owner also in the absence of network effects,
which would make the market penetration of the product affect the value that it has
for the consumers, because an increase in the “advertising cost” might increase the
profits of the bootleggers and the number of the bootleggers who enter the market.
  I now turn to the optimization problem of the copyright owner, which is the problem
of maximizing the revenue ? ? ? ?M M M M MR p p D p? , where ? ?M MD p  is given by
(33). It turns out that although the integral which occurs in (33) cannot be evaluated
explicitly, the derivative of the revenue ? ?M MR p  has a surprisingly simple
expression.
PROPOSITION 4. The optimal price Mp  of  legitimate  copies  is  never  such  that  some
pirate copies would be so cheap that there would be no consumers who prefer buying
a legitimate copy to buying one of them. If Mp  is such that this is not the case, and if
there are pirate copies on the market,
(34)
? ? min2 21
1 1
M M M
M
dR p p p
dp q q
? ? ?
? ?
  This proposition implies that for each fixed value of k the derivative ? ?M M MdR p dp
has the value zero when
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(35) min,
1
2M k
q
p p
?? ?
where min,kp denotes the minimum price of pirate copies for the given Mp  and k.
Further, together with the fact that min, 0k Mp p? ? ?  (see Proposition 2(a) above) this
implies that for each k there can be at most one value of Mp for which (35) is valid.
  However, the actual number of the pirates ? ?Mk p is determined by Mp  in
accordance with (3), and it is a non-decreasing function of Mp .  According  to
Proposition 2(b), min,kp  is a decreasing function of k and hence, also the equilibrium
value of Mp  determined by (35) is a decreasing function of k. These observations
yield the following characterization of the equilibrium price Mp  of legitimate copies.
COROLLARY 2. (a) Assume that there are K k?  potential bootleggers and that they do
not have fixed costs. If there are pirate copies on the market in equilibrium, the
equilibrium value of Mp  is determined by the condition (35).
(b) More generally, when there are K potential bootleggers with fixed costs 0F ?
there can be at most one value of Mp  for which (35) is  valid with ? ?Mk k p? . The
optimal choice of Mp is either this value (if it exists) or the value which maximizes
? ?M MR p  in ? ?? ?0,1,..., 1Mp k k K? ? , where ,M kp  denotes the largest price for which
the number of the active bootleggers stays below k, i.e.
? ?? ?, max ;M k M i Mp p P p k F? ?
  Figure 2 illustrates the first part of this result. It shows the revenue curve ? ?M MR p
of the copyright owner when the number k of the bootleggers is 0, 1, and 2, and the
limit of ? ?M MR p  when k ?? .  In  the  situation  of  the  figure  the  copyright  owner
would have to lower Mp  to the value Mp?  in order to prevent the emergence of a
market for pirate copies, and in equilibrium she will let all potential bootleggers enter.
In the limit in which the number of the active bootleggers approaches infinity the
optimal price Mp  of legitimate copies approaches the value ,M optp  shown in Figure 2.
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Figure 2. The revenue curve of the copyright owner for some values of k when
b=0.002, q=0.5, and F=0.
  Figure 3 represents a situation in which the potential bootleggers have fixed costs,
but which is similar in other respects. The dotted lines show the revenue of the
copyright owner in the presence of 0, 1, and 2 bootleggers. The revenue curve of the
copyright owner – which is shown as a solid line – has a discontinuity at the points
,1Mp  and ,2Mp  at which the number of the bootleggers changes. According to the
latter part of the above corollary, the equilibrium value of Mp  is  either  one  of  the
points of discontinuity or the maximum of the curve which corresponds to one of the
values 0k ? , 1k ? ,… . Figure 3 illustrates the former possibility, since in it the
optimal price Mp  is the largest price which suffices to block the entry of the second
bootlegger, i.e. ,2Mp .
,M optpMp ?
0k ?
1k ?
2k ?
k ? ?
0.1
95
Figure 3. The revenue curve of the copyright owner when b=0.002, q=0.5, and
F=0.001.
  When the number of the bootleggers k is fixed, according to Proposition 3(c) an
increase of b shifts the revenue curve ? ?M MR p  upwards and hence, it must
correspond to an increase of the revenue of the copyright owner. However, if b is
sufficiently small and 2k ? ,  an  increase  of b will  increase  the  profits  of  the
bootleggers. This decreases the Mp  values ,2Mp , ,3Mp ,… at which the bootleggers
enter, and if one of these values is the equilibrium value of Mp , this decreases of the
revenue of the copyright owner in equilibrium.
  The following corollary follows immediately from these observations and
Proposition 3.
COROLLARY 3.  Suppose that the strategies of the copyright owner and the bootleggers
form a Nash equilibrium of the game 1) - 4).
0k ?
1k?
2k ?
96
a) The revenue of the copyright owner is a non-decreasing function of the fixed cost F
and a decreasing function of q.
b) The revenue of the copyright owner is sometimes increased and sometimes
decreased by an increase in the advertising cost b.
  Hence, our earlier conclusion that an increase in the punishments for piracy might
decrease the revenue of the copyright owner generalizes to the equilibriums of the
model as a whole. I shall conclude this section by presenting some other comparative
static results which are concerned with these equilibriums. Clearly, the comparative
static properties of the model will be different in the equilibriums in which Mp  is
optimal relative to some fixed number of bootleggers, and the “corner solutions” in
which Mp  has  the  largest  value  which  suffices  to  block  the  entry  of  one  more
bootlegger. In the following proposition, attention has been restricted to the
equilibriums of the former kind. These equilibriums are the ones in which the revenue
of the copyright owner is maximal also when the number of the active bootleggers is
exogenously given, which corresponds to setting 0F ? .
PROPOSITION 5. Suppose that the strategies of the copyright owner and the bootleggers
form  a  Nash  equilibrium  of  a  game  of  the  form  1)  -  4)  in  which 0F ? . Suppose
further that there are K k?  active bootleggers who send advertisements.
(a) The price Mp  of legitimate copies and the minimum and maximum prices of
pirate copies, minp  and maxp , are decreased by an increase in k.
(b) When 1k ? , the prices Mp  and maxp  are independent of b. When 2k ? , the
prices Mp , maxp ,  and minp  are increasing functions of the advertising cost b, and
minMdp dp
db db
?
(c) A raise in the quality parameter q shifts Mp  downwards, but the derivatives
maxdp dq  and mindp dq  can be either positive or negative.
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3.5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
  Above the role of government policy and DRM systems in preventing commercial
piracy was analyzed in a setting in which the profitability of piracy was restricted not
just  by  these  factors  and  the  competition  with  the  copyright  owner,  but  also  by  the
competition between the commercial pirates. The at first glance puzzling fact that the
prices of pirate copies do not always sink to zero via Bertrand competition between
the pirates was explained by drawing a distinction between the different effects that
government monitoring and DRM systems have on the illegal business model of the
commercial  pirate.  The  costs  of  breaking  DRM systems and  the  expected  costs  of  a
punishment were viewed as consisting of a fixed cost of production and an
“advertising cost” which depends on the number of the consumers to whom a
bootlegger –  i.e., a commercial pirate – offers her products and which keeps the
prices of pirate copies above their production costs.
  Above the markets for legitimate and illegitimate copies of information goods were
studied both when the copyright owner chooses the price of legitimate copies
optimally and when this is not the case, e.g. because of lack of information concerning
the pirate copy market. The comparative statics of these markets was studied with
respect to the quality of the pirate copies and the policy variables, i.e. the fixed and
the variable costs of the bootleggers.  Some of the results of this analysis were to be
expected, but others were more surprising.
  For example, it turned out that the revenue of the copyright owner is decreased by an
increase in the quality of pirate copies both when the price of legitimate copies is
optimal and when it is exogenously given, and that – as long as this does not affect the
number of the bootleggers on the market – an increase in their “advertising costs”
increases  the  revenue  of  the  copyright  owner  and  the  prices  of  pirate  copies.  More
interestingly, it also turned out that when there are several bootleggers on the market,
an increase in the price of legitimate copies increases price dispersion in the market
for  pirate  copies  and  decreases  their  minimum  price.  Since  the  pirate  copies  which
have a very low price might be viewed as the counterpart of non-commercial forms of
piracy in the current model, this result can be taken to mean that if the copyright
owner chooses a sufficiently high price for an information good, it will
simultaneously be subject to both commercial and non-commercial forms of piracy.
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  Our analysis also revealed that the effects of the two policy variables on the revenue
of  the  copyright  owner  were  different:  whereas  it  was  always  in  the  interest  of  the
copyright owner that the fixed costs of the bootleggers were increased, this was not
true of the “advertising costs”, because an increase in the “advertising costs” might
increase the profitability of commercial piracy and the incentive to enter the market
for pirate copies. As the current model contains just a single information good without
any network effects, this result is distinct from the familiar results that the producer of
an information good might profit from piracy if this makes it easier to sell
complementary goods or services to consumers,23 or if this leads network effects
which increase the popularity of the product.24
  Since the fixed costs of the bootleggers can be caused by technical protection
devices whereas – at least in the case of commercial piracy on the Internet – the
“advertising costs” result almost completely from the increased risk of a punishment,
this result can be interpreted to mean that an improvement in the DRM systems which
make an information good technically difficult to copy is always in the interest of the
copyright owner, but this is not necessarily true of an increase in the legal protection
of information goods.
  Above  I  did  not  present  a  detailed welfare analysis from which one could have
deduced the optimal values of the policy variables of the model. Such an analysis is
made problematic by the fact that it is not clear whether a social planner should aim at
maximizing welfare which is obtained by illegal means, like through commercial
piracy.  I  also  did  not  analyze  the  effects  of  piracy  on  the market penetration of  the
product, which would be quite essential if one wanted to include network effects in
the current model. Inclusion of network effects would lead to several interesting
questions that we have not considered. E.g., above it was seen that an improvement in
the quality of pirate copies tends to lower the revenue of the copyright owner, and it
would be interesting to find out whether this effect could in the presence of network
effects be balanced by the positive effects of the increase in market penetration that a
quality improvement would cause.
23  For example, the demand for concerts by an artist might be increased by the pirate copies of her
recordings (Gayer and Shy, 2006). Somewhat less obviously, when the consumers do not know in
advance which information products they prefer (e.g. which musical recordings they would enjoy
listening), the possibility to sample pirate copies might make them willing to pay more for their
preferred product. Cf. Peitz and Waelbroeck, 2006b.
24    See e.g. Conner and Rumelt (1991, Proposition 4 on p. 133).
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APPENDIX. PROOFS OF THE PROPOSITIONS IN CHAPTER 3.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1.  When one puts
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?, , exp iAi i j i
j i
f A a p px p A p e a p?
?
? ?
? ?? ?
? ?
?
the Euler equation which must be valid in the interval ? ?min max,p p  for a function
? ?iA p  for which the function iR  given by (12) obtains its maximum value turns out
to be
(A1) 0
i i
f d f
A dp a
? ?? ?
? ?
  This Euler equation is equivalent with
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?exp exp 0i iA Aj i j
j i j i
d
px p A p e a p px p A p e
dp
? ?
? ?
? ?? ? ? ?
? ? ? ? ?? ?? ? ? ?
? ?? ? ? ?? ?
? ?
and further with
(A2) ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?j
j i
x p px p px p a p
?
?? ? ?
Since we are considering a symmetric equilibrium, it can be concluded that
(A3) ? ? ? ?? ?
1 1
1i
x p
a p
k p x p
? ??
? ?? ?? ?? ? ?
and further that
? ? ? ?? ?
? ?
? ?min min min
1 1 1
ln
1 1
p
i p
x u px p
A p du
k u x u k p x p
? ??
? ? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?
?
This proves the validity of (14).
  The result (13) is can be deduced from (14) by observing that (14) and (12) imply
that
(A4)
? ? ? ?? ?
? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?
max
min
min min
min min   1
i
i
p A p
i ip
A
p x p
R px p e a p dp
px p
p x p e
?
?
? ?
? ? ?? ?? ?
? ?
?
and that the profit of each bootlegger is given by
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(A5) ? ?? ?min min 1 iAi i i iP R bA p x p e bA?? ? ? ? ?
Since each bootlegger could choose to send arbitrarily many advertisements with the
price minp  without having to compete with the other bootleggers, iA  must have the
value which maximizes profits for the given value of minp .  In  other  words,  in
equilibrium it must be the case that
? ?min min 0iAi
i
P
p x p e b
A
?? ? ? ?
?
so that
(A6)
? ?min min minln lni
p x p r
A
b b
? ?
  On the other hand, the values of iA  and minp  are connected also by the fact that the
total number of the advertisements that the advertiser i sends is ? ?maxiA p . The result
(14) implies that
(A7) ? ? ? ?? ?
max max max
max
min min min
1 1
ln ln
1 1i i
p x p r
A A p
k p x p k r
? ? ?
? ?
Together the results (A6) and (A7) imply (13). ?
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2. First it is observed that since by assumption
max min 1Mp p p q? ? ? ? , (19) implies that ? ? ? ?? ?2 1 2Mp q q? ? ? . Keeping this in
mind, it is observed that part (a) of this proposition follows trivially from (13), (16),
(19), (20), and (21), except for the statement that min 0Mp p? ? ? . It can be proved by
observing that the when 2k ?  and min 1Mp q p? ? ? , the condition (13), i.e.
1 1 1
min max
k kr b r?? , can be expressed in the form
? ?
? ? ? ?
1
2
min min 1 1
1 4 1
k
M k M
qp p p qp
b
q q q
? ? ?? ? ? ?? ?? ?? ?
Hence,
? ?
? ?
min min min
min
2 2
1 1
M
M M
qp p p p
r
q q p q kp
? ? ? ?
? ? ?
and
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? ?
? ?
? ?
? ?
min minmin
min
minmin
2 2 1
1 1
2
1 0
1
M
M M
M
M
qp p x pp
p
q q p kp q
qp pp
q qkp
? ? ?? ? ?? ?? ? ?? ?
?? ?
? ? ?? ?? ? ?
Since min max2 2 0M Mqp p qp p? ? ? ? , it now follows that min 0Mp p? ? ? .
  The parts (b) and (c) of this proposition follows trivially from (13), (15), (16), (19),
and (21), except for except for the claim concerning the profit iP  of the bootleggers.
In order to demonstrate it, we assume that 2k ?  and observe that (18) and (13) imply
that
(A8) ? ?
1
max max
1
1 1
1 1 1 ln
k
i
k
P r r
k
b b k b k
? ? ? ? ? ?
?
and that
(A9)
2 1
max
2 2 1 1
1 1ki
k
P rk
b k b kb?
? ?? ? ?
?
 This immediately implies that there is precisely one value of ? ?max0,b r?  for which
2 2 0iP b? ? ? , and this further implies that there are at most two values of ? ?max0,b r?
for which 0iP b? ? ? . It is now observed that
(A10) ? ?
max
1
1 1 1 0i
b r
dP
k
db k?
? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ?? ?
so that within the interval ? ?max0, r there can be at most one value of b for which
0iP b? ? ? . On the other hand, since the function iP  is by construction positive in the
interval ? ?max0, r , and since it has the limit 0 when 0b ?  and when maxb r? , it must
be the case that 0iP b? ? ?  for  at  least  one  value ? ?max0,Eb r? . Hence, iP  is an
increasing function of b when Eb b?  and that iP  is a decreasing function of b when
.Eb b?
  Finally, turning to the part (d) of this proposition, also all the statements in it follow
trivially from (13), (18), (19), (20) and (21), except for the statement concerning
minp q? ? . It can be demonstrated by using (8) for expressing (13) in the form
? ?
1 1 2
min
min1 1 11 1 41
k k
M M
k kk
qp p b p
p
q q
?
??
? ?
?
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Since the right-hand side of this equation is constant for each constant value of q, it
must be the case that
(A11)
? ?
min min
min min min
2 1 1 1 1
1
M M
M M
qp p p p k k
qp p p q qp p q q
? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ?? ? ? ?? ?? ?
Clearly, the multiplier of minp q? ?  in  (A11)  is  always  positive,  but  the  term on  the
right-hand side is sometimes positive and sometimes negative: the right-hand side is
negative e.g. when 2k ?  and 3 4q ? , but it has a positive value when 0q ?  and also
? ?min Mp qp  is very small, since in this case
min
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1
M
M
p k k k
qp p q q q q kq
? ?? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ?? ?? ?
This proves the statement that minp q? ?  is sometimes positive and sometimes
negative. In order to prove the claim concerning its upper limit we now introduce the
notation ? ?min Mp qp? ?  and observe that the right-hand side of (A11) can be positive
only if
? ?
1 1 1 1 1
0
1 1
k k
q q q?
? ?? ? ?
? ?
This is equivalent
(A12)
1
1 2 1
k q
q k
? ??
? ?
The partial derivative min Mp p? ?   can be positive only when this condition is valid,
and if this is the case,
(A13)
? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?
min
min
1 2 1 2 12 1 2 1 1 1
1 1
1 1 2 1 1 1 2
M
M
q k k qqp p k
k
qp p q k k q q
?
?
? ? ? ?? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ?
? ? ? ? ? ? ?
 Hence, now one can conclude from (A11) that if min Mp p? ?  is positive,
min min
min
min
1 1 2
2 M
M M
p k p p
p
p q qp p kq
? ?? ?? ? ?? ?? ?? ?
Given that min max 2Mp p qp? ?  and that 2k ? , it now follows that
min 1
2
M
M
p p
p k
? ? ?
?
.?
103
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3. When ? ? ? ?? ?2 1 2Mp q q? ? ?  the  statements  of  this
proposition follow trivially from (23) and the continuity of ? ?M MD p .  Suppose then
that ? ? ? ?? ?2 1 2Mp q q? ? ? . According to (33) in this case
(A14) ? ? ? ?
min
1 2
min 1 21
1 M
M
M M p qp
M M
p p b
D p f z dz
q p p?
??? ? ? ?
? ?
where ? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ?11 14 1 k kkf z b z z ??? ? . Below ? ?f z will be viewed as given by this
formula for arbitrary real values of k although, of course, (A14) has a meaningful
economic interpretation only when k is  an  integer.  Clearly,  (A14)  is  formally  valid
also when 1k ? , since in this case ? ? ? ?min max 1 2M Mp qp p qp? ? ? , so that the
integral on the right-hand side of (A14) vanishes.
  When min 1Mp p q? ? ? ? , (A14) implies that
? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?
1 2
1 1
1 2
M M M
M M p p qp
M M
b
D p f z dz
p p? ?
? ??
and it immediately follows that ? ? 0M MD p b? ? ?  and ? ? 0M MD p q? ? ? . When it is
observed that ? ?4 1 1z z? ?  when 1 2z ? , it follows that
? ?
? ? ? ?
? ?1 1
1 1
0
1 4 1
k
f z
k z z k z z
?
? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ? ? ?? ?
so that also ? ? 0M MD p k? ? ? . This proves (a) and (b) when min 1Mp p q? ? ? ? .
  When min minp p? ? , the analysis of the considered partial derivatives is made more
complicated by the implicit dependence of minp  on b, q, and k. However, (31) implies
that
(A15)
2
min
1
M
M
p qp
f
qp q
? ?
?? ? ?? ?
so that one can conclude from (A14) that
? ?
? ?
min
min
1 1
0
1
M M
M M M
D p p
f
p q p qp qp
? ? ??? ? ?? ??? ? ? ?
and this makes it legitimate to leave this dependence out of consideration below.
  Now it follows that when min minp p? ? ,
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(A16)
? ? ? ?
min
1 21 2
0
M
M M
p qp
M M
D p f z
dz
b p b p?
? ?
? ? ?
? ??
so that the demand of the copyright owner is an increasing function of b. Further,
since ? ? 0f z k? ? ? , must be the case that
(A17)
? ? ? ?
min
1 21
0
M
M M
p qp
M
D p f z
dz
k p k?
? ?
? ?
? ??
Finally, (A14) and (A15) together imply that
(A18)
? ?
? ?
? ? ? ? ? ?
min min min
2
2
min min
min2 2 22
1
1
1 1
   0
11 1 1
M M M
M M M
M M M
M M
D p p p p p
f
q p q qp qpq
p p p qp p
p
p q p qq q q q
? ?? ? ? ? ?? ?? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ?? ? ? ? ?? ?
? ??? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ??? ? ?? ?
This  completes  the  proof  of  the  parts  (a)  and  (b)  of  the  proposition.  Turning  to  part
(c), it is first observed that an increase in F can affect the demand of the copyright
owner only by decreasing k, and as it just has been proved, a decrease of k has a non-
negative effect on ? ?M MD p . Finally, above it was seen that ? ? 0M MD p b? ? ? , so
that an increase in b increases ? ?M MD p  if it does not affect the number of the active
bootleggers. However, since according to Corollary 1(b) an increase in b can increase
k, and since an arbitrarily small change in b can change k by 1, it must sometimes be
the case that an increase in b decreases ? ?M MD p . ?
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4. First it is observed that if ? ? ? ?? ?2 1 2Mp q q? ? ? , (23)
immediately implies that ? ? ? ?M M M M MR p p D p?  is a decreasing function of Mp  and
that the copyright owner can increase her profits by lowering the price Mp . Suppose
now that ? ? ? ?? ?2 1 2Mp q q? ? ? . In this case (33) implies that
(A19) ? ? ? ?
min
1 2
min1 2
1 M
M
M M M p qp
p p
R p p f z dz b
q ?
?? ??? ? ? ?? ??? ? ?
and the derivative of ? ?M MR p  is seen to be
(A20)
? ? ? ?minmin min1
1
M M MM
M
M M M M
dR p d p qpd p p p
p f
dp dp q dp qp
?? ?? ? ? ?? ??? ? ?? ? ? ?? ??? ? ? ?? ?
If min 1Mp p q? ? ? ? , this implies that
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? ? ? ? min1 1 0M M M
M M M
dR p q pd p
f
dp dp q qp
? ?? ? ? ? ?
? ? ?? ? ? ?
? ?? ?
and the copyright owner has an incentive to lower the price. Hence, in equilibrium
min min 1Mp p p q? ? ? ? ? , and some consumers would buy a legitimate copy even if
they could get a pirate copy for minp .
  When min minp p? ? , the price minp  satisfies  the condition (A15) and one can conclude
from (A20) that
? ? 2min min min min
2
min min min
2 1
1
1 1 1
2 2 2
   1 1
1 1 1 1
M M M M M
M M M M M
M M
dR p p p p dp dp p qp
dp q q dp qp dp qp q
p p p p p
q q q q
? ?? ??? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ? ?? ? ? ?
?? ? ? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?
This completes the proof. ?
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5. According to Proposition 2(b) , for each value of Mp  the
minimum price min,kp  is decreased by an increase in k. Hence, Proposition 4 implies
that an increase in k decreases the derivative ? ?M M MdR p dp  for each value of Mp , so
that the value of Mp  for which ? ? 0M M MdR p dp ?  grows smaller if k increases. Now
(19) and (35) imply that also maxp  and minp  will decrease.  This proves part (a) of the
proposition.
  Turning to part (b), (35) is written in the form
(A21) ? ? ? ?min
1
, , , , ,
2M M
q
p q b k p p q b k
?? ?
When 1k ? , min maxp p?  is for each fixed value of Mp  independent of b, so that also
the solution of this equation is independent of b.  Suppose  then  that 2k ? .
Differentiating (A21) with respect to b one gets
(A22) min minM M
M
dp p p dp
db b p db
? ?? ?
? ?
According to Proposition 2, min 0Mp p? ? ?  and min 0p b? ? ? ,  and  one  can  conclude
from (A22) that
min min
min
0
1
M
M
dp dp p b
db db p p
? ?? ? ?
?? ?
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Now (19) implies that also max 0dp db ? . Finally, (A21) also implies that
(A23) min min
1
2
M M
M
dp p p dp
dq q p dq
? ?? ? ?
? ?
Since min 1 2p q? ? ?  according to Proposition 2(d), this implies that
min
min
1 2
0
1
M
M
dp p q
dq p p
? ? ?? ?
?? ?
It must still be demonstrated that no similar general results are valid for maxdp dq  and
mindp dq .  In the case of maxdp dq , perhaps the easiest way to see this is to observe
that  –  as  one  can  demonstrate  by  elementary  means  –  when 1k ? ,
? ? ? ?1 2Mp q q? ? ?  and ? ? ? ?? ?max 1 2 2p q q q? ? ? ,  and  that  the  sign  of
? ? ? ? ? ?? ?max 1 2 2dp dq d dq q q q? ?? ? ?? ?  depends on the value of q. Assume then that
2k ? . Clearly, (A23) implies also that
(A24) min min
min
1 1 2 1
2 1 2
M
M
dp dp p q
dq dq p p
? ? ?? ? ? ?
?? ?
so that since min1 1Mp p?? ? ? , mindp dq  must be positive whenever minp q? ?  is
positive. Perhaps the easiest way to see that mindp dq  can be negative is to assume
that k is very large and to write the condition (A21) in the form
(A25)
? ?
min min1
1 2
Mqp p p
q q q
? ? ?
?
Clearly, the left-hand side of this equation equals ? ?minx p , and in the limit in which
k ??  it will be the case that ? ?min minx p p b? . Hence, in the limit in which k ??
? ?min min min min
1
2
p
p p x p b
q
? ?
? ? ?? ?
? ?
Clearly, the left-hand side of this equation is an increasing function of both q and minp
but the right-hand side is a constant, and this immediately implies that when k is
sufficiently large mindp dq  must be negative. ?
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CHAPTER IV
COMMERCIAL PIRACY, NETWORK EXTERNALITIES,
AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICY
ABSTRACT
It has often been pointed out that end-user piracy may increase the profit of the
copyright owner in the presence network externalities. I consider a model of
commercial piracy with network externalities in which the positive price of pirate
copies is explained by the increase in the risk of punishment that the informing of
potential customers causes. The model yields a characterization of the optimal pricing
policy of the copyright owner in the presence of commercial piracy, and shows how
the profit-maximizing intellectual property protection strength increases with the
quality of pirate copies.
4.1. INTRODUCTION
  There is a relatively large economic literature on both the legal and the illegal ways
in which consumers can share information goods.1 The legal business models that are
based on the sharing of information goods include e.g. resale markets of books, video
rental stores, and the for-profit circulating libraries that existed in England in the 18th
and 19th centuries.  It  is  easy  to  see  that  if  the  copyright  owner  is  able  to  charge  a
higher price for those copies of an information good which are shared by several
consumers,  such  legal  forms  of  sharing  do  not  necessarily  lower  her  profits  (cf.
Varian, 2000, pp. 475-7).
  It has also been pointed out by several authors that if an information good is subject
to sufficiently large network externalities, even illegal end-user copying might
1   For  a  survey on the  literature  on  illegal  sharing  (i.e.,  end-user  piracy),  see  Peitz  and Waelbroeck
(2006).
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increase the profit of the copyright owner.2 This may  be the case if piracy increases
the valuation that the consumers give to the information good, and if this positive
effect overrules the negative effect of losing consumers to the pirates, so that the net
effect on the profit of the copyright owner is positive. Takeyama (1994) shows that
this is sometimes the case in a setting in which pirate copies are of a lower quality
than legitimate copies,3 whereas Slive and Bernhardt (1998) prove a similar result in a
model in which pirate copies are of the same quality with legitimate ones, and in
which consumers are divided into two groups (business consumers and home
consumers) who have a different ability to pirate.4
  In  each  case,  piracy  is  increases  the  revenue  of  the  copyright  owner  if  it  is  a
surrogate for price discrimination: when the copyright owner cannot sell the
information good at a different positive price to the low-valuation and high-valuation
consumers, it might be in her interest to let the low-valuation consumers pirate it. The
same point is illustrated also by the analysis of King and Lampe (2003). King and
Lampe restrict attention to a case in which pirate copies are of the same quality with
legitimate copies, and conclude that in this case piracy can be in the interest of the
copyright owner only if there is a substantial body of high-valuation consumers who
are not able to make use of a pirate copy. 5
2   See also Shy and Thisse (1999), who prove a closely related result according to which allowing for
piracy might be in the interest of a copyright owner for strategic reasons, in order to make the
information good more attractive than a similar product of a competing manufacturer.
3   Takeyama (1994, pp. 158-162) considers a model in which the consumers are divided into two
homogenous groups, the high-valuation and the low-valuation consumers, and pirate copies are of a
lower value than originals for each of these groups. If the copyright owner is unable to price
discriminate, in Takayama’s model she has she in the absence of piracy the options of choosing a price
which is so low that also the low-valuation consumers will buy the product, or selling the product to the
high-valuation consumers only at a higher price. It turns out that when the network externalities are
sufficiently strong, letting the low-valuation consumers pirate the product yields higher profit than
either of these alternatives (see formula (8) in ibid., p. 160).
4   See Proposition 1 in Slive and Bernhard (1998), p. 893.  Cf. also Proposition 4 in Conner –Rumelt
(1991), p. 133.
5   According to King and Lampe (2003), the results of Slive and Bernhard (1998), Conner and Rumelt
(1991), and Takeyama (1994) are based on four assumptions. These are that “customers have a
differential ability to pirate”, “the seller does not have an ability to directly price discriminate between
different customers”, “the number of potential pirates is relatively small”, and “the ability to pirate is
inversely correlated with customer willingness-to-pay” (King and Lampe, 2003, p. 274). It should be
observed that this is not quite rigorously true of the analysis of Takeyama, in which all consumers have
an identical ability to pirate. In Takeyama’s model market segmentation is caused by the fact that pirate
copies are of a lower quality than legitimate copies, and when this is the case, the high-valuation
consumers sometimes buy legitimate copies even when low-valuation consumers make use of pirate
copies (Takeyama, 1994, p. 159).
  Analogously, it is essential for the results that are deduced below that the difference in the surplus
from buying a legitimate copy at price Mp , i.e. Mp?? ? , and the surplus from buying a pirate copy
for the price p, i.e. q p?? ? , is an increasing function of the parameter ? , so that the consumers with
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Software products are obvious examples of information goods which are subject to
network externalities, since their popularity affects their value in many ways. Most
obviously, when a consumer wishes to exchange files (like e.g. documents produced
by a word processor) with other consumers, it is in her interest that the other
consumers  are  using  identical  or  at  least  compatible  software  products.  Also  the
availability of complementary goods and services (such as plug-ins, product support,
and training seminars) can be expected to improve with the popularity of a software
product. Finally, the popularity of a software product that a company is using also
improves  the  chances  that  the  company  will  be  able  to  hire  employees  who  are
familiar with the product in advance, and this reduces the expected costs of training
employees.6
  The economic analyses of software piracy in the presence of network externalities
have  until  now  been  almost  exclusively  concerned  with  end-user  piracy  rather  than
with commercial piracy.7 However,  pirate  copies  of  software  products  are  not  just
distributed for free, but they are also sold at a positive price. Since both commercial
and non-commercial forms of piracy are illegal, it is difficult to estimate to which
extent the pirate copies that are currently in use result from commercial piracy rather
than end-user piracy,8 but e.g. the profits that major commercial pirates have earned
suggest that also the commercial forms of software piracy are of a considerable
economic significance.9
a large ?  value prefer a legitimate copy also when the consumers with a small ?  value prefer a pirate
copy. However, it will be not necessary to assume that the consumers with a higher ? value would
have a smaller ability to make use of pirate copies (i.e. that they would receive fewer advertisements).
6   Cf. Slive – Bernhardt, 1988, p. 888. Also  the  fact  that evaluation versions of many commercial
software products are freely available on the Internet suggests that the free distribution of software
must, for one reason or another, be in the interest of software manufacturers (ibid, p. 887).
7    An exception is formed by Banerjee (2003), pp. 113-116, which contains a short analysis of the
effects of network externalities on the competition between a monopolist (i.e. the copyright owner) and
a single commercial pirate. Banerjee assumes that the utility that a consumer draws from an
information good consists of two components, a stand-alone value which is uniformly distributed in an
interval ? ?,L H? ?  and a component which results from network externalities, and which is identical for
all consumers. It turns out that for a utility function of this kind, the profit of the monopolist is always
smaller in the presence of the pirate than in her absence, independently of the strength of the network
externalities.  (The former is *lfm?
?
, given by formula (B.8) in ibid., Appendix, B on p. 124, and the
latter is *m? ? , given by formula (B.2)  on p. 123, and it is easy to see that
* *lf
m m? ?
? ?? ).
8   The Business Software Alliance publishes yearly estimates for the software piracy rates in the
different countries of the world, and in the world as a whole (see http://w3.bsa.org/globalstudy/,
accessed on March 18, 2008). However, these estimates do not draw a distinction between the
commercial and the non-commercial forms of piracy.
9    For reports by the U.S. Department of Justice on court cases against large-scale commercial
software pirates, see e.g.
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  Intuitively, it seems that when the pirate copies are sold at a positive price, the
effects of piracy on the revenue of the copyright owner might well differ from its
effects when pirate copies are distributed for free. Piracy has a direct negative on the
revenue of the copyright owner, when some of the consumers who would have bought
a legitimate copy in the absence of piracy make use of a pirate copy instead, and it has
an indirect positive effect, when it increases the valuation that the paying consumers
give to the product. Both of  these  effects  decrease  as  the  price  of  pirate  copies
increases, since high-price pirate copies are less attractive to the customers of the
copyright owner than low-price pirate copies, and since their availability causes
smaller network effects. Hence, it is interesting to ask to which extent the earlier
results concerning the effect of piracy on the profit of the copyright owner carry over
to commercial piracy. Below I shall develop a model which addresses this question.
  Pirate copies are by definition information goods that are not protected by copyright,
and since they have several producers, one might expect that their prices would
always sink to the level of their production costs via Bertrand competition.
Accordingly, a satisfactory model of commercial piracy should explain why all
pirated information goods do not resemble the copyrighted files that are illegally
distributed via peer-to-peer networks in having zero price. In the current model the
positive price of the pirate copies that are sold rather than distributed for free is
explained by postulating that commercial piracy is made possible by the punishments
for piracy.
  If the pirate’s risk of getting caught and receiving a punishment for piracy is
increased  whenever  she  informs her  potential  customers  of  the  availability  of  pirate
copies, the risk of a punishment functions analogously with an advertising cost. In this
case each pirate might be able to offer her product only to a part of the potential
consumers, and some consumers might be able to buy a pirate copy from a single
commercial  pirate  only.  Clearly,  in  this  case  the  prices  of  pirate  copies  cannot  be
expected to sink to zero. A model with these features but without network
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/vae/Pressreleases/12-DecemberPDFArchive/05/20051213petersonnr.pdf ,
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/vae/Pressreleases/08-AugustPDFArchive/06/20060825ferrernr.pdf, and
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/vae/Pressreleases/04-AprilPDFArchive/07/20070420knott.pdf
(accessed on March 18, 2007).
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externalities was put forward in Kiema (2008).10 Below I shall consider a model
which contains network effects, but which has an otherwise similar logical structure.11
  In  Section  4.2,  I  shall  present  the  basic  features  of  the  current  model.  Section  4.3
characterizes the equilibria of the market for pirate copies, and Section 4.4 studies the
optimization problem of the copyright owner. In the model the strength of copyright
protection is represented by an “advertising cost” (i.e. expected disutility from
punishment) which affects both the price and the availability of pirate copies, and in
Section 4.5 I shall consider the problem of choosing its strength so that the revenue of
the copyright owner is maximized. Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2. THE BASIC FEATURES OF THE MODEL
  The agents of the current model are the monopolist, a continuum ? ?0,1  of consumers
which is indexed by ? , and an infinite number of commercial pirates, to whom I shall
refer as bootleggers. The consumer ?  gives the valuation ??  to a legitimately bought
copy of the good, where the valuation parameter ?  is defined by eA Bn? ? ? . Here
, 0A B ?  are constants, and en  is the expected market penetration of all (both legally
bought and pirated) copies of the product. Further, the consumer ?  gives the
valuation q??  to a pirate copy of the product, where 0 1q? ?  is a constant called the
quality parameter.12
  This specification of the network externality is similar with the one postulated in e.g.
de Palma – Leruth  (1996, p. 239) in so far that in the current model the utility from
the network externality is higher for the high-valuation consumers. The specification
differs from the one in the classical paper Katz – Shapiro (1985), although just like in
the current model, in ibid. (p. 426) the value of a network good has two components, a
stand-alone value which is different for different consumers, and a component which
is due to the network externalities. However, in Katz and Shapiro’s model the latter
10   Essentially the same paper has been presented also as Chapter 3 above.
11    More precisely, the two models differ also in so far that the model in Kiema (2008) was a model of
an oligopoly of k commercial pirates, whereas below I shall for the sake of simplicity restrict attention
to a situation in which the number of the pirates is infinite.
12 Here the parameter q has been meant to represent not only the fact that a pirated product might be
technically of a worse quality than a legally bought one or not operational at all. Rather, it can be also
be viewed as a representation of the fact that some consumers prefer legally bought copies also for
ethical reasons or because there might be legal sanctions against using (and not just against selling)
pirate copies, or because buying a pirate copy requires giving credit card information to criminals.
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component is identical for all consumers. It is clear that the specification that is used
below is more natural in the context of information goods. If the considered good is
e.g. a word processor and the considered network externality consists of the
possibility to exchange files, it is clearly plausible to assume that the utility which is
due to the network externality is small for the consumers for whom the stand alone
value of the product is small.13
  The bootleggers inform consumers of the availability of their products by sending
them advertisements at random, and – as it will shortly be seen – the market share of
each bootlegger must be infinitesimal in equilibrium. As it was explained above, in
the current model pirate copies have a positive price because the informing of
consumers increases the risk of getting caught and receiving a punishment. More
specifically, I postulate that the cost of the punishment is G and that the sending of an
advertisement increases its probability of a punishment by ? , so that the “advertising
cost” b for informing a single consumer is given by14
(1) b G??
  This “advertising cost” represents the strength of intellectual property rights in the
current model. The monopolist, the bootleggers, and the consumers participate in the
following game.
1) The copyright owner sets the price Mp  of legitimate copies.
2) Observing Mp , the copyright owner, the consumers and the bootleggers form
the expectation that the market penetration of (the legitimate and pirated copies of) the
product will be en , where en  has some value in ? ?0,1 . This expectation determines the
valuation parameter ?  in accordance with eA Bn? ? ? , where , 0A B ? .
3)   The bootleggers choose whether to advertise pirate copies. If they do, they
send advertisements to randomly chosen consumers. Sending a single advertisement
causes an increase b in the expected disutility of punishment. The bootleggers are not
constrained to offering the product at the same price in different advertisements.
4) The consumers choose whether to buy the product. Each consumer has the
options  of  buying  the  product  from the  copyright  owner  for Mp  or  from one  of  the
13  Accordingly, in the context of the current model this specification of the network externality seems
more natural than the one use d in Banerjee (2003). Cf. also footnote 7 above   .
14 For a discussion of the econometric problem of actually constructing an index which measures the
strength of legal software protection in a given country, see Andrés (2006, pp. 34-37).
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bootleggers (if any) from whom they have received an advertisement. In equilibrium
each consumer makes the choice which maximizes her surplus.
  It will shortly be seen that the price Mp  of the legitimate copies of the product and
the valuation parameter ?  of the consumers will suffice to determine both the
advertising and pricing decisions of the bootleggers and the buying decisions of the
consumers, so that the realized market penetration n of the product can be expressed
as a function ? ?, Mn p?  of ?  and Mp . On the other hand, according to 2) each value
of ?  corresponds to the expected market penetration ? ?en ?  which is given by
(2) ? ?e
A
n
B
?? ??
  Below we shall be interested in fulfilled expectations equilibria, i.e. situations which
satisfy the equilibrium condition
(E) ? ? ? ?, M en p n? ??
which states that the actual market penetration ? ?, Mn p?  of the (legally bought and
pirated) copies of the product is identical with its expected market penetration ? ?en ? .
Obviously, here the range of the possible values of ?  is ? ?,A A B? .
  In  what  follows ? ?x p  will denote the probability with which a randomly chosen
consumer is willing to buy a pirate copy for the price p when she does not receive any
advertisements with a lower price. Obviously, ? ?x p  depends implicitly on both Mp
and ? .  The value of the price of p that maximizes ? ?px p  for given values of Mp  and
?  is below denoted by maxp . It is clear that the bootleggers will send some
advertisements if and only if
? ?max maxp x p b?
  When this condition is valid, the equilibrium that emerges in the pirate copy market
resembles the equilibria of the classical model of advertising by Butters (1977). I shall
conclude this section by discussing the situation in which this condition is not valid,
and the bootleggers do not enter the market. Clearly, in this case a consumer ?  will
buy the consider good from the monopolist if and only if 0Mp?? ? ? , so that the
realized market penetration turns out to be
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(3) ? ?, max 0,1 MM
p
n p?
?
? ?? ?? ?
? ?
  It  is  clear  that  when Mp A? ,  the  model  has  a  corner  solution  in  which 0en n? ?
and ? ?e MA Bn A p?? ? ?? ? ? ?  for all consumers ? . This represents a case in which
there are no consumers who would be willing to buy the product, because each
consumer assumes that no one else will buy it. The formulas (2) and (3) also
immediately imply that the equilibrium condition (E) can be valid for at most two
other values of ? .
   Figure  4.1  depicts  a  situation  in  which  there  are  altogether  three  equilibria  of  the
model. In this figure the region in which the curve ? ?n ?  is above the curve ? ?en ?
corresponds to cases in which the consumers underestimate the popularity (and,
accordingly, the value) of the considered good, and the two regions in which ? ?n ?  is
below ? ?en ?  correspond to cases in which consumers overestimate it. The points at
which the curves ? ?n n ??  and ? ?en n ??  cross represent equilibria of the model, and
the corresponding values of ?  have been denoted by ? ?and ? ??  in the figure. The
corner solution A? ? , 0en ? , i.e. the case in which no one buys the product because
each consumer believes that no one else will buy it,  corresponds to the origin in the
figure, because the figure represents a case in which 0A ? .
  However, in the situation of Figure 4.1 the equilibrium ? ? ??  is unstable in a sense
in which the two other equilibria (i.e., 0A? ? ?  and ? ???? ) are not. This idea can be
made rigorous by considering a game in which the considered good is repeatedly
offered for sale for the price Mp , and in which the valuation parameter ?  is
determined by the actual market penetration n? of the product in the previous round,
i.e. in which A Bn? ?? ? . In Figure 4.1, the arrows which have been drawn between
the curves ? ?n ?  and ? ?en ?  represent the time development of the valuation
parameter ?  and the market penetration of the product in this repeated game. As the
figure illustrates, if the value of ?  is originally below ? ? , in the repeated game it will
approach A, and the market penetration of the product will approach 0. Similarly, if
the valuation parameter is originally above ? ? , it will approach ? ?? .
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Figure 4.1. The expected market penetration en  and the actual market penetration n
as functions of ?  in the absence of piracy when 0A ? , 1B ? ,  and 0.2Mp ? .
      However, both the equilibrium in which no consumers buy the product and A? ?
and the equilibrium in which ? ????  are stable in the sense that if ?  is originally
sufficiently close to the equilibrium value, ?  will start to approach the equilibrium
value in the repeated game. As Figure 4.1 illustrates, an equilibrium with positive
market penetration corresponds to an equilibrium which is stable in this sense if and
only if it meets the stability condition15
(S) ? ? ? ?, Me
n p
n
?
?
?
?
? ?
?
.
15 More precisely, the geometry of the situation makes it obvious that the equilibria which satisfy the
condition (S) are stable if both ? ?en ?  and ? ?, Mn p?  are  increasing  functions  of ? ,  which  is,  of
course, trivially the case when they are given by (2) and (3).
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4.3. THE EQUILIBRIUM OF THE PIRATE COPY MARKET
  We now turn to the case in which the price set by the monopolist and the valuation
parameter eA Bn? ? ?  are such that the bootleggers send at least some
advertisements. As it was explained above, this will be the case whenever
? ?max maxp x p b?
where maxp  is the price which maximizes ? ?px p , i.e. the expected revenue from a
single advertisement in the absence of all other advertisements. Since the consumer ?
gives the valuation ??  to a legitimate copy and the valuation q?? to a pirate copy, the
probability with which a randomly chosen consumer buys a pirate copy for the price p
when this is the lowest price that is suggested in the advertisements that she receives
is given by
(4) ? ? ? ?? ?
? ?
? ? ? ?
1 ,,
,    1 ,
A
B M
p q p px p p p
x p
x p p p qp p q q p p
?
?
?? ?????? ?? ?? ?? ?? ? ? ?? ?? ? ? ?
where ? ?1Mp p q ?? ? ? ? . Intuitively, when ? ? ? ?Ax p x p? , there are no consumers
who  would  buy  a  legitimate  copy  if  they  can  get  a  pirate  copy  for  the  price p, but
when ? ? ? ?Bx p x p? , the price p is so high that such consumers exist. The result (4)
implies that, somewhat surprisingly, in the latter case an increase in the expected
market penetration of the product decreases the popularity of pirate copies.
  Putting ? ? ? ?? ?1 2 2M Mp q p? ? ?  and ? ? ? ? ? ?? ?? ?2 2 2 1M Mp q q p? ? ? ? ,  a
straightforward calculation shows that maxp  is given by
(5)
? ?
? ? ? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?
1
max 1 2
2
2,
1 ,
2,
M
M M M
M M
q p
p p q p p
qp p
? ? ?
? ? ? ?
? ?
??
?
? ? ? ? ??
? ??
  Intuitively, when ? ?2 Mp? ?? , the price maxp  is  so  high  that  some consumers  who
can get a pirate copy for maxp  will nevertheless choose a legitimate copy, but when
? ? ? ?1 2 2M Mp p? ? ?? ? , maxp  is the largest price for which this is not the case. When
? ?1 Mp? ?? , maxp  is even lower than this limit price. Table 4.1 summarizes these
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facts, together with intuitive interpretations for some of the other functions that will
defined below.
Function Interpretation
? ?L Mp? The smallest value of ?  for which the bootleggers advertise.
? ?H Mp? The largest value of ?  for which the bootleggers advertise.
? ?1 Mp? The smallest value of ? for which maxp is the limit price which
makes all consumers prefer a pirate copy to a legitimate copy; if
? ?1 Mp? ?? , Mp  is  so  high  (relative  to ? ) that maxp  is even
lower than this limit price.
? ?2 Mp? The largest value of ?  for  which maxp is the limit price which
makes all consumers prefer a pirate copy to a legitimate copy; if
? ?2 Mp? ?? ,  some consumers  prefer  legitimate  copies  to  pirate
copies with the price maxp .
? ?3 Mp? If ? ? ? ?2H M Mp p? ??  (i.e., if the bootleggers advertise also for
some values ?  for which ? ?2 Mp? ?? ), ? ?3 Mp?  is the largest
value of ?  for which all consumers prefer some (at least the
cheapest) pirate copies to legitimate copies.
If ? ? ? ?2H M Mp p? ?? , ? ?3 Mp?  is defined by convention as
? ? ? ?3 2M Mp p? ?? .
Table 4.1.
  Now it easily follows from (4) and (5) that in the absence of other advertisements the
expected revenue from an advertisement with the price maxp  is
(6) ? ?
? ?
? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
? ?? ? ? ?
1
max max max 1 2
2
2
4 ,
1 ,
4 1 ,
M
M M M M
M M
q p
r p x p p p q q p p
qp q p
? ? ?
? ? ? ? ? ?
? ? ?
? ?
??? ? ? ? ? ? ??
?
? ???
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Forming the derivative maxr ?? ? , it is easily observed that when the revenue maxr  is
viewed as a function of ? , it has a single maximum, and that this corresponds to the
value 1M Mp q? ? ?  which is located between ? ?1 Mp?  and ? ?2 Mp? . The revenue
maxr  is an increasing function when M? ??  and  a  decreasing  function  when M? ??
and hence, when Mp  is fixed, the values of ?  for which maxr b?   – i.e. the values for
which the pirates enter the market – form a closed interval.
Figure 4.2. The expected market penetration en  and the actual market penetration n
as functions of ?  when 0A ? , 1B ? , 0.2Mp ? , 0.5q ? ,  and 0.02b ? .
This makes it clear how Figure 4.1 gets modified when commercial pirates are
included in it. Figure 4.2 corresponds to a fixed value of Mp , and it shows the realized
market penetration ? ?, Mn p?  as a function of the valuation parameter? , when the
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“advertising cost” b is so high that the bootleggers do not enter the market, and  when
b is reduced so much that they enter for some values of ? . In the latter case the values
of ?  for which the bootleggers enter form an interval ? ?,L H? ? . Within this interval
the curve ? ?, Mn p?  shifts upwards, but outside of it the curve remains unchanged.
   Clearly, if there was just a single bootlegger, she would maximize her revenue by
specifying the price maxp p?  in all her advertisements. However, in the current model
the number of the bootleggers is  infinite,  and this easily implies that  there has to be
price dispersion in the market for pirate copies. To see this, let ? ?A p  denote the
number of the advertisements which have a price which is smaller than or equal with
p. Since the number of the consumers has been normalized to 1 and since the
advertisements are sent at random, it easily follows that the probability with which a
consumer does not receive any advertisements with a price smaller than or equal with
p is ? ?A pe? . Hence, the expected revenue ? ?r p  from sending one more advertisement
with a price p is
(7) ? ? ? ? ? ?A pr p e px p??
This must be equal with b for each p at which some bootleggers advertise (since if
? ?r p b? , some bootleggers would be advertising with a negative profit, and if
? ?r p b? , each bootlegger with an infinitesimal market share would have an incentive
to send one more advertisement at the price p).
  It is also clear that in equilibrium the largest price in the advertisements must always
have the value maxp . Trivially, no bootleggers can have an incentive to advertise with
a price maxp p? , since in this case ? ? ? ?maxA p A p?  and ? ? ? ?max maxpx p p x p?  so that
? ? ? ?maxr p r p? . On the other hand, if all advertisements contained prices lower than
maxp ??  for some 0? ? , profits would be increased by changing the highest prices in
the advertisements from maxp ??  to maxp  (because this would not change the risk that
the consumer gets an offer with a lower price, but it would increase ? ?px p  ).
Analogous  arguments  show  that  the  smallest  price minp  that  appears  in  the
advertisements is determined by the condition
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(8) ? ?min minp x p b?
and also that some bootleggers must be advertising at each price p in the interval
? ?min max,p p .
  Now it also follows that (7) is valid for each p for which min maxp p p? ? , so that A is
a continuous function and the number of the advertisements that are sent at each price
p is infinitesimal. This further implies that the market share of each single bootlegger
is infinitesimal (since if a bootlegger with a finite market share decided not to send
her higher-price advertisements when (7) is valid, this would not affect her profit from
those advertisements, but it would allow her to earn a positive profit from her lower-
price advertisements).
  In particular, (7) and the fact that ? ?r p b?  imply that ? ?A p  is given by
(9) ? ? ? ?ln px pA p
b
? ?
? ? ?
? ?
for all prices p in ? ?min max,p p . The result (9) also implies that the total number of the
advertisements is given by
(10) ? ? maxmax ln
r
A A p
b
? ?? ? ? ?? ?
    As the next step, we shall deduce from (8) an explicit formula for minp . When
? ?2 Mp? ?? ,  (4)  and  (5)  imply  that min maxp p p?? ?  so that ? ? ? ?min minAx p x p? .
Intuitively, this condition means that all consumers prefer buying a pirate copy to
buying a legitimate copy.
  Assume now that the bootleggers advertise for some values of ?  for  which
? ?2 Mp? ?? .  Now (4) and (5) imply that maxp p??   and ? ? ? ?max maxBx p x p? , which
means that some (but not necessarily all) pirate copies cause market segmentation in
the sense that the highest-valuation consumers prefer legitimate copies to them, but
lower-valuation consumers do not. All pirate copies cause market segmentation in
this sense if also minp p?? . This will be case if
(11) ? ?p x p b? ? ? ,
i.e. if the limit price p?  is so small that it is unprofitable to advertise at it. Keeping in
mind that Mp  is fixed and that we are considering the case in which ? ?2 Mp? ?? , it
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can be verified by elementary means that the condition (11) valid if and only if
? ?3 Mp? ?? ,  where
(12) ? ? ? ? ? ?? ?
22
3
2 4
2 1
M M M
M
q p bq q p b qp b
p
q
?
? ? ? ? ?
?
?
It is clear that the expression under the square root sign is positive in the case in which
we are considering, i.e. when the bootleggers send advertisements for some values of
?  for which ? ?2 Mp? ?? .16 When  there  are  no  such  values  of ? , we define, by
convention, ? ? ? ?3 2M Mp p? ?? .
  Now it can be concluded from (4) and (8) that whenever ? ? ? ?L M H Mp p? ? ?? ?
(i.e., whenever the valuation parameter is such that the bootleggers send at least some
advertisements),
(13)
? ?
? ? ? ?
2
3
min
2
3
,
2 2
1 ,
2 2
M
M M
M
q q
q b p
p
qp qp
bq q p
? ? ? ? ?
? ? ?
? ? ?? ? ? ?? ?? ? ?
? ?
? ? ?? ? ? ?? ? ?? ??
  After these preparations it has become possible to deduce an explicit formula for the
realized market penetration ? ?, Mn p?  of the product when the bootleggers are on the
market. For this purpose, the potential consumers of the monopolist and the
bootleggers are divided into three groups. Firstly, the consumers ?  for whom
Mp?? ?  will all buy either a legitimate copy or a  pirate copy. Such consumers will
exist if and only if Mp? ? , and the demand component which corresponds to them is
16 We are considering a case in which the bootleggers advertise when the valuation parameter is ? ,
where ? ?2 Mp? ?? . According to (6), this implies that ? ?2 4 1Mqp q b?? ?  or, equivalently,
? ?2 4 1Mqp b q ?? ? . Given that ? ? ? ? ? ?? ?? ?2 2 2 1M Mp q q p? ?? ? ? ? , this condition can only
be valid if ? ?2 2 2M Mqp b q p? ? . The latter condition is equivalent with 2 2 4M M Mqp bqp bp? ? ,
and it further implies that
? ?2 2 22 4M M M Mq p b qp bqp qb bp? ? ? ? ?
However, this is equivalent with ? ?22 4 0M Mq p b qp b? ? ? . Hence, the expression under the
square root sign is positive, if ? ?2 Mp? ??  and the bootleggers advertise when the valuation
parameter has the value ? .
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(14) ? ? ? ?1 , max 0,1M Mn p p? ?? ?
  The second group of potential customers consists of the consumers who will not buy
a  legitimate  copy but  who are  willing  to  buy  a  pirate  copy even  for  the  price maxp .
Obviously,  a  consumer  of  this  group  buys  a  pirate  copy  if  she  gets  at  least  one
advertisement. A consumer ?  belongs to this group if and only if maxp q???  and
Mp?? ? ,  i.e.  if  and  only  if ? ?max Mp q p? ? ?? ? , and consumers for whom this
condition is valid will exist whenever max Mp qp? . However, the latter condition must
always be valid in equilibrium, since in general a consumer ?  can prefer buying a
pirate copy for the price p to buying a legitimate copy for Mp   only if
Mq p p?? ??? ? ? , and this condition cannot be valid for any value of ?  if Mp qp? .
Hence, in equilibrium there are always consumers which belong to the second group.
Clearly, since the probability with which a consumer gets no advertisements is
max
Ae b r? ? , the market penetration component which corresponds to these
consumers is
(15) ? ? ? ? max2 , 1 min ,1A MM ppn p e q? ? ?
? ? ?? ?? ? ?? ?? ?
? ?? ?
  Finally, the third group of potential customers consists of the consumers whose
reservation price for pirate copies lies between minp  and maxp . Since the maximal
price that the consumer ?  is  willing  to  pay  for  a  pirate  copy  is q??  , the market
penetration component which corresponds to these consumers is
(16) ? ? ? ?? ?? ?
? ? ? ?? ?max max
min min
3
1
, 1 1
p q pA q A p
M p q p
n p e d e dp
q
? ??
?
? ?
?
? ?? ? ? ?? ?
Putting these results together, it can be concluded that when there are pirate copies on
the market, the total market penetration of the product is
(17)
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
? ?max
min
1 2 3
maxmin
max
, , , ,
1
   1 min ,1
M M M M
p A pM
p
n p n p n p n p
pp b p
e dp
q r q q
? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?
?
? ? ?
? ?? ?? ? ? ? ?? ?? ?
? ?? ?
?
  This  can  be  evaluated  using  (4),  (5),  (6),  and  (9).  As  these  results  show,  the
expressions of maxp  and maxr   depend on whether ? ?1 Mp? ?? ,
? ? ? ?1 2M Mp p? ? ?? ? , or ? ?2 Mp? ?? , and also the function ? ?A p  which appears in
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the integral in (17)  receives a different form depending on whether ? ? ? ?Ax p x p?  or
? ? ? ?Bx p x p?  for the prices between minp  and maxp . Keeping this in mind, a tedious
but straightforward calculation leads to the following expressions for the market
penetration (17) of the product when the pirates are on the market:
(18) ? ? min min
min
2
, 1 lnM
p b b q p
n p
q q q p
??
? ? ?
? ??? ? ? ? ? ?
? ?
( Mp? ? )
(19) ? ? ? ?min min2
min
2 2
, 1 lnMM
b pp b q p
n p
q q q p
? ??
? ? ?
? ? ??? ? ? ? ? ?
? ?
      ( ? ?1M Mp p? ?? ? )
(20)
? ? ? ?? ?
? ?? ?
? ?
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min
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, 1
1
   ln
M
M
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b qp
n p
q p q
p q q pb
q p p
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? ?
? ? ?
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? ?? ? ?
? ? ?? ??? ?
    ( ? ? ? ?1 2M Mp p? ? ?? ? )
(21)
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   ( ? ? ? ?2 3M Mp p? ? ?? ? )
(22)
? ? ? ?
? ?
min
min
min
2 1
, 1
1
     ln
M
M
M
M
b qp
n p
q qp
b q qp p
qp p
?
?
?
? ? ?
? ? ??? ? ?
? ?
                              ( ? ?3 Mp? ?? )
  In what follows I shall be interested in the fulfilled expectations equilibria which
satisfy the stability condition, i.e. situations in which both (E) and (S) are valid for
? ?en ?  and ? ?, Mn p? .17 In the absence of the bootleggers the market penetration
? ? ? ?, max 0,1M Mn p p? ?? ?  is  a  concave  function,  and  as  Figure  4.1  illustrates,  in
17 As it was pointed out that in Section 2, the geometry of Figure 1 makes it obvious that the equilibria
which satisfy the condition (S) are stable as long as both ? ?en ?  and ? ?, Mn p?  are increasing
functions of ? . It should be observed that although this condition is trivially valid in the absence of the
bootleggers, there is no obvious economic reason why ? ?, Mn p?  would always have to increase as a
function of ?  when the bootleggers are on the market. However, a straightforward calculation shows
that ? ?, 0Mn p? ?? ? ?  also when ? ?, Mn p?  has one of the expressions (18)-(22).
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this case each price Mp  of legitimate copies corresponds to at most one equilibrium
with 0? ?  which satisfies the stability condition (S).  However, when the bootleggers
are taken into account, ? ?, Mn p?  is no longer in general a concave function of ? .
Accordingly, it is conceivable that there are more than one stable fulfilled
expectations equilibria with a positive market penetration which correspond to the
same price Mp .
  In what follows I shall restrict attention to the fulfilled expectations equilibrium
which has the largest market penetration and, accordingly, the largest ?  value, and for
each Mp ,   I  shall  let ? ?Mp?  denote the valuation parameter in this fulfilled
expectations equilibrium. However, it is straightforward to verify that when there are
many equilibria which satisfy (S), the results concerning the function ? ?Mp?  below
remain valid if ? ?Mp?  is an arbitrary continuous function which gives for each Mp  a
value of ?  which corresponds to a stable equilibrium.
  It is also easy to see that the equilibrium with the largest market penetration satisfies
the stability condition (S), except for an implausible special case. To see this, one
should first observe that ? ?MA p A B?? ? ? , since when eA Bn? ? ? , the value
A? ?  corresponds to the market penetration 0en ?  and  the  value A B? ? ?
corresponds to the market penetration 1en ? . When ? ?Mp A? ?  so that the
equilibrium market penetration is positive, the equilibrium condition (E) receives the
form
(23) ? ?? ? ? ?? ?, 0e M M Mn p n p p? ?? ?
  Since for each positive price Mp
? ? ? ? ? ?, 1 , 0e M Mn A B n A B p n A B p? ? ? ? ? ? ?
and since the value ? ?Mp A B? ?? ? ?  is the largest value of ?  which satisfies (23),
it must be the case that
(24) ? ? ? ?? ? ? ?, 0Me M pn n p ? ?? ?? ?
? ? ?
?
In other words, the equilibrium ? ?Mp? ??  satisfies the stability condition (S), except
for the case in which ? ?, Mn p? ?? ?   and ? ?en ??  are identical in it. (The latter
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possibility will be realized, in particular, if the curves ? ?, Mn p?  and ? ?en ?  meet at
just one point, and ? ? ? ?, M e Mn p n p? ?  elsewhere.)
4.4. THE OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM OF THE MONOPOLIST
  We  now  turn  to  the  optimization  problem  of  the  monopolist,  i.e.  the  problem  of
choosing Mp  so that the revenue of the monopolist is maximized when ? ?Mp? ?? .
Clearly, solution of this problem might either be a value of Mp  for which the
bootleggers enter the market, in which case ? ?Mp?  is given by one of the formulas
(18)-(22),  or  it  might  be  a  value  of Mp  for which the bootleggers do not enter.
According to (3), in the latter case the demand of the monopolist is given by
? ?, 1M Mn p p? ?? ? , so that the revenue of the monopolist is
(25) 1 MM M
p
R p
?
? ?? ?? ?
? ?
( maxr b? )
  In order to find an expression for MR  when the bootleggers are on the market, we
now assume that maxr b? , which implies that the bootleggers advertise in equilibrium,
and divide potential customers of the monopolist into the high-valuation, medium-
valuation, and the low-valuation customers.
  The high-valuation customers,  are,  by  definition,  consumers  who  will  buy  a
legitimate copy even if they can get a pirate copy for minp . Such consumers exist only
if ?  is larger than ? ?3 Mp? , and a consumer ?  belongs to this group only if
minMp q p?? ??? ? ? .  This is equivalent with ? ? ? ?? ?min 1Mp p q? ?? ? ? , so that the
demand from the high-valuation consumers is
(26)
? ?
? ? ? ?
3
min
3
0,
1 ,
1
M
H M
M
p
D p p
p
q
? ?
? ?
?
? ?
?? ?? ? ?? ??
  By definition, the low-valuation customers are the ones who will buy a legitimate
copy if and only if they do not receive any advertisements. Clearly, a consumer ?  is a
low-valuation consumer if and only if Mp? ??  and maxMp q p?? ??? ? ? . When
? ?2 Mp? ?? , the latter condition is valid for all the consumers 1? ?  so that
128
max
1 1A M ML
p b p
D e
r? ?
? ? ?? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ?? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?? ?
When ? ?2 Mp? ?? , (5) implies that the condition maxMp q p?? ??? ? ?  is equivalent
with ? ? ? ?? ?? ?1 2 1 Mq q p? ?? ? ? , and the demand from the low-valuation
consumers is
? ?max
1 2
1 2 1
A M M M
L
q p p b qp
D e
q r q? ? ?
? ? ?? ?? ??? ? ? ? ?? ?? ? ? ?? ?? ?? ? ? ?
  Together with (6), these results imply that
(27)
? ? ? ?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ?
? ? ? ?? ?
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  Finally, the medium-valuation customers are by definition consumers who are
willing to buy a legitimate copy even if they can get a pirate copy for maxp , but not if
they  can  get  a  pirate  copy  for minp .  Clearly,  when ? ?2 Mp? ?? , no consumers with
1? ?  are  medium valuation customers. Assume then that ? ?2 Mp? ?? .  Now  a
consumer ?  is a medium-valuation customer if min maxMq p p q p?? ?? ??? ? ? ? ? .
This is equivalent with
(28)
? ? ? ?
max min
1 1
M Mp p p p
q q
?
? ?
? ?? ?
? ?
Remembering that ? ?max 2Mp qp?  when ? ?2 Mp? ?? , and putting
? ?
minmin ,1
1
Mp p
q
?
?
? ??? ?? ? ? ??? ?
(28) is easily seen to be equivalent with
? ?2 Mp? ? ? ? ?? ?
Hence, when ? ?2 Mp? ?? , (9) implies that the demand from the medium-valuation
consumers is
? ?? ?
? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ?? ?2 2
1
1 1
M
M M
A p q
med p p
M M
bd
D e d
p q x p q
? ???
? ? ? ?
??
?? ??
? ?? ? ?? ?
? ? ? ?? ?
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Remembering that ? ? ? ? ? ?? ?? ?2 2 2 1M Mp q q p? ? ? ? , it is readily calculated that
? ?? ?
? ?
1
ln
1
M
med
M M
q pb
D
p p q
??
??
? ??? ?
? ? ?? ??? ?? ?
The definitions of ? ?3 Mp?  and ? ?  imply that 1? ? ?  if ? ? ? ?2 3M Mp p? ? ?? ? , but
? ? ? ?? ?min 1Mp p q? ?? ? ? ?  if ? ?3 Mp? ?? . Hence, medD  has, in general, the
expression
(29)
? ?
? ?? ?
? ? ? ? ? ?
? ?
2
2 3
3
min
0,
1
ln ,
1
ln 1 ,
M
M
med M M
M M
M
M
M
p
q pb
D p p
p p q
b qp
p
p p
? ?
?
? ? ?
?
? ?
?
?
??
? ? ??? ? ?? ? ??
? ? ?? ? ?? ?? ? ??
In each case, the revenue MR  of the monopolist is given by
? ?M M L med HR p D D D? ? ? . Combining (26), (27), and (29), this it is seen to equal
(30)
? ? ? ?
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  Having deduced an expression for MR  – which given by (25) or (30), depending on
whether the bootleggers enter the market – we now turn to the problem of choosing
Mp  so that MR  is maximized, when ? ?Mp? ?? . Clearly, in either case
(31) M M M
M M M
dR R d R
dp p dp
?
?
? ?? ?
? ?
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so that the effect of a change of Mp  on revenue consists of the direct effect, which is
given by MR p? ? , and the indirect effect, which is represented by the latter term and
which is caused by the change in the valuations of the consumers.
  We begin our analysis of this optimization problem by considering the latter effect.
The derivative Md dp? , which appears in (31), is determined by the equilibrium
condition (E), i.e. ? ?? ? ? ?? ?,M M e Mn p p n p? ?? . Clearly, this condition implies that
(32)
? ?
? ? ? ?
,
,
M M
M e M
n p pd
dp n n p
??
? ? ?
? ?
?
? ? ? ?
  This further implies that Md dp?  and Mn p? ?  have  the  same  sign  if  the  stability
condition (S) is valid. This observation will be formulated as a separate proposition.
PROPOSITION 1. In a stable equilibrium 0Mn p? ? ?  implies that 0Md dp? ?  and
0Mdn dp ? , and 0Mn p? ? ?  implies that 0Md dp? ?  and 0Mdn dp ? . (I.e. the
sign of the change of the market penetration caused by a small change in Mp  is
identical in a stable fulfilled expectations equilibrium, and in a case in which the
valuations of the consumers are fixed.)
  This makes it possible to determine the sign of Md dp?  directly on the basis of the
expressions (18)-(22) of the function ? ?, Mn p? ,  by  studying  the  signs  of  the  partial
derivatives ? ?, M Mn p p?? ? . These are given by the following lemma.
LEMMA 1. Suppose that ?  and Mp  are  such  that  the  pirates  are  on  the  market.  If
? ?2M Mp p? ?? ? , 0Mn p? ? ? , but if ? ?2 Mp? ?? , 0Mn p? ? ? . If ? ?2 Mp? ?? ,
0Mn p? ? ? , so that if the valuation parameter ?  is fixed, in this case an increase in
Mp increases market penetration.
  The result (30) easily implies that when ? ?2 Mp? ??  – i.e., when none of the
consumers who can get a pirate copy will buy a legitimate one – the direct effect of a
decrease of price Mp  on revenue MR  is  positive (since 0M MR p? ? ? )   and also the
direct effect of an increase in ?  is positive (since 0MR ?? ? ? ) . However,
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Proposition 1 and Lemma 1 imply that in this case a decrease in Mp  increases ? , and
combining the results, it follows that the monopolist has always an incentive to lower
the  price   if ? ?2 Mp? ?? .18 This statement will be formulated as the following
corollary.
COROLLARY 1. Suppose that the model has a fulfilled expectations equilibrium with
bootleggers in which ? ?2 Mp? ??  (which means that none of the consumers who can
buy a pirate copy will prefer to buy a legitimate copy). The revenue of the monopolist
is increased when the monopolist lowers the price Mp  until the resulting equilibrium
is either such that ? ?2 Mp? ?? , or such that the bootleggers do not enter the market.
  This  corollary  corresponds  to  a  clear  intuition.  As  it  was  explained  in  the
introduction, the reason why the pirates are sometimes useful for the monopolist is
that they constitute a surrogate for price discrimination: if the copyright owner cannot
sell the information good at a lower price to the low-valuation consumers, it might be
in her interest to distribute it to them for free and charge a larger price from the high-
valuation consumers. Obviously, there is no market segmentation of this kind when
? ?2 Mp? ??  and all the consumers who can get hold of a pirate copy will prefer it to a
legitimate copy.
  The above corollary leaves three possibilities, two of which are intuitive. Firstly, it
may be the case in equilibrium that the monopolist blocks the entry of the bootleggers
by choosing a price which is so low that piracy is unprofitable, and secondly, it may
also be the case that the bootleggers enter but ? ?3 Mp? ?? . The latter possibility leads
to the kind of market segmentation which exists also in the models of non-commercial
piracy, since in this case all pirate copies are such that the consumers with a
sufficiently high valuation prefer legitimate copies to them.
18 As it was stated at the end of Section 3, the fulfilled expectations equilibrium in which ? ?Mp? ??
either satisfies the stability condition (S) or is such that ? ? ? ?,e Mn n p? ? ?? ? ? ? . To be precise,
Corollary 1 follows from Proposition 1 and Lemma 1 only in the former case, but – as the proof of
Corollary 1  in the Appendix shows – it is more or less trivial to generalize this proof so that Corollary
1 gets demonstrated in the latter case as well.
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  A third possibility which has not been eliminated yet is that ? ? ? ?2 3M Mp p? ? ?? ? .
In this case, some (i.e. the cheapest) pirate copies are such that all consumers prefer
them to legitimate copies, whereas other (i.e. the more expensive) pirate copies lead to
the kind market segmentation which might increase the revenue of the monopolist.
There seems to be no obvious economic reason why a situation of this kind could not
be revenue-maximizing for the monopolist. Nevertheless, the following proposition
demonstrates  that  this  cannot  be  the  case  in  the  current  model.  According  to  it,  the
profit-maximizing equilibrium is always either of the two more plausible alternatives.
PROPOSITION 2. The revenue-maximizing choice of Mp is always either such that the
bootleggers do not enter the market, or such that they enter but ? ?3 Mp? ??  (i.e., all
pirate copies have prices which are such that the highest-valuation consumers prefer
buying a legitimate copy to buying one of them).
  When (30) and Proposition 2 are combined, they lead to a relatively simple
characterization of the optimal price in an equilibrium in which the bootleggers are on
the market. Given that ? ?3 Mp? ?? ,  one  can  conclude  from  (4)  and  (8)  that
? ? ? ?? ?? ?min min 1Mb p qp p q q ?? ? ? , and from (30) that
? ? ? ?min min min
0
1
M M M
M
R qp p
b
p p qp p q ?
? ? ? ? ?
? ? ?
Hence, although a change Mp  changes also minp ,  this  effect  can  be  left  out  of
consideration when one forms the derivative M MdR dp . Accordingly, the equilibrium
condition
0
M M M
dR R R d
dp p dp
?
?
? ?? ? ?
? ?
is equivalent with
(33) ? ?
? ?
? ?
? ?
min min
2
2
1 0
1 1
M M M
M
p p p p p d
q q dp
?
? ?
? ?? ?
? ? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?
Intuitively, this condition states that the direct effect on profit that a small change in
Mp would cause, and which is represented by the former term, and its indirect effect
which is due to network externalities, and which is represented by the latter term,
must cancel each other out in equilibrium.
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4.5. OPTIMAL COPYRIGHT PROTECTION IN THE PRESENCE OF COMMERCIAL
PIRACY
  I shall conclude the analysis of the model by studying the dependence of the
incentives to create information goods on the amount of copyright protection. In the
current model the incentives to create information goods are represented by the
revenue of the monopolist MR , and – as it was explained in Section 4.2 above –
copyright protection is represented by the “advertising cost” b, which corresponds to
the disutility from a punishment for copyright violation. Hence, the problem of
choosing copyright protection so that the incentives to create information goods are
maximized corresponds in the current model to the problem of maximizing the
equilibrium value of MR  as a function of b.
  Intuitively, since the negative effect of piracy which is caused by the loss of paying
consumers is small when the pirate copies are of a low quality, but the positive effect
which is due to network effects is in the current model independent of their quality,
the revenue-maximizing level of IPR protection can be expected to be small when the
quality of pirate copies is low. This intuition is confirmed by the following
proposition which is concerned with low-quality pirate copies.19
PROPOSITION 3. In the limit in which the quality q of pirate copies approaches zero,
the revenue-maximizing equilibrium approaches the situation of free availability of
pirate copies. I.e., the revenue-maximizing advertising cost b and the minimum price
of pirate copies minp  approach zero, and the market penetration approaches 1.
19 To get a concrete idea of the situation in which the parameter q is small, one can once more consider
the  sales  of  pirate  copies  of  software  products  via  the  Internet.  As  it  was  stated  in  footnote  12,  the
parameter q has not been intended to represent only a physically low quality of pirate copies, but also
other reasons why consumers might prefer legitimate copies to pirate copies (like e.g. ethical
considerations, or unwillingness to give credit card information to criminals). Clearly, even if all the
consumers would have a low willingness to pay for pirate copies because of such considerations, such
considerations would not affect the utility that the users of the legitimate copies obtain from the pirate
copies via network effects.
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Proposition 3 is illustrated by Figure 4.3(a). It represents an extreme case in which
0.2q ? , so that the pirate copies are of a low quality, and 0A ?  and 1B ? , so that
that the considered good is a pure network good which has no intrinsic value for a
consumer if it is not used by others. In the situation of the figure the revenue-
maximizing value of b is 0b ? , meaning that it would be in the interest of the
copyright owner that pirate copies would be available for everyone for free.
(a)  (b)
Figure 4.3. The revenue MR  of the monopolist for the optimal price Mp  as a function
of the strength of IPR protection b, when 0A ?  and 1B ? . In Figure 4.3(a) the
quality parameter 0.2q ? ,  but in Figure 4.3(b) 0.45q ? .
  On the other hand, if pirate copies are of a high quality, the negative effect which is
caused by the loss of consumers to the bootleggers can be expected to overrule the
positive effect which is due to network externalities. The following proposition shows
that this is, indeed, the case.
PROPOSITION 4.  When  the  quality  of  the  pirate  copies q is sufficiently large, the
equilibrium revenue of the monopolist receives its maximum in the absence of piracy,
i.e. when the “advertising cost” b is so high that the pirates do not advertise.
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  Proposition 4 is illustrated with Figure 4.3(b), which shows that when pirate copies
are of a high quality, the revenue of the monopolist MR  is an increasing function of
the “advertising cost” b, and MR   obtains its largest value when b is so large that the
pirate copies are no longer available.
  The revenue of the monopolist is a monotonous function of IPR protection strength
b in both Figures 4.3(a) and 4.3(b). These figures and Propositions 3 and 4 make it
natural to ask whether this is always the case, or whether the optimal amount of
copyright protection is sometimes located between complete protection (represented
by the values of b which eliminate piracy) and no protection (represented by 0b ? ).
Figure 4.4. The revenue MR  of the monopolist for the optimal price Mp  as a function
of the strength of IPR protection b,  when 0A ? , and 1B ? ,  and  the  quality
parameter 0.45q ? .
Figure 4.4 shows that also this is possible, if the quality of the pirate copies is neither
too  large  nor  too  small.  For  the  parameter  specification  of  this  figure  a  situation  of
commercial piracy is for the monopolist preferable to both a situation of the free
availability of pirate copies and a situation of no piracy. However, the numerical
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examples worked out by the author seem to indicate that the effects of piracy on the
revenue of the monopolist are relatively small when this happens: e.g. in the situation
of Figure 4.4, the revenue-maximizing equilibrium of commercial piracy yields only
approximately 9% larger revenue than the situation in which pirate copies are freely
available, and only approximately 1%  larger revenue than complete IPR protection.
4.6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
  It has repeatedly been pointed out that non-commercial piracy can increase the
profits of a copyright owner when an information good is subject to sufficiently
strong network externalities. Above I studied a model of commercial piracy, which
constitutes, in a sense, a generalization of the models which lead to this result. A
situation of free availability of pirate copies corresponds in the current model to the
limiting case in which the “advertising cost” b,  which  represents  the  strength  of
copyright protection, approaches zero, whereas a situation of no piracy correspond to
the values of copyright protection strength b which are sufficiently large to make
piracy unprofitable. The earlier models allow for a comparison of these two cases, but
in  the  current  model  it  is  possible  to  discuss,  more  generally,  the  effects  of  piracy
when the strength of copyright protection has been arbitrarily chosen.
  Most of the results that were deduced above in this more general setting were quite
intuitive.  For  example,  according  to  Corollary  1  the  revenue-maximizing  choice  of
the price of legitimate copies is never such that all the consumers who get the
opportunity to buy a pirate copy would buy one. This result was to be expected, since
the  reason  why  piracy  has  in  the  earlier  literature  sometimes  turned  out  to  be
beneficial  for  the  copyright  owner  is  that  it  acts  as  a  surrogate  for price
discrimination: the free distribution of pirate copies can be thought of as selling low-
quality versions of an information good to low-valuation consumers at price zero, and
this might be in the interest in the copyright owner if no other methods of price
discrimination are available. However, the optimal choice of the copyright owner
might well be such there are pirate copies on the market, if the higher-valuation
consumers prefer a legitimate copy to all (even the lowest-price) pirate copies.
  Since the prices of the pirate copies vary in the current model, the model allows also
for  a  third  possibility:  it  might  be  the  case  that  all  (even  the  highest-valuation
137
consumers) prefer the lowest-price pirate copies to legitimate copies, although the
higher-price pirate copies cause the kind of market segmentation which is in the
interest of the copyright owner. There seems to be no obvious economic intuition on
whether  a  situation  of  this  kind  can  be  in  the  interest  of  the  copyright  owner.
However,  Proposition  2  showed  that  a  situation  of  this  kind  cannot  emerge  in  the
current model if the copyright owner chooses the price of legitimate copies optimally.
  Above the strength of copyright protection was represented with an “advertising
cost” b which was an adjustable parameter and accordingly, the considered model
allowed  for  a  discussion  of  its  optimal  choice.  Confirming  to  the  earlier  results  by
Takeyama  (1994),  it  was  seen  that  when  the  pirate  copies  are  of  a  sufficiently  low
quality, the revenue-maximizing value of copyright protection strength b is zero, and
that when they are of a sufficiently high quality, the revenue of the copyright owner is
maximized when b  is sufficiently high to prevent piracy altogether. 20 This  made  it
natural to ask whether the revenue of the copyright owner always receives its
maximum in either of these corner solutions,  or whether it  is  possible that from the
perspective of the copyright owner a situation of commercial piracy is sometimes
preferable to both the free availability of pirate copies and a situation of no piracy.
Above it turned out that also this case is possible, although is seems that this will
happen only for the parameter specifications for which the (positive or negative)
effects of piracy on the revenue of the copyright owner are rather small.
APPENDIX. PROOFS  OF THE PROPOSITIONS IN CHAPTER 4.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1. The fact that Mn p? ?  and Md dp?  have  the  same  sign
when the stability condition (S) is valid follows immediately from (32). Trivially,
since in any fulfilled expectations equilibrium the actual market penetration
? ? ? ?en n A B? ?? ? ? ,  it  must  also  be  the  case  that ? ? ? ?1M Mdn dp B d dp??  has
the same sign with Mp?? ? .
20   Cf. results (9) and (10) in Takeyama, pp. 160-161.
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PROOF OF LEMMA 1. It might seem that since minp  depends of ?  in accordance with
(13), one should take this dependence into account when forming the partial
derivative Mn p? ? . However, when e.g. 1Mp ? ?? ?  so that
? ? ? ?min minmin minA
p q p
b p x p
q
?
?
?
? ?
(19) implies that
? ?
min
min min min min min
1 1
ln 0
n b q p b
p q q p p q q p p
?
? ? ? ?
? ?? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ?? ? ?? ?
A similar computation shows that
(A1)
? ?
? ?min minmin ,
,
0
M
M
p p p
n p
p
?
?
?
?? ?
?? ??? ?
in  all  of  the  cases  (18)-(22).  (The  intuitive  explanation  for  the  result  (A1)  is  that  in
each case, the explicit dependence of n on minp  results from the integral in the
expression (16)  of ? ?3 , Mn p? ,  and trivially, ? ?3 min, 0Mn p p?? ? ? , since in (16) the
integrated function receives the value 0 at the lower limit of the integral.)
  The result (A1) implies that all terms containing ? ? min, Mn p p?? ?  cancel out in the
derivatives ? ?, M Mn p p?? ? . Keeping this in mind, (19) trivially implies that when
? ?1M Mp p? ?? ?  , 0Mn p? ? ? . Moving to the case in which ? ? ? ?1 2M Mp p? ? ?? ? ,
it is readily calculated that in this case (20) implies that
? ? ? ? ? ?? ?? ?
? ?? ? ? ?2
2 1 2 2 1
1
M
M M M
b q q q p
p p q p
??
? ?
? ? ? ?? ?
? ? ? ?
and since by assumption ? ? ? ? ? ?? ?? ?2 2 2 1M Mp q q p? ?? ? ? ? , it turns out that
0Mn p? ? ? , and that 0Mn p? ? ?  if and only if ? ?2 Mp? ?? .
  When ? ? ? ?2 3M Mp p? ? ?? ? , it follows from (21) with a straightforward calculation
that
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ?
? ? ? ?2 2
, 2 1 1 1 1
ln
1
M M
M M M M M M
n p b q b q q p b
p qp qp p q p p
? ?
? ?
? ?? ? ? ? ?
? ? ?? ?? ?? ? ? ?? ?
Now the assumption that ? ? ? ? ? ?? ?? ?2 2 2 1M Mp q q p? ?? ? ? ?  implies that
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? ? ? ?
? ?? ?
? ? ? ?
2 2
2
, 2 1 2 1 2 11
0M
M M M M M MM M
n p b q b q qb b
p qp p qp p qpp p
?
?
? ? ? ?? ?
? ? ? ? ?? ?? ? ? ?
Finally, when ? ?3 Mp? ?? , (22) implies that
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
? ?
min
2 2
min min
, 2 1 1 1
lnM M
M M M M M
n p b q b q b qqp p
p qp qp p p qp p
?? ? ? ?? ??? ? ?? ?? ?? ?
Since in this case min max 2Mp p qp? ? , it follows that
? ? ? ? ? ?
? ?? ?2
, 2 1 1
0
2
M
M M M M M
n p b q b q
p qp p qp qp
?? ? ?
? ? ?
? ?
.?
PROOF OF COROLLARY 1. If Mp   has been chosen so that ? ?2 Mp? ??  in a stable
equilibrium with bootleggers, according to Lemma 1 a sufficiently small decrease p?
in price Mp  will cause an increase n?  in the market penetration n.   In  this  case
? ? ? ?, M en p p n? ?? ? ? , and since ? ?,e Mn p?  and ? ?en ?  are continuous in ? , there
must be some ? ?? ?  for which ? ? ? ?, M en p p n? ?? ?? ? ? . Hence, a sufficiently small
decrease in Mp  causes an increase in ? ?Mp? . According to (30), both a decrease in
Mp  and an increase in ?  increase MR  when ? ?2 Mp? ?? , so that the considered
choice of Mp  cannot be optimal. ?
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2.  The previous corollary already demonstrated that the
revenue-maximizing choice of Mp  cannot be such that ? ?2 Mp? ?? , and  Lemma 1,
(30), and (32) easily imply that that the price ? ?2 Mp? ??  cannot be optimal either,
since for this price
0M M M M
M M M M
dR R R d R
dp p dp p
?
?
? ? ?? ? ? ?
? ? ?
.
  In order to demonstrate this proposition, it must still be shown that if the price set by
the monopolist has a value M Mp p? ?  for which ? ? ? ? ? ?2 3M M Mp p p? ? ?? ?? ? ? , then
M Mp p? ?  cannot be the revenue-maximizing price. In order to show this, we put
? ?Mp? ??? ?  and ? ? ? ?, M en n p n? ?? ?? ?? ? ,  and  assume  that ? ? ? ?2 3M Mp p? ? ?? ??? ? , and
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demonstrate that the revenue MR  is  not  maximal  for M Mp p? ?  by considering
separately the cases in which 1 2n ??  and 1 2n ?? .
  Assume first that 1 2n ?? , and let 0Mp   be the price which satisfies
(A2) 01 Mp n?? ?? ?
  Since for the given values of Mp?  and ??  the market penetration in the absence of the
bootleggers would be smaller than the actual market penetration, i.e. since
(A3) 1 Mp n?? ??? ? ,
it must be the case that, 0M Mp p? ? .  Next we shall demonstrate that the bootleggers
do not enter the market when the monopolist chooses the price 0M Mp p?  by
deducing a contradiction from the assumption that they do.
  Assume that 0M Mp p?  and the bootleggers send advertisements. In this case there
must be some ? ?? ? ?  for which ? ?
0
max , M Mp p
r b
? ? ?? ?
? . Obviously, in this case
? ? ? ?2 2 0M Mp p? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ? , and now (6) implies that ? ?max , Mpr b? ?  also  when
? ?? ? and Mp  has an arbitrary value in the interval 0,M Mp p? ?? ?? . Obviously, for all of
these values of Mp ? ? ? ?2 2M Mp p? ? ?? ?? ? , and one can now conclude from Lemma 1
that ? ?, 0M Mn p p?? ? ?  whenever 0M M Mp p p? ? ? . Hence,
? ? ? ?0 01 , ,M M Mp n p n p? ??? ? ?
? ? ??
This contradicts (A2), however. Hence, if the monopolist chooses the price 0Mp , the
bootleggers will not enter the market. In this case the resulting valuation parameter
? ?0Mp?  must nevertheless be at least ?? , because according to (A2) in the absence of
the bootleggers one of the equilibria of the model is such that 0M Mp p?  and ? ?? ? .
Hence, in this case the revenue of the monopolist 0MR  satisfies the condition
(A4) ? ?0 0 01M M MR p p ?? ? ? .
  On the other hand, for the price Mp?  the demand of the monopolist  is  smaller than
1 Mp ?? ?? , so that in this case the revenue of the monopolist must satisfy the condition
(A5) ? ? ? ?1M M M MR p p p?? ? ?? ? ?
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The assumption that 1 2n ??  and (A3) together imply that 0 2Mp ?? ? . However, the
expression ? ?1 M Mp p?? ?   is a decreasing function of Mp  when 2Mp ?? ? . Hence,
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?0 0 01 1M M M M M M M MR p p p p p R p? ?? ? ? ? ?? ?? ? ? .
In other words, if 1 2n ??  the revenue of the monopolist is increased if she lowers the
price  of  legitimate  copies  to  such  an  extent  that  the  bootleggers  do  not  enter  the
market.
  Assume now that 1 2n ?? . In this case we prove that M Mp p? ?  cannot be the optimal
choice by deducing a contradiction from the assumption that MR  receives a local
maximum when M Mp p? ? . Clearly, this assumption can only be valid if either
(A6) 0
M M
M
M p p
dR
dp
?
? ?
?? ?
? ? ?
or the function ? ? ? ?,M MM p pR ?  has  a  discontinuity  when M Mp p? ? . Also the latter
possibility must be taken into account, because according to Lemma 1 a decrease of
Mp  shifts the curve ? ?, Mn n p??  downwards when ? ? ? ?2 3M Mp p? ? ?? ?? ,  and it  is
conceivable that a decrease of Mp  might make the equilibrium market penetration
? ?Mp?   jump discontinuously  to  a  smaller  value,  in  which  case  also MR  would be
discontinuous.
  In what follows, we shall eliminate each of these possibilities in turn. Assume first
that (A6) was valid. Putting Mp? ?? , (30) implies that
? ?? ?
? ?
1 1
2 ln
1 1M
q
R b b
q
?
?
? ?? ?
? ? ? ?? ?? ?? ?
Obviously, this is an increasing function of ? , so that 0M MdR dp ?  is equivalent
with
(A7)
? ? 1
0M
M M M M M
d pd d
dp dp p dp p
?? ? ?? ?? ? ? ?? ?
? ?
and further with
(A8)
M M
d
dp p
? ??
Next it is observed that (A8) implies that
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(A9)
? ? ? ? 1
M MM M
e
e
M M M Mp pp p
dn d n
n
dp dp p B p
? ? ??
??
? ? ? ? ?? ? ?? ? ? ?
? ?? ?
? ??
? ?
and also that
1 1
M M
M Mp p
d
dp p? ?
?
? ?? ? ??? ?? ?
? ?? ? ? ?
On the other hand, (A7) implies that
? ? ? ?1 1 1
0
1
M M M M
M
M M Mp p p p
p q qd d
dp p dp
? ?
? ?
? ?
? ? ? ?? ? ? ?
? ?? ? ? ?? ?? ? ? ?? ?
When the two last results are inserted into (21), it turns out that
(A10)
? ? ? ?? ?
? ? ? ?? ?min
,
1 ,
1 , 1
   ln
M MM M
M M
M
M
M M p pp p
M
p p
M M M
dn p d
n p
dp dp
n p b d n
q p
p dp pq
?
?
?
?
?
??
?
? ? ? ?
? ? ?? ? ? ?
? ?? ?
? ?? ? ? ?
??
?
? ? ?
?? ?
Combining (A9) and (A10), it now follows that
? ? ? ?, 1
M M M M
e M
M M M Mp p p p
dn dn pn n
p dp dp p
? ?
? ?
? ? ? ? ?? ? ?? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?? ?
? ?
? ?
This contradicts the assumption that 1 2n ?? , however.
  Secondly, consider the possibility that ? ?Mp?  is discontinuous when M Mp p? ? . In
this case ? ?,Mn p ??  and ? ?en ?  must have the same slope when ? ?? ? , so that
(A11) ? ?? ? ? ?, 1M en p dn B n? ?? ? ? ?? ?? ? ? ? ?? ? ?? ?
It is readily calculated that
? ?
? ?? ?? ?
1
ln
1
M M
M M M
p q qp
p p q p
?
? ? ? ?
? ?? ?? ? ?? ?? ? ? ? ?? ?
Using this result, it is easy to see that (21) implies that
(A12)
? ? ? ?? ?
? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ?
? ?
? ?
1 ,,
1 , 12 1 1
    ln
2 11
MM
M M M
MM M
M M
n pn p
n p b p qb q p q
pqp q p
b qn b
qp p
? ? ? ?
? ?
??
? ?
? ? ?
? ?? ? ?
? ? ? ?
? ?
?
? ?? ??? ?
? ?? ?? ? ? ?? ?? ? ? ?
? ? ? ? ?? ? ?? ??? ? ? ? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?
??? ? ?
?
? ?
?
??
? ?? ? ?
? ? ? ?? ?
?
? ? ? ?? ?
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The assumption ? ? ? ?2M Mp p? ??? ?  implies that ? ? ? ?? ?2 1 2Mp q q ?? ? ? ?? ,  and  also
that
? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ?2 1 2 2Mp q q q q? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? .
Plugging these results into (A12), it turns out that
(A13)
? ? ? ? ? ?
2 2
, 2 21 1Mn p b q q bn n
q q? ?
?
? ? ? ? ?
?
? ? ?? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ??? ? ?
? ? ?
? ? ? ?
Together the conditions (A11) and (A13) imply that
? ?, 1Mn pn n
? ?
?
?? ?
?
?? ? ?? ?? ??? ? ?
?? ?
? ?
which contradicts the assumption that 1 2n ?? .  This  eliminates  the  possibility  that
? ?Mp?  would be discontinuous when M Mp p? ? , and completes the proof .?
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3. If q is fixed and the advertising cost b approaches zero, for
each Mp  the market penetration of the product approaches 1, and max? ?? , where
max A B? ? ? . In this case the revenue of the monopolist approaches the revenue from
the consumers who prefer buying a legitimate copy to getting a pirate copy for free.
I.e., it approaches
? ? max
1
1
M
M
p
p
q ?
? ?
?? ?? ??? ?
Hence, the revenue of the monopolist when Mp  is chosen optimally approaches
? ? max1
4
q ??
On the other hand, for a fixed value of ?  which is smaller than max?  the revenue of
the monopolist cannot be larger than ? ?1 M Mp p?? , which further implies that it
cannot be larger than 4? . Hence, for each q the  revenue-maximizing  choice  of b
must be such that it leads to a market penetration which satisfies the condition
? ? max1
4 4
q ?? ??
Hence, the valuation ?  in the revenue-maximizing equilibrium approaches max?  when
0q ? , which means that the market penetration of the product approaches 1.
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Trivially, this can only be the case if the minimum price minp  and the advertising cost
b approach zero. ?
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4. Denote the revenue-maximizing price and the
corresponding valuation parameter value be ,M optp  and opt?  in the absence of piracy,
so that the maximum revenue in the absence of piracy is given by
(A14) ,, , 1
M opt
M opt M opt
opt
p
R p
?
? ?
? ?? ?? ?? ?
  Corollary 1 states if the corresponding values are Mp  and ?  in an equilibrium with
pirates, the monopolist can increase her revenue by lowering the price Mp  if
? ? ? ? ? ?? ?? ?2 2 2 1M Mp q q p? ?? ? ? ? .  Hence,  if  for  some q the revenue-maximizing
equilibrium is an equilibrium with pirates, in it the price Mp  satisfies  the  condition
? ?? ? ? ?? ?2 1 2Mp q q ?? ? ? , implying that the revenue of the monopolist can be at
most
(A15) ? ?? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ? max1 2 1 2 2 1 2MM M MpR p p q q q q? ??
? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ?
? ?
where max A B? ? ? . Since (A14) does not depend on q, it must for sufficiently large
values of q be larger than the revenue MR  which satisfies (A15).?
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